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Abstract  
 
Until recently climate change adaptation was not on the agenda of international 
climate negotiations. Only at the 7th Conference of the Parties in 2001 in Marrakech, 
the particular vulnerability of developing countries to climate change and the need for 
adaptation was recognised. At the COP 15 in 2009 in Copenhagen the importance of 
the private sector in funding adaptation projects was emphasised amid the global 
economic crisis and the public sector’s inability to finance adaptation projects alone. 
In the Middle East water scarcity presents one of the largest challenges of the future, 
worsened by climate change. This thesis highlights the importance of adaptation to 
climate change, with particular focus on the water sector in the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan, a country which has been identified as a prime example of an emerging 
economy and Middle Income Country with one of the lowest freshwater availabilities 
per capita in the world. Despite water scarcity, water usage and management is 
inefficient, levels of unaccounted-for-water are high and agriculture consumes 
around two thirds of water resources on extremely low tariffs. At the same time, 
Jordan’s economy has suffered considerably under the economic crisis, and as an 
emerging economy is not able to independently finance projects to improve water 
management and access to safe drinking water over the long term. Jordan will 
therefore be heavily dependent on foreign development aid as well as private sector 
investments. Consequently, Jordan was chosen by the author as it makes a good 
case study for analysis. The thesis aims to identify the drivers and barriers to private 
sector responses to water scarcity in Jordan and will produce a set of policy 
recommendations for attracting private sector capital to invest in, what has been 
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identified as, adaptation technologies in a resource poor country. These guidelines 
will be useful to policymakers and private companies alike. The recommendations 
given herein provide a basis for enhancing private sector investments in the water 
sector in Jordan. Though they are specific to Jordan, these recommendations are 
valid and can be translated to other scenarios under which a Middle Income Country 
government aims to attract private sector finance for climate change adaptation 
projects provided that similar political, economic, cultural and environmental 
conditions prevail: 
1. Eliminate corruption 
2. Create long-term prospects for investors (especially under uncertainty about 
climate change and its effects) 
3. Build confidence for investors 
4. Develop a solid legislative framework and risk-sharing scheme 
5. Adaptation makes business sense: open adaptation to climate change as a 
new market for innovation and investments 
6. Achieve high levels of transparency in the award of projects and contracts 
7. Develop a regulatory framework that defines the water consumption for 
agriculture (proportionate to GDP and available water resources) 
8. Ensure consistency and coherence in policy-making. Avoid an implementation 
deficit 
9. Frame a trend in climate that requires an adaptation strategy in the context of 
climate change 
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1. Introduction 
 
Water, you have no taste, no colour, no scent,  
one cannot describe you,  
but only enjoys you without knowing you.  
You are not something that is needed for life; you are life itself.  
Your fulﬁllment of the sense of happiness,  
that, cannot be explained by senses only.  
With you all the powers from  
which we have distinct counsels come back to us.  
You are the most precious wealth in the world  
and yet you are also the most fragile one.  
So pure, emerge from the womb of the earth.  
 
("Wind, Sand and Stars", Antoine de Saint-Exupery, 1939) 
 
 
Until recently1 climate change adaptation was not on the agenda of international 
climate negotiations. Only at the 7th Conference of the Parties in 2001 in Marrakech, 
the particular vulnerability of developing countries to climate change and the need for 
adaptation was recognised. However, research has shown that adaptation will be 
costly and there is no policy or mechanism that will close the inherent funding gap in 
the context of climate change adaptation. At the COP 15 in 2009 the importance of 
the private sector in funding adaptation projects was emphasised amid the global 
economic crisis and the public sector’s inability to finance adaptation projects alone. 
                                                          
1
 At the time of writing, March 2013  
25 
 
However, a limited amount of research is dedicated to the way the private sector 
could be mobilised to fund adaptation projects; the role of the private sector is 
generally rather seen within the context of mitigation rather than adaptation. 
However, in large parts of the world even immediate mitigation and stabilisation of 
greenhouse gas emissions would come too late to avoid the mainly adverse effects 
of climate change. Hence, the focus for many years to come will have to shift – at 
least partially – towards the adaptation of societies to climate change, in order to 
abate the most adverse effects and consequences of climate change-induced 
weather events and extremes.  
 
In the debate around funding for adaptation projects the focus is generally on least 
developed countries, as these are considered the most vulnerable to climate change 
effects whilst at the same time also the least capable to adapt. However, 
geographically many countries that are categorised Middle Income Countries are 
going to be equally affected by climate change and its effects, yet they lack the 
financial means and technical capabilities to adapt and hence remain equally 
exposed and vulnerable to global warming. It was therefore decided that the focus of 
this research would be directed towards a Middle Income Country.  
 
In the Middle East water scarcity presents one of the biggest challenges of the 
future, worsened by climate change, in addition to demographic changes, political 
conflicts and on-going economic development. This thesis highlights the importance 
of adaptation to climate change, with particular focus on the water sector in the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a country which has been identified as a prime 
example of an emerging economy and Middle Income Country with one of the lowest 
26 
 
freshwater availabilities per capita in the world. Despite water scarcity, water usage 
and management is inefficient, levels of unaccounted-for-water are high and 
agriculture consumes around two thirds of water resources on extremely low tariffs. 
At the same time, Jordan’s economy has suffered considerably under the economic 
crisis, and as an emerging economy is not able to afford projects to improve water 
management and access to safe drinking water over the long term. Jordan will 
therefore remain heavily dependent on foreign development aid in addition to new 
and additional private sector investments. The thesis aims to identify the main 
drivers and barriers to private sector responses to water scarcity in Jordan and will 
produce a set of policy recommendations for attracting private sector capital to invest 
in, what has been identified as, adaptation technologies in a resource poor country. 
These guidelines will be useful to policymakers and private companies alike and will 
provide international development organisations and institutions with incentives to 
increase private sector involvement in project planning.  
 
1.2 Thesis structure  
The rationale of the research, accompanied by a brief overview on the research 
topic, is outlined in this introductory chapter. It presents in short the background of 
the research and lays the foundation for the research undertaken for this thesis.  
 
The methodology chapter explains how the theoretical framework was developed 
and designed and subsequently validated. The chapter highlights the methods that 
were applied to identify the relevant stakeholders and how the interview and survey 
process was organised and delivered.  
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The literature review in chapter 4 identifies the most relevant and accepted literature 
in the field of climate change adaptation and highlights the shortcomings with respect 
to climate finance, in particular in Middle Income Countries. Furthermore, the chapter 
emphasises that climate change adaptation as a policy area is still in its infancy and 
that further research will have to be conducted in the future in order to develop 
coherent and effective adaptation strategies and to derive best-practice approaches 
to adaptation finance and private sector involvement.  
 
Chapter 5 investigates some of the trends in climate change that will urgently require 
an adaptation strategy and it identifies water scarcity as the trend that will build the 
focus of this research. It does so by applying a criteria-based approach, which is 
developed and described therein.  
 
The chapter that follows establishes the different approaches to the question of 
funding responsibilities in the context of climate change adaptation. It discusses 
responsibility versus burden-based approaches, as well as concepts such as 
incentives for emitters, moral hazard, just desert, loss spreading and distributive 
benefits. The chapter concludes that the private sector will increasingly play a crucial 
role in the mobilisation of funding for adaptation-related projects.  
 
Chapter 7 analyses the context of the chosen case study, the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan. It reviews the economic and social trends and their impacts on water 
resources in the country, and highlights the additional pressure climate change adds 
to water availabilities. Furthermore, the chapter aims to place water into the broader 
socio-economic context in order to better understand the underlying reasons for 
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specific policy decisions or inaction in certain areas. The chapter also touches upon 
water tariff structures and the demand-side management of water resources.  
 
Derived from the previous chapters, the literature and extensive research, the 
subsequent chapter then develops a theoretical framework according to which the 
drivers and barriers to private sector investments in the water sector in Jordan were 
identified and subsequently verified in the stakeholder process. The development of 
the drivers and barriers is derived from an analysis of past types of instruments that 
were applied for funding climate change adaptation.  
 
Chapter 9 presents a summary of the findings from the stakeholder validation, 
primarily carried out in the form of interviews in Jordan as well as through survey 
completion by private sector companies. The validation occurred over a period of 
several months; thereof several weeks were spent in Jordan. 
 
Lastly, chapter 10 provides a discussion of the findings from chapter 9 and develops 
a set of policy recommendations, according to which decision-making for attracting 
private sector responses can be facilitated. Furthermore, the policy 
recommendations as developed in this research mean to encourage private sector 
engagement for adaptation-related projects, but also to enhance the attractiveness 
of a given country, i.e. Jordan, for foreign investors over the long-term.  
 
The concluding chapter of this thesis will summarise the research and will highlight 
topics for further research and analysis. It will also remind us that research revolving 
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around the topic of water, or rather the lack thereof, is a very complex topic that can 
be researched from various academic disciplines and angles.  
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2. Aim and Objectives 
 
2.1 Aim 
The aim of this thesis is to address the challenge of climate change adaptation 
finance and its implications for adaptation projects and programmes in Middle 
Income Countries. The focus is hereby water scarcity in the Hashemite Kingdom 
Jordan and the responses of the private sector to climate finance.  
 
2.2 Objectives  
The main objectives of this thesis are as follows:  
- Critical assessment of the existing literature and policy on climate change 
adaptation.  
- Evaluation of the existing frameworks and mechanisms of financing climate change 
adaptation. 
- Assessment of the potential role of the private sector, as an approach to relieve the 
pressures associated with increased funding gaps in climate finance.  
- Evaluation of the drivers and barriers associated with private sector investments in 
climate change adaptation.  
- Based on the outcomes of the above objectives, development of a framework and 
policy recommendations to aid decision-making in climate change adaptation 
finance, with regards to the private sector, using the case of the water sector in 
Jordan.  
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2.3 Significance of the work  
The significance of the thesis rests on the foundation that it critically assesses the 
inherent funding gap for climate change adaptation projects, in particular in Middle 
Income Countries and highlights the essential role of the private sector in financing 
such projects. In this regard, it is submitted that it makes original contributions to 
knowledge in relation to: 
 Climate change adaptation finance in the context of Middle Income 
Countries. 
 The role of the private sector in closing the funding gap for climate change 
adaptation finance. 
 Jordan as a case study and example of a Middle Income Country that needs 
to adapt to water scarcity. 
 The drivers and barriers for private sector investors to invest in climate 
change adaptation projects in the water sector in Jordan. 
 
Adaptation was not for a long time considered in international climate change 
research; however, in recent years, research and policy development is considering 
adaptation as an ever more necessary option. Although some literature addresses 
the problem of insufficient finance available to cover adaptation, the majority focuses 
on how to stimulate finance for the least developed countries. Thereby, a large group 
of countries remains neglected, albeit lacking the financial and technical capabilities 
of adapting through their own means. Furthermore, although the role of the private 
sector has increasingly been highlighted in the literature since late 2010 and early 
2011, there is still no agreement how private sector involvement could be stimulated 
and regulated. This demonstrates and justifies the necessity and need for research 
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into the role of the private sector in climate change adaptation finance, as well as 
into the opportunities for Middle Income Countries. This thesis makes a significant 
contribution to this by identifying a climate change trend that requires a Middle 
Income Country to develop an adaptation strategy and subsequently assesses the 
opportunities for private sector involvement as well as highlighting the inherent 
drivers and barriers to investments.  Each chapter constitutes an individual, unique 
part of this assessment with chapter 9 and 10 assembling the different parts into a 
whole in order to address the drivers and barriers and to provide policy guidelines 
according to which policymakers could attract private sector investments in order to 
drive adaptation projects forward. Furthermore, what has been developed in this 
research can be applied in other contexts; it facilitates decision-making procedures 
and enables policymakers to better understand how policy decisions can be made in 
an environment context, whilst driving business investments, i.e. how to use 
adaptation as a driver for economic development.  
 
The theoretical framework that was developed throughout this research was 
subsequently validated through a thorough stakeholder process, which has enriched 
this thesis with unique insights, information and cultural aspects.   
 
This research will furthermore provide expert knowledge and insights into the 
particular case study chosen for this thesis; during the time of conducting this 
research (April 2010 – April 2013), but especially since 2012 several international 
organisations and institutions, as well as academic research groups have identified 
and expanded their work to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as a prime example of 
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a Middle Income Country affected by climate change2. This once more highlights the 
importance and topical nature of the research.  
 
2.4 Publications 
Parts of the chapters of this thesis have been published as a peer reviewed chapter 
in: Makuch, K. and Pereira, R. (2012), Environmental and Energy Law, Wiley-
Blackwell, as well as in various conference presentations, thereby reflecting the 
originality and relevance of the research work. Part of this research has also been 
incorporated in a draft proposal for an EU Climate Change Adaptation Directive, 
whilst other parts are currently in the process for submission to a recognised 
international journal.  
 
2.5 Conference attendance and presentations  
 
 “Governing Climate Engineering - A Transdisciplinary Summer School”, July 
12th – 16th 2010, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and 
International Law, Karl-Ruprecht Universität Heidelberg, Germany 
 “24th International Climate Policy Workshop”, May 3rd – 4th 2012, Albert-
Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg and Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy 
Systems, Germany 
 “2nd Water Forum”, September 10th – 12th 2012, Euro-Mediterranean 
Association for Cooperation and Development and Hamburg Chamber of 
Commerce, Germany 
 
                                                          
2
 This includes, but is not limited to: the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ); the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); Heidelberg Centre for the 
Environment (HCE) Research Group I part of the Karl-Ruprecht Universität Heidelberg.  
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2.6 Conference papers accepted for: 
 24th International Climate Policy Workshop, May 3rd – 4th 2012, Albert-
Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg and Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy 
Systems, Germany: “Private sector investments in adaptation technologies: 
the case of Jordan” 
 26th International Climate Policy Workshop, April 25th – 26th 2013, Climate 
KIC, EDF and CDC Climat Research, Paris, France 
 1st Global Sustainability Institute Research Conference, May 15th 2013, Anglia 
Ruskin University, Cambridge, UK: “Sustainable Technologies to alleviate 
water scarcity: the case of Jordan” 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Thesis Aim 
The aim of this thesis is to develop and extend the understanding for policy makers 
and companies of the inherent drivers and barriers for investments in Middle Income 
Countries (MICs) under a certain set of given circumstances. The research also 
examines whether theoretical drivers and barriers (i.e. those identified but not tested 
in the literature) are in fact real. The research hereby draws on a selected case 
study: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, hereinafter, Jordan. The research 
contains three main aspects:  
- the development of an innovative methodology  
- the application of the methodology to the case study and  
- the evaluation of the case study 
 
The methodology for this research was developed through an extensive analysis of 
the existing literature about climate change adaptation finance as well as about the 
inherent obstacles and opportunities of private sector finance in given countries. This 
process allowed extrapolating a set of drivers and barriers that had been identified in 
the literature, though not validated in a context-specific environment. This 
methodology was subsequently applied to the identified case study; the drivers and 
barriers were validated, or not as the case may be, in stakeholder engagement with 
the private and public sector as well as with the third sector. The results of the 
theoretical framework and its subsequent validation process were then used to 
develop a set of recommendations for the Jordanian Government to enhance private 
sector investments in climate change adaptation-related projects and technologies.  
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In doing so, the research required the development of a theoretical framework which 
was tested, evaluated and analysed by the case study and by stakeholder validation. 
The methodology applied in this thesis incorporates a combination of selected 
design features, which are commonly applied in evaluation and assessment 
exercises (Patton, 2002). In order to test the methodology, it was applied to the case 
study mentioned above, which serves as a prime example of a country belonging to 
the group of MICs, vulnerable to and affected by the adverse effects of climate 
change and incapable of adapting to climate change effects through its own financial 
means.  
 
3.2 The methodological approach 
This chapter presents the methodological approach that was applied to achieve the 
following:  
 To identify the stakeholders involved,  
 to develop the surveys,  
 to arrange and conduct semi-structured interviews,  
 to carry out secondary data collection and  
 to analyse the findings within the theoretical framework  
 to validate the said findings and framework 
 
The evaluation methodology applied in this thesis draws on methods derived from 
conventional risk analysis approaches as applied in business and policy-
development (Rios-Morales et al., 2009). This, in combination with the reviewed 
literature, has led to the selection of a set of criteria that help identify the risks and 
opportunities for investments in the water sector in an MIC. These criteria are 
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derived mainly from qualitative methods and take into account factors such as the 
political and economic environment, technology innovation and equity to 
stakeholders. The primary purpose of this approach is to ensure that as many 
aspects of investment decisions in adaptation technologies as possible are analysed 
and evaluated adequately.  
 
Patton (2002) has identified two categories of issues that need to be identified when 
developing a policy evaluation framework (see table 1 below). Although this research 
does not aim at evaluating a specific policy framework, Patton’s framework is applied 
for the purpose of structuring the procedural method for the methodological 
framework applied in this research. Not all conceptual or technical issues as 
identified by Patton can be applied here, but the elements applied to the 
methodological framework can be derived from table 1 below: 
 
Table 1: Developing a policy evaluation framework (Patton, 2002) 
Conceptual issues Technical issues 
Identify relevant stakeholders Sampling strategy 
Purpose of analysis Comparisons (if any) to be made 
Approach, model or framework to be used 
to direct the analysis 
Type of data to be collected, from whom, when 
and how 
Primary evaluation/analysis 
questions/issues 
Level of accuracy required, how to ensure 
accuracy and quality of data 
Any political considerations to be taken 
into account 
Address concerns over validity and reliability 
Standards and criteria against which the 
analysis will be judged 
  
Resources available for the analysis 
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The approach as outlined in table 1 was largely executed in this thesis. Both, 
conceptual and technical issues were identified before the onset of the 
research and regularly reviewed throughout the research process.  
 
Before the research process was initiated, the purpose of the analysis as well 
as the approach and the primary evaluation and analysis questions were 
developed; whilst on the technical side, it was decided that for the purpose of 
this research no comparative approach would be taken. The other issues as 
listed in table 1 were developed during different stages of the research 
process and reviewed where necessary.  Due to the largely qualitative nature 
of this research, concerns over validity and reliability where addressed 
throughout and after the conclusion of the research process.   
 
 
3.3 Definitions of terms frequently used in this thesis 
A variety of terms and expressions common in the science of climate change 
adaptation and related policy and economic instruments are referred to in this thesis. 
In many cases there is not one commonly accepted definition of such a term, and 
hence the table below offers an overview of the definitions taken as a basis for the 
analysis in this thesis.  
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Table 2: Commonly used terms 
Term Definition 
Climate Change A change of climate which is attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition 
of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to 
natural climate variability observed over comparable 
time periods. (UNFCCC) 
Climate Change Adaptation Any adjustment in natural or human systems in 
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their 
effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial 
opportunities. (IPCC) 
Vulnerability to Climate Change The degree to which a system is susceptible to, or 
unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, 
including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability 
is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of 
climate variation to which a system is exposed, its 
sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity. (IPCC) 
Adaptive Capacity The property of a system to adjust its characteristics or 
behaviour, in order to expand its coping range under 
existing climate variability or future climate conditions. 
The ability to design and implement effective 
adaptation strategies, or to react to evolving hazards 
and stresses so as to reduce the likelihood of the 
occurrence and/or the magnitude of harmful outcomes 
resulting from climate-related hazards. (IPCC) 
Water Scarcity  Water scarcity occurs when demand for water 
exceeds the supply. 
 Chronic water scarcity annual renewable 
freshwater resources per capita = 1,000 – 
1,700m³.  
 Anything below 1,000m³ = beyond the 
manageable capacity (according to the 
Falkenmark Index) 
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3.4 Research strategy 
This research contains three main aspects: 
 The development of an innovative methodology that allows for an evaluation 
of the drivers and barriers to investments in adaptation technologies in a 
Middle Income Country3 
 The application of the methodology to the case study 
 The evaluation of the case study  
 
Figure 1 provides an overview to the procedure that was applied to execute the 
research. An extensive literature review was conducted (see chapter 4) to cover the 
key areas in this field of research and to point out eventual research gaps. The 
outcomes of this review are used to inform about already existing adaptation policies 
and serve to point out the lack of a consistent and coherent strategy to climate 
change adaptation, as highlighted by the example of water scarcity in Jordan.  
 
3.5 The case study 
The case study was subsequently selected according to a set of criteria that 
reflected the urgency for coherent adaptation policies under a particular climate 
change trend, which is exacerbated by climate change. Furthermore, the case study 
selection needed to be based on its representative capacity in a global context and 
serve as a prime example of the climate change trend chosen, as well as of its 
economic classification. Eventually, then, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was 
chosen as the case study for this research. It is not assumed that research findings 
                                                          
3
 Economies are divided according to 2011 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas 
method. The groups are: low income, $1,025 or less; lower middle income, $1,026 - $4,035; upper 
middle income, $4,036 - $12,475; and high income, $12,476 or more. Retrieved from: 
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications, 11.07.2012  
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from this case study are generalisable or transferable to other MICs. This is for other 
experts to decide according to their national research interests.  
 
3.6 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework was subsequently applied to the chosen case study, using 
a variety of mainly qualitative and quantitative methods that would allow for a 
thorough assessment of the case study and validation of the theoretical framework. 
These methods included semi-structured interviews with public and third sector 
stakeholders and survey participation with private sector stakeholders. The surveys 
included both multiple choice and open-ended questions. The final stage of the 
research required an assessment of the chosen case study in light of the theoretical 
framework and the data sourced from the literature. This enabled the identification of 
the inherent opportunities (drivers) and risks (barriers) for private sector companies 
to invest in adaptation technologies, in the context of an ever-growing need for 
private sector finance in climate change adaptation, for developing a policy 
recommendation framework in Jordan.  
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Figure 1: Research strategy  
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3.7 Inductive approach 
The research strategy employed in this research is predominantly of an inductive 
research approach, with elements of the deductive approach. The inductive 
approach is predominantly used and applied by social scientists, whereas the 
deductive approach is primarily applied in scientific research (Trochim, 2000; 
Saunders, 2000).  Table 3 below highlights the key characteristics and elements of 
both the inductive and the deductive approach. 
 
Table 3: Deductive and inductive research methods (Saunders, 2000) 
Deductive approach (top-down) Inductive approach (bottom-up)  
Based on scientific principles To gain understanding of what meaning 
humans attach to specific events 
Aims to explain the relationship between 
variables 
Aims to achieve closer understanding of the 
research context 
Quantitative data Qualitative data 
Researcher is often independent of what is 
being researched 
Researcher is part of the research 
Needs sufficient sample size to enable 
generalisation of conclusion 
Less need to generalise findings 
Application of concepts to ensure clarity of 
definition 
Flexible structure to enable changes of 
emphasis while research progresses 
 
Although an inductive approach has predominantly been applied in this research, 
certain elements of the deductive approach have also been incorporated in order to 
overcome the limitations of a purely inductive research strategy. Furthermore, to 
ensure that the research goes beyond a description of the case study, quantitative 
and qualitative data accumulation was conducted to allow for critical analysis and 
comparative elements.  
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3.8 Research questions 
Following a thorough analysis and examination of the existing, relevant literature as 
well as policy documents and pieces of legislation, it became apparent that there is 
still a large research gap in the field of the role and the opportunities of private sector 
finance in the context of climate change adaptation finance. Although existing 
literature points to the necessity of private sector finance in the implementation of 
climate change adaptation projects, there is no thorough analysis of the inherent 
risks and opportunities of private sector companies to invest in a Middle Income 
Country. The absence of such analysis and related models or examples led to the 
identification of the main research problem:  
 Private sector finance is needed to bridge the financing gap in climate change 
adaptation projects; however, this is not adequately addressed nor explored 
for companies to make informed decisions and for governments to know how 
to facilitate such investments.  
 
Derived from this research problem, the following research questions have been 
developed:  
1. What should the Jordanian Government do to attract and to facilitate private 
sector investments in adaptation technologies?  
2. What should companies consider prior to agreeing to such investments?  
3. What are private sector responses to climate change adaptation projects?  
 
In order to adequately address these rather broad research questions, sub-questions 
were developed to gain a better understanding.  
1. Why do private sector companies invest in certain countries but not in others? 
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2. Why is private sector finance needed? 
3. What are the drivers and barriers to mobilising private sector finance for 
adaptation-related projects? 
 
3.9 Literature review 
The purpose of the literature review is to gain a solid understanding of the subject 
area. The literature review should furthermore help identify certain trends within the 
subject area, point towards the most relevant aspects of the subject area and help to 
highlight any research gaps. Moreover, the literature review serves as a decision-
making-tool for the researcher to decide upon the most suitable approach and 
method for a specific research question. In addition to highlighting research gaps, 
the review of existing literature should also help the researcher to identify the 
weaknesses in existing research designs, if any are available. In the context of this 
research, the literature review identified the following shortcomings in existing 
literature: 
 Adaptation to climate change as a research topic is still in its infancy 
 Adaptation to climate change is often regarded a local rather than a global 
problem 
 The costs for adaptation projects have been estimated, but there is no 
reference how those costs can be covered and by whom and when 
 Focus in the context of climate change adaptation is the least developed 
countries (LDCs), MICs are generally ignored 
 Existing literature points towards the role of the private sector but does not 
specify in which form private sector finance can be utilised  
 
46 
 
The literature review analysed previous academic work in the subject area, analysed 
policy documents and individual pieces of legislation. The literature critique focused 
on the different forms of private sector finance that could enable sufficient and 
adequate adaptation projects globally. It furthermore focused on the role of Middle 
Income Countries in an adaptation context and concluded that the focus is 
predominantly weighted towards Low Income Countries as well as local adaptation 
strategies. It also found that a geographical area that is of geo-political and economic 
high importance to the European Union and the United States is neglected in many 
climate change adaptation discussions, i.e. the Middle East. Albeit, water scarcity 
has been a matter of high importance and much discussion in an academic context, 
this has predominantly evolved around geo-political and security concerns in specific 
regions of the world.  For the purpose of this research, policy documents and reports 
were analysed to gain a broad understanding of the matter at hand; this included 
international reports such as the Stern Review (2006) as well as national briefings 
and policy strategy papers produced by the Jordanian Government and its agencies. 
It was noted that over the course of the research adaptation to climate change and 
the question of how to mobilise sufficient finance has gained in prominence.   
 
3.10 Selection of case study 
The approach to the research was a case study in order to test and validate the 
theoretical framework that has been derived from extensive literature analysis. The 
case study is seen as a tool to achieve more understanding on a subject matter and 
to strengthen and support an argument. In particular, social scientists make wide use 
of the case study as a research method, in order to examine real life scenarios and 
hence provide the basis for the application of ideas under different scenarios (Soy, 
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1997). According to Yin (1994) the case study is suitable for studying complex social 
phenomena within their real-life context. Critics of the case study method argue that 
one case or a small number of comparative cases cannot form the basis for 
generalisation, while others argue that exposure to the study of one particular case 
may bias the outcome and analysis of the conclusions (Giddens, in Yin, 1994; Tellis, 
1997).  However, as Yin and Soy argue, the purpose of the case study is to 
generalise theoretical propositions and to offer explanations. We are inclined to 
follow the non-generalisable position and leave it to experts for other states to 
evaluate the generalisability of our findings beyond the case study state Jordan. 
Table 4 summarises the criteria according to which the case study in this research 
has been selected. 
 
Table 4: Criteria for case study selection 
Criteria Definition Rationale 
Climate Change A trend that requires an 
adaptation strategy 
A natural 
phenomena/circumstance, 
which is exacerbated by 
climate change and requires 
adaptation 
Geographical location A country that forms part of 
the Middle Income Countries 
group 
To direct focus to MICs  
(particularly Jordan) that are 
often neglected in 
international climate change 
negotiations, yet do not have 
the capacity to adapt to 
climate change 
Natural resources Choice of country that is not 
resource rich 
Resource rich countries have 
a competitive advantage to 
attract investors  
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Applying these criteria led to the identification of one case study:  
 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Jordan)  
 
At the outset of this research, two other possible case studies that were considered 
were Egypt and Palestine. However, due to the political instability and political 
sensitivity (respectively) in the two countries it was decided to focus on Jordan. Even 
these two points may militate against the generalisability of results from the Jordan 
case study. That is a matter for Egyptian and Palestinian authorities to determine.  
 
3.11 Identification of stakeholders 
In order to be able to develop a comprehensive questionnaire in preparation for the 
semi-structured interviews as well as for the company surveys the most relevant 
stakeholders were identified (see table 23 and Appendix). In case study research 
purposive sampling is often applied due to the highly complex nature of the research 
area (see chapter 7). Purposive sampling allows the researchers to apply their own 
judgement in identifying the most suitable stakeholders, with adequate knowledge, in 
a specific subject area (Patton, 1990). Purposive sampling was considered the best 
approach for this specific research, given the level of technical expertise required by 
stakeholders in order to be able to participate in the interviews or to complete the 
survey. Due to the complexity of the research area, it was decided that semi-
structured interviews would be conducted with the public sector entities, whereas 
surveys would be emailed to private sector companies.  
 
Governmental and other public sector stakeholders included multiple government 
ministries in Jordan, NGOs, foreign aid agencies, development banks, consultancies 
as well as local associations, individual academics and humanitarian funds. These 
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stakeholders were identified through literature analysis, policy documents, referral 
and websites.  
Private sector companies were predominantly identified through web-based research 
and through the analysis of project reports. Due to the sectoral nature4 of the case 
study only a small number of participating companies could be identified. These 
stakeholders were subsequently divided into three further groups: 
 Private sector companies that have operation in the MENA region 
 Private sector companies that have operation in Jordan 
 Private sector companies that do not operate neither in Jordan nor in the 
MENA region 
 
A complete list of stakeholders5 can be found in the Appendix of this thesis.  
 
3.12 Questionnaire design 
Questionnaires were sent to all private sector stakeholders via email. A copy of the 
questionnaire can be found in the Appendix. The same questionnaire was sent to the 
three groups identified earlier. After developing the questionnaire, it was peer-
reviewed by PhD researchers, academics and consultants alike. The feedback that 
was provided was used to amend the content, the format and style of the survey. 
Having identified 62 companies to which to questionnaire would be sent, each 
company was contacted via email and phone initially, in order to obtain the contact 
                                                          
4
 Companies that were chosen in the context of this study are companies operating in the water 
sector: water supply companies, water solutions companies and water technology companies  
5
 A full list of participating stakeholders can be found in the Appendix, but individual names are 
withheld for confidentiality reasons, although they can be made available to the examiners in 
confidence at the examination as required. 
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details of a participant with enough expertise to complete the questionnaire. Upon 
receiving these contact details, a survey was emailed.  
 
The majority of the 14 questions were closed questions, with some options 
presented in a ranking scale. Some of the questions were open questions and 
allowed respondents to comment and to provide personal feedback. The advantage 
of allowing respondents to comment is that ideas are expressed freely without prior 
predefined choice by the questionnaire designer. However, the use of open ended 
questions also often results in the respondent reacting spontaneously without 
necessarily reflecting actual company policy. There is a debate in social science 
research whether to include closed questions or open questions or both types in 
questionnaire design. Closed questions are usually more difficult to construct for the 
researcher, but easy to analyse whilst open questions are easy to develop but rather 
difficult to analyse. Closed questions are often used within quantitative research 
approaches while open questions are more common in qualitative research, where 
the focus is often on a particular case study. For the purpose of this research it was 
therefore decided to present a combination of both types of questions. In particular, 
due to the nature of the research topic, open questions were considered valuable 
due to the freedom and spontaneity of responses, the opportunity to probe and to 
test hypotheses about ideas or awareness of a particular topic (Bird, 2009).  
 
All questionnaire respondents indicated that they would like their responses to be 
treated confidentially and remain anonymous, i.e. that their answers would not be 
seen by any third party and that individuals and companies would not be named and 
that publication of the research would not lead to the subsequent identification of an 
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organisation or an individual. Anonymity and confidentiality is often regarded as an 
“instrumental part of research ethics” (Whelan, 2007). Whether it makes the 
responses more or less reliable cannot be determined with full confidence, but it is 
generally perceived to increase comfort levels of the questionnaire or interview 
participant, whilst at the same time answers may be more subjective (Hyman, 1944; 
Ong and Weiss, 2000).  
 
 A list of participating institutions, organisations and companies can be found in the 
Appendix. The names of individuals are withheld for confidentiality reasons, though 
they can be made available to the examiners in confidence at the examination as 
required. Questionnaire participants were asked if they would participate in a follow-
up interview, however, with only one company representative agreeing no 
respondent gave consent. It was thus considered obsolete to conduct a follow-up 
interview with only one respondent. 
 
According to Saunders et al. (2000) response rates for business-oriented 
questionnaires have reportedly been as low as 15 – 20%. In this research it was 
found that responses were generated only after multiple persistent enquiries on part 
of the researcher and that numerous companies declined completing the survey due 
to company policies, lack of personnel capacity and time and even lack of expertise 
in the chosen case study’s geographical area. This was anticipated and considerable 
effort to attempt to get responses was made. An initial list of 62 companies was 
compiled; first contact was made by email describing the research project and 
purpose and to enquire about the contact details of the most suitable contact person 
to complete the survey. If no replies were received within a week to ten days, a 
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follow-up email was sent and then usually contact was made via phone. It was found 
that in the majority of cases, responses were delayed, calls not returned and emails 
ignored. Therefore, the response rate to the surveys was lower than anticipated.  
 
3.13 Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted over a period of three weeks in Jordan. 
A detailed list of participants is listed in the Appendix. Interviews were conducted 
with governmental and other public sector stakeholders including multiple 
government ministries in Jordan, NGOs, foreign aid agencies, development banks, 
consultancies as well as local associations, individual academics and humanitarian 
funds.  In preparation for the interviews an extensive literature review was conducted 
in order to be familiar with each organisation’s profile and expertise.  
 
Usually, a semi-structured interview begins with more general questions or open 
questions (Bird, 2009). Relevant topics are initially identified and the possible 
relationship between these topics and other more specific issues become the basis 
for further detailed questions, which are usually not prepared in advance and are 
dependent on the flow of the conversation and the interview. During the preparation 
period an advance set of questions had been prepared and was used during the 
interviews as a guideline. Interviews generally lasted between 60 – 90 minutes and 
were all carried out in person; noting the time limitations it proved useful to have a 
set of questions prepared in order not to lose focus during the interview. However, 
not all questions were designed and phrased ahead of time; depending on the 
stakeholder or expert that was interviewed, questions differed according to expertise 
and institutional background, allowing both the interviewer and the person being 
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interviewed the flexibility to discuss other relevant issues. This was in particular the 
case during this research process; due to the highly political and cultural sensitivity 
of the research topic and depending on the affiliation of the interviewed individual 
different aspects were discussed and referred to in the interviews.  A complete set of 
questions that were prepared before the interviews and used as a guideline can be 
found in the Appendix.  
 
The interviewees preferred not to be recorded during the interviews and hence 
detailed notes were taken, which were later transcribed in order to allow 
completeness of the analysis. A total of 29 interviews were conducted, with 14 
interviewees requiring full confidentiality of their individual and organisational identity. 
Every individual expert, organisation and institution that was contacted was available 
for an interview, which led to a response rate of 100%. Every person or organisation 
that was contacted was willing to participate in an interview and also gave consent to 
be available for follow-up interviews or questions.   
 
Predominantly, the interviewees were very knowledgeable in the subject area and 
ready to share information during the interviews; it was noted, however, that senior 
governmental officials were more reluctant than others to provide detailed answers 
or to share key information, likely due to political sensitivity of the subject matter and 
at times, due to lack of expertise. It was therefore noted that some comments which 
were made during the interviews could have been biased or based on subjective 
opinion and not official government positions. Where this occurred then it is pointed 
out in the subsequent analysis in this thesis.  
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Both, survey participants and interviewees were offered a copy of this research and 
its findings upon publication in 2013.  
 
3.14 Interpretation of the findings of the survey and the interviews 
The findings from the questionnaire and the interviews were analysed using 
quantitative techniques where applicable, whereas qualitative approaches, i.e. open-
ended questions from the questionnaire and from the interviews were used to 
enhance the data and the findings from the literature. The findings from the data 
analysis were used to validate the theoretical framework as developed according to 
the literature and relevant policy documents and legislation.  
Both, survey participants and interviewees were offered a copy of this research and 
its findings upon publication.  
 
3.15 Development of the recommendations to stakeholders 
This part of the methodology chapter focuses on one of the key elements of this 
research: the development of a comprehensive set of recommendations, guidelines 
and code of practice for private sector companies and public sector agencies alike. 
These recommendations take into account the inherent risks and opportunities for all 
stakeholders when considering investments in, what has been identified as, 
adaptation technologies in the water sector. This framework is specific to the water 
sector in a country with acute water scarcity; however, at the discretion of other MIC 
national experts, elements of the framework may be transferrable to countries under 
similar conditions and scenarios.  
Each of the drivers and barriers and recommendations has been derived from 
extensive literature review and policy analysis and was subsequently validated in 
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stakeholder interviews and through surveys. Different factors were weighed 
differently by different stakeholders; however, the results will enable stakeholders to 
make more informed decisions while paying attention to the most crucial decisive 
factors in a specific sector. A complete set of the theoretical drivers and barriers is 
listed in chapter 8 (complete with an assessment of whether they were validated), as 
well as the validated final list of recommendations to private and public sector 
stakeholders.   
 
3.16 Criteria for judging the quality of research design 
For a researcher to reduce scepticism towards case study research with regards to 
generalisability, multiple case studies and the methods applied in these, for example 
triangulation or cross-case analysis, could be used (Yin, 2009).  For a researcher to 
be convincing and credible with its case studies they ought to follow certain 
requirements. Yin (2009) provides a good overview of the most relevant in the 
context of this research. However, the caveat is still stated that generalisability of 
results to another state is a matter for experts in the receiving context to determine:  
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Table 5: Requirements for good case study research 
Tests Case study methodology Phases of research 
providing validity 
Construction validity  Use multiple sources 
of evidence 
 Establish chain of 
evidence 
 Have key informants 
review draft or case 
study report 
Data collection 
Internal validity  Pattern-matching 
 Explanation-building 
 Address rival 
explanations 
 Use logic models 
Data analysis 
External validity  Use theory in single-
case studies 
 Use replication logic 
in multiple-case 
studies 
Research design 
Reliability  Case study protocol 
 Develop case study 
database 
Data collection  
 
3.16.1 Construction validity 
The construction validity during the data collection phase has been carried out 
according to what Yin describes as the “triangulation” method. Triangulation allows 
the researcher to use multiple data collection methods in one piece of research in 
order to ensure that there is coherence in the data and the conclusions drawn from 
the data. Using multiple sources for data collection allows for greater accuracy and 
trustworthiness, as well as for often higher quality and more convincing arguments.  
 
For the case study in this research multiple sources of information and evidence 
were used; initial analysis of relevant literature and policy documentation was 
completed at a later stage by stakeholder interviews and questionnaires.  The 
responses of each interviewee were analysed separately.   
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Yin (2009) recommends developing a chain of evidence, which allows the researcher 
to increase the reliability of the information in the case study, to allow readers to 
follow the derivation of the conclusions of the research and to prove that no 
information has been lost throughout the process.  
 
Figure 2 below shows the format that Yin suggests: 
Figure 2: Chain of evidence according to Yin (2009) 
 
It should be noted that the case study report should always refer to the case study 
database; the database should disclose when and how the evidence was collected 
and refer to any circumstances this involved; lastly the case study protocol should be 
coherent to the initial case study questions (Yin, 2009).  
 
3.16.2 Internal validity 
The internal validity of this research was determined by consideration of alternative 
explanations to the findings as well as by matching the theoretical results established 
by the literature with the results obtained in the interviews and questionnaires. The 
complex nature of this research, i.e. water at the interface of multiple policy areas, 
was taken into consideration and accounted for in the analysis in order to correctly 
attribute results in the wider context of specific policy areas.  
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3.16.3 External validity 
The external validity of the case study research is used as an indicator in how far a 
case study can be applied to other situations and in how far results are generalisable 
(Yin, 2009). The research that was undertaken did not appear suitable for 
incorporating a comparative element, due to the nature of regulatory and socio-
economic specificities. However, other countries under similar pre-conditions were 
taken into consideration and referred to in the literature analysis. The 
recommendations derived from this research are theoretically generalisable though 
this is a matter upon which the author defers to experts in the recipient state or 
region. Even then, generalisation is only possible to a certain degree and hence 
differing circumstances, such as geo-politics, economy and the climate change effect 
should be taken into consideration when applying this framework to other situations.  
 
3.16.4 Reliability 
In reference to Yin’s criteria for judging research design, reliability within case study 
research can be derived from the case study protocol and the case study database. 
In this research the information entailed in the database was carefully documented in 
order to ensure a highest level of accuracy to provide a solid basis for analysis and 
interpretation.  
 
3.17 Summary 
This chapter has provided a detailed elaboration to the methodological approach that 
was applied in this research. The following chapter introduces a detailed analysis 
and critique of the literature to date in the relevant research areas, with particular 
focus on climate change adaptation finance as it applies to Jordan. Generalisability 
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or transference beyond Jordan is a matter for other relevant experts to consider 
according to the recipient or transfer state or region.   
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4. Adaptation funding strategies to date: a review of existing 
literature and policy 
 
“The Conference of the Parties […] requests the GEF to continue improving its 
modalities to increase the responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency of its 
support, including: […] promoting private-sector financing and investment to address 
climate change activities”  
(UNFCCC, COP 15, 2009, Draft decision  
Fourth review of the financial mechanism) 
 
Until recently, climate change adaptation was not on the agenda of international 
climate negotiations. Only at the 7th Conference of the Parties (COP) in 2001 in 
Marrakech, the particular vulnerability of developing countries to climate change and 
the need for adaptation was recognized. At the COP 15 in 2009 in Copenhagen the 
importance of the private sector in funding adaptation projects was emphasised amid 
the global economic crisis and the public sector’s inability to finance adaptation 
projects alone. This chapter provides an overview of the adaptation landscape within 
an international context. It analyses the adaptation strategies as developed by the 
European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank. It further 
highlights the lack of a legally binding international adaptation strategy, the gap 
between funding allocated to adaptation projects on the one hand and the funding 
needed to finance adaptation programmes on the other hand. Lastly, it emphasises 
the need to mobilise private sector finance in order to cover the funding gap in 
climate change adaptation policy. The chapter thereby refers to leading literature in 
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the field of climate change adaptation as well as to policy documents and policy 
strategy papers.  
 
4.1 Introduction to climate change adaptation funding 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) adaptation “is 
any adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected 
climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial 
opportunities” (IPCC, 2001, Chapter 18). Smit et al. (2001) define adaptation as 
“adjustments in ecological, social or economic systems in response to actual or 
expected climatic stimuli and their effects or impacts. It refers to changes in 
processes, practices, and structures to moderate potential damages or to benefit 
from opportunities associated with climate change”. The objective of adaptation is to 
reduce vulnerability to changes in the climate, yet at the same time for some regions 
and countries in the world the effects of climate change and adaptation will have 
beneficial outcomes (Stern, 2006). So far, the international adaptation effort is, as 
Burton (2006) describes, rather “an irregular patchwork of multilateral and bilateral 
initiatives than a fully conceived and functioning regime”.  In this chapter adaptation 
funding strategies to date are discussed and evaluated, each followed by a critique 
on its feasibility or contribution to successful international adaptation. 
 
As outlined in the introductory chapter of this thesis climate change adaptation is 
going to be, and already is in many parts of the world, crucial in reducing the 
vulnerability to climate change and presents the only option for coping with the first 
impacts of a warming climate that appears inevitable over the next few decades 
(Stern, 2006). Over centuries humans have adapted to the particular climate that is 
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specific to the places where they live, in sectors such as agriculture, forestry, water 
resources and working practices. Some regions may benefit from a warming climate, 
in which cases adaptation could be supportive in reaping the rewards. In the majority 
of cases, however, adaptation will help adjust economic activity in certain vulnerable 
sectors and support sustainable development. However, adaptation can only reduce 
but not remove climate change impacts and without early adaptation and mitigation 
action, the costs of both will rise sharply (Stern, 2006). Until recently climate change 
adaptation was not yet on the agenda of international climate negotiations. Only at 
the 7th COP in 2001 in Marrakech, the special vulnerability of developing countries 
was recognised and three new funds were subsequently established: the Least 
Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and 
the Adaptation Fund (AF). The LDCF and the SCCF are financed through voluntary 
donor contributions, with a total amount of around US$ 26 million in 2007 (Ganter, 
2009), which sums up to “less than what the United Kingdom spends on its flood 
defence programme within a week” (Human Development Report 2007/08, pp.14; 
pp.165). Contrary to mitigation efforts, adaptation cooperation proceeds very slowly. 
Among the reasons for this might be that adaptation deals with the impacts of 
climate change and the transformation or loss of livelihood primarily on the local 
level. Adaptation is therefore often not seen as a “global commons” or international 
problem (Ganter, 2009).  
 
According to the Stern Review, as the speed and intensity of climate change 
accelerates, the effectiveness of adaptation alone will diminish (Stern, 2006). There 
are certain limits as to which humans, species and ecosystems can migrate and 
adjust. Thus, without a combination of both mitigation and adaptation policy 
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approaches the limits and socio-economic costs will rise, especially for developing 
countries. Whether adaptation will be sustainable over the long-term is largely 
dependent on countries’ and regions’ adaptive capacity as well as on their level of 
vulnerability to climate change impacts (Smit et al., 2001). Adaptive capacity is 
defined as “the potential or ability of a system, region, or community to adapt to the 
effects or impacts of climate change” and is largely dependent on the respective 
level of vulnerability (p. 881). Accordingly, the capacity to adapt varies from region to 
region, leaving a vast number of developing and least-developed countries exposed 
to a high level of vulnerability to climate change. 
    
In the Stern Review (2006) Stern analyses the economics, i.e. the costs of climate 
change adaptation and provides a range of policy responses for an effective 
adaptation strategy. He highlights the fact that adaptation, in contrast to mitigation, 
provides local benefits without major time lags. This means that the effects of climate 
change adaptation programmes in the majority of cases can be seen without major 
time lags, contrary to mitigation policies that will benefit future generations mainly. As 
a result some adaptation will occur in the private sphere, autonomously, as 
individuals respond to economic and environmental changes, whereas larger scale 
adaptation projects will have to be implemented on national and international levels.  
After the heat wave, which hit Europe in 2003 with over 30,000 deaths recorded, 
(UNEP, 2004) not only governments responded by installing early warning and alert 
systems, but the sales of air conditioning and fans rose sharply as people started 
adjusting to hotter summers with rising average temperatures. Yet, adaptation is not 
necessarily an easier option than mitigation, due to its complexity and the constraints 
that need to be overcome. For example, it is a significant challenge that adaptation is 
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a fluid and constantly changing process owing to the increased severity of climate 
change-related impacts as mitigation options fail to keep pace with increased GHG 
emissions. Governments play a crucial role in making adaptation feasible, providing 
policy guidelines as well as institutional and financial support to civil society and the 
private sector (Stern, p. 404). While the majority of action will have to take place 
locally and the immediate benefits will be felt locally, other aspects of adaptation, 
such as acquiring knowledge and developing technologies, will be of global benefit.  
 
4.2 Autonomous versus planned anticipatory adaptation  
Smit et al. (2001) distinguish between  
1. autonomous adaptation and  
2. planned anticipatory adaptation  
Autonomous adaptation tends to occur on the regional, local and individual level; 
however, this has proven not to be sufficient to avoid damages associated with 
climate change-related variations (p. 879). Planned anticipatory adaptation, on the 
other hand, has a high probability of reducing vulnerability to climate change and 
realises the opportunities associated with a changing climate. Planned adaptation 
takes the form of adaptation policies, programs and measures usually with 
immediate, but also with future benefits. Autonomous adaptation tends, as 
mentioned above, to occur on the individual level. This can come in the form of 
individual rainwater harvesting systems built by farmers themselves to adapt to a 
shrinking availability of water; it can come in the form of acquisition of ventilation 
systems for private households to adapt to hotter summers and heat waves; or 
autonomous adaptation could result in local communities and regional governments 
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installing early warning systems for flooding or sandbag damming in villages and 
cities.  
Smit et al. state that “the costs of adaptation often are marginal to other 
management or development costs” (p. 879) when seen in relation to the damages 
and costs that are incurred following inaction. 
 
4.3 Adaptation at two levels: building adaptive capacity versus 
delivering adaptation actions 
Stern (2006) suggests that adaptation can operate at two distinct levels,  
1. building adaptive capacity on the one hand and  
2. delivering adaptation actions on the other hand  
Building adaptive capacity involves the accumulation of information and the creation 
of conditions that are favourable to support adaptation; this can range from 
regulatory, to institutional and managerial requirements as well as to structural 
reforms and financial reserves. Delivering adaptation actions involves taking steps 
that help to reduce the vulnerability to a changing climate or to exploit the 
opportunities arising from climate change, i.e. to design, develop and implement 
targeted adaptation projects and programmes that help a community or society 
adapt to the effects – negative or positive – of climate change. Examples of these 
actions include investing into alternative infrastructures, planting different crops and 
altering the timing of crop planting (Stern, 2006).  
 
4.4 Policy-driven versus autonomous adaptation 
Adaptation can also occur in the form of policy-driven adaptation or in the form of 
autonomous adaptation; policy-driven adaptation is defined “as the result of a 
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deliberate policy decision” initiated and implemented by the public sector (also 
referred to as planned adaptation), whereas autonomous adaptation is characterised 
by action taken by the private sector, i.e. initiated by individuals or communities 
themselves (Stern, 2006).  The extent to which autonomous adaptation reduces the 
costs of climate change essentially determines the degree of further policy action. A 
majority of adaptation actions that will be taken will be triggered by the way the 
changing climate is experienced and perceived. Extreme weather events such as 
heat waves, droughts and storms are very likely to send important signals as well as 
the accumulation of information and knowledge. However, since adaptive capacity is 
strongly linked to income, the most vulnerable and least developed will experience 
the same negative impacts of climate change in an even more extreme form whilst 
lacking the capacity to adapt. A further obstacle presents the fact that adaptation 
decisions are linked to habits and custom, which influences, in particular, decisions 
made on an autonomous adaptation level by private actors. This phenomenon might 
limit the extent to which adaptation actions are directed to maximising net benefits in 
an economic and social sense (Stern, 2006).  
 
4.5 Financial constraints  
Arguably the major barrier to effective adaptation, however, remains financial 
constraints, which primarily affect the poorer, and developing countries and 
societies. Lack of financial capital does not allow countries to implement successful 
adaptation projects; at the same time, developed countries are reluctant to increase 
investments in development and climate change adaptation projects amid the global 
economic crisis.  Good policies can reduce these inefficiencies on a local level in 
developing countries; however, policy makers have to deal with imperfect information 
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as well as with organisational and political challenges. Many developing countries 
will be those most severely affected by climate change and are also those least 
capable of investing in effective adaptation policies. Financial resources are already 
very limited, which constrains the ability to cope with and recover from climate and 
weather shocks, in particular when combined with other stresses such as famines 
and illnesses. It is important to note, though, that it will be the poorest in all societies 
across the world that will have the least capacity to adapt. The impacts of a warming 
climate could thus not only set back development efforts in developing countries, but 
also further exacerbate existing inequalities within the developing world. According to 
Smit et al. (2001) the main barriers to effective adaptation in developing countries 
are 1) a lack of capital and lack of credit (financial/market), 2) weak institutional 
structures and instabilities (institutional/legal), 3) rigidity in land-use practices and 
social conflicts (social/cultural), 4) technological constraints and 5) lack of 
information and education (p. 897). Table 6 below summarises the main barriers to 
adaptation as identified by Smit et al.  
 
Table 6: Barriers to effective adaptation to climate change 
Barriers to effective adaptation, Smit et.al (2001) 
 Lack of capital 
 Weak institutional structures 
 Rigidity in land use practices 
 Social conflicts 
 Technological constraints 
 Lack of information 
 Insufficient levels of education 
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4.6 Climate change adaption and the role of governments 
In developed countries the focus of adaptation needs to target the reduction of the 
costs and the disruption caused by climate change effects as well as help take 
advantage of the opportunities of climate change. The additional costs of investing in 
new infrastructure and buildings that are more resilient to climate change in OECD 
countries are estimated at a range from US$15 to 150 billion each year (equivalent 
to 0.05 – 0.5 per cent of GDP), with even higher costs in the future if temperatures 
are continuously rising (Stern, p. 416). For developing countries, adaptation costs 
are very difficult to estimate, due to the uncertainty of the exact impacts of climate 
change; according to Stern, “they [the costs of adaptation] are likely to run into tens 
of billions of dollars” (Stern, 2006, p. 430). Governments that respond to climate 
information will not only trigger adaptation amongst individuals and companies but 
might also encourage better risk management. However, progress on adaptation 
strategies in developed countries is also still in its infancy despite well-developed 
market structures and a high capacity to adapt. Thus governments need to provide 
clear policy frameworks, according to which effective adaptation can be developed 
and implemented, by individuals and companies.  
 
According to Stern there are four key areas that should be covered by government 
policies in the medium and long term. (1) Governments should provide high-quality 
climate information in order to drive efficient markets; (2) there should be land-use 
planning and performance standards for the investment in climate change adjusted 
infrastructures; (3) furthermore, governments should contribute through long-term 
policies for climate-sensitive public goods, such as coastal protection and 
emergency preparedness; (4) lastly, Stern suggests that a financial safety net should 
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be provided that helps the poorest and most vulnerable in society to make necessary 
adjustments (Stern, p. 416).   
 
Table 7: Government action for effective adaptation to climate change 
Summary of key areas to be covered by governments for effective adaptation, 
Stern (2006) 
 provide high-quality climate information in order to drive efficient markets 
 land-use planning and performance standards for the investment in climate 
change adjusted infrastructures 
 through long-term policies for climate-sensitive public goods 
 financial safety net to help the poorest and most vulnerable in society 
 
4.7 Adaptation and development 
Adaptation in developing countries reaches yet another dimension since it is strongly 
interlinked with development as such. Developing countries will be the ones most 
affected by climate change, with a very high risk of undermining development efforts 
and progress made to date. The Stern Review therefore suggests that adaptation 
policy should be considered an “extension of good development practice” (Stern, p. 
430) and that any adaptation actions should be fully integrated into development 
efforts in order to avoid mal-adaptation and to reach high efficiency. The debate on 
whether adaptation to climate change should be viewed independently or as an 
integral part of, development is a very interesting and complex one. The scope of 
this thesis does not allow for a detailed discussion about the development-adaptation 
interface, however, further research into this field is recommended.  
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4.8 The costs of climate change adaptation  
The overall costs of adaptation are very difficult to estimate and vary between US$9 
and 109 billion per year (Grantham Institute for Climate Change, 2009), due to 
uncertainty about the specific impacts of climate change and its effects on societies. 
According to a study conducted by Oxfam (Pettengell, 2010) these estimates can be 
broken down according to different sources and years. In 2006 the World Bank 
estimated costs of adaptation in developing countries at around US$9-41 billion per 
annum (p.a.), which includes the costs of climate proofing Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), Gross Domestic Investment (GDI) and Overseas Development Aid (ODA) 
flows. Also in 2006 the Stern Review estimated adaptation costs of US$4-37 billion 
p.a., with a slight modification of the World Bank estimates; in 2007 Oxfam estimated 
adaptation costs to exceed US$ 50 billion p.a., based on World Bank estimates, plus 
an extrapolation of costs from National Adaptation Programmes of Actions (NAPAs) 
and NGO projects. Lastly, in 2007 the UNDP estimated costs of US$86-109 billion 
p.a. also based on the World Bank plus costing of Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) 
targets and improved disaster response (p. 8).  
 
Since their extreme poverty reduces their capacity to adapt, developing countries are 
dependent on the support of developed countries. The Stern Review does not 
elaborate on how such financial, technological and logistical support could be 
organised, however, it highlights a number of factors that could contribute to the 
efficient development-adaptation integration. Examples include better urban 
planning, achieving gender equality and building robust education and health 
systems. From an economist point of view, the Stern report argues that natural 
disasters cause far greater economic costs in developing countries than in 
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developed countries and additionally can cause setbacks to social and economic 
development. Stern suggests that it is more cost-effective to invest in better disaster 
preparedness and management, both in terms of finances and lives saved (p. 434).  
Investments can range from encouraging technology transfers and supporting the 
flow of knowledge to investing in human capital (education and health), investing in 
institutions and new governance arrangements, and making long-term infrastructure 
more climate-resilient.  
 
Table 8: Estimated adaptation costs for developing countries 2010 - 2015 
Source US$ billion p.a. 
World Bank (2006) 
Stern (2006) 
Oxfam (2007) 
UNDP (2007) 
9 – 41 
4 – 37 
 50 
86 – 109 
 
4.8.1 Limitations of adaptation funding strategies to date 
The Stern Review extensively addresses the implications of climate change for 
developing and developed countries, outlines potential strategies for adaptation and 
highlights the barriers and constraints to adaptation. In Chapter 26 of the Stern 
Review, the authors address the question of how the international community can 
accommodate the costs of adaptation and support developing countries to adapt. 
The Review refers to the adaptation strategies that are already in place, including the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Adaptation Fund (AF). However, the GEF 
including the Least Developed Country Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund 
together only contribute an amount of around US$135 million – a mosaic of the costs 
actually required for effective and sustainable adaptation. Burton (2006) identifies the 
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limited funding for adaptation as a “significant constraint” on adaptation efforts (p. 
14), whereas Stern does not comment on this, arguably, largest barrier to successful 
adaptation strategies in the developed and least-developed world. Alternatives to the 
already existing adaptation strategies have been proposed by some researchers (for 
example: Stern, 2006), including: 
 
 a GDP-based levy on the Annex I countries (to the Kyoto Protocol)  
 apportion a part of the emission permits auctioning revenue for adaptation 
 initiating an adaptation levy or impose a levy on Joint Implementation (JI) 
projects 
 
However, as Stern recognises, there are major flaws in the suggested alternatives 
mentioned above; only the GDP-based levy appears feasible and enforceable under 
an international or EU agreement. The levies on JI projects for example could have a 
“perverse” (p.559) effect by reducing the incentive for the private sector to invest in 
mitigation in developing countries but instead relying on adaptation. Auctioning of 
emission permits, on the other hand, may encourage discussion on the revenue this 
approach generates, forcing finance ministers to take the best value-for-money 
decisions and considering the effects on the economy as a whole for EU member 
states. Hence, a major shortcoming of the Stern Review in respect of adaptation 
strategies is that it fails in designing a new and more innovative way to finance 
climate change adaptation policy. The Review gives a full account of already existing 
mechanisms, suggesting that public-private partnerships (PPPs) as well as 
remittances could play a crucial role in making adaptation feasible. However, as 
indicated above the Review does not provide an innovative solution on how to close 
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the funding gap in climate change adaptation. It is important to note though that the 
focus of this part of the Review is clearly on how to integrate adaptation policy into 
existing development strategies, primarily in the context of UK policy-making. Burton 
(2006) suggests that options for going forward with an effective adaptation policy 
could be an integrated adaptation policy under the UNFCCC; alternatively, 
adaptation could be integrated with development policies and lastly a “climate 
insurance” system could be developed for committing funds to support climate relief 
in vulnerable regions and countries for losses and damages as a result of climate 
change (p. 16). Burton refers to the United Nations Central Emergency Response 
Fund which is worth US$500 million and is supported by voluntary contributions and 
through regular replenishment. He suggests taking this approach a step further 
within climate change policy through a new mechanism and supported by long-term 
funding commitments in order to provide emergency relief from climate impacts and 
disasters (p. 16). Despite the three, rather theoretical, options for future adaptation 
funding Burton also fails to identify an effective finance mechanism that would 
estimate total adaptation costs and provide a financing plan according to which this 
funding deficit could be covered.    
 
It is also questionable whether combining development and adaptation policies 
would lead to the most advantageous result for developing countries. Coupling 
adaptation to Overseas Development Aid (ODA) could lead to overall lower financial 
support than if the two policy areas would remain separated. However, as pointed 
out above, climate change adaptation and development are often seen to go hand in 
hand and are mutually enforceable; without adaptation, development efforts could 
experience a setback of years and at the same time development is also a pre-
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condition for effective and sustainable adaptation policies. Working through the 
development process could be the most direct and probably the most effective 
means of supporting investments that strengthen climate resilience, while 
discouraging investments that increase vulnerability to climate change. Furthermore, 
a development-centred approach to adaptation would mainly operate outside the 
UNFCCC; the political momentum could be achieved through the international 
climate regime (Burton, p. 18). Yet, it is rather unlikely that developing and least-
developed countries would agree to such a policy-integration, assuming that overall 
funding for adaptation and development would be remarkably lower than if the two 
policy areas were separated into two distinct policy areas.  
 
4.8.2 Climate finance mechanisms and funds and the role of the private sector 
The following part of this chapter discusses the different funds and mechanisms that 
are already in place to tackle climate change adaptation and to pledge funding for 
adaptation directed projects and programmes. The Adaptation Fund, the Green 
Climate Fund and the National Adaptation Programmes for Action will be discussed; 
furthermore, the EU’s climate change adaptation strategy will be analysed while the 
role of the private sector in funding adaptation will be highlighted towards the end of 
this chapter.  
 
4.9 The Adaptation Fund 
The Adaptation Fund was created under the Kyoto Protocol of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in order to finance specific adaptation 
programmes and projects.  A mechanism already in place for making decisions on 
adaptation funding is the Adaptation Fund (AF), which was established to finance 
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adaptation projects and programmes in developing countries (those that are parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol) which are especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of 
climate change (UNFCCC). It has unique features that could, if developed further, 
introduce a “new era of international cooperation on adaptation” (IIED, 2009).  
However, developing countries’ demands and needs for adaptation funding are 
enormous, with average estimates of around US$60 billion a year (IIED, 2009). In 
contrast, Adaptation Fund finance is currently estimated at about US$250-350 million 
for 2012. The current structure and approach of the AF can therefore only be 
considered a first step towards fulfilling the funding demands. The AF was launched 
at the 7th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in March 2001 in Marrakech and 
was made operational in 2009 (The Adaptation Fund, 2011).  
 
The Adaptation Fund is financed through the share of proceeds of the clean 
development mechanism (CDM) and other sources of funding, in the form of grants. 
The share of the proceeds amounts to approximately 2% of certified emission 
reductions (CERs) attributed for CDM project activities (UNFCCC, 2011). One of the 
AF’s key principles according to which it operates is the principle of direct access; 
the Fund will assist countries depending on a needs basis and according to a set of 
criteria and priorities identified by the respective country itself, through country-driven 
processes. There are three major principles the AF rests on:  
 
1. the principle of ownership  
2. the funding mechanism and  
3. its governance structure  
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The following paragraphs elaborate on these guiding principles in more detail.  
 
4.9.1 The principle of ownership 
The principle of ownership refers to the leading role that is given to developing 
countries within the international climate regime. Developing countries are given the 
majority on the AF Board, which ensures that that countries affected most by climate 
change also have full participation rights within decision-making processes, ensuring 
that funds are distributed effectively and transparently according to needs (IIED, 
2009). Furthermore, developing countries have direct access to AF resources, 
instead of “having to rely on large global institutions to bid for cash for them” (BBC, 
2009), which enhances this sense of ‘ownership’.   
 
4.9.2 The funding mechanism 
The second principle refers to the funding mechanism of the AF. As briefly 
mentioned above, the fund revenues are obtained primarily through a 2% share of 
the proceeds from the CDM project activities. This means, that the AF is self-
financed through the Carbon Market, as well as independently from the contributions 
of developed countries. According to the IIED the first credits from CDM projects 
have generated approximately US$18.33 million. Projections estimate that the Fund 
is likely to generate at least US$500 million by 2012 (IIED, 2009). However, as 
Oxfam (2010) points out that “estimates of the cost of adaptation in developing 
countries point to a scale of finance of the order of US$50bn to US$150bn a year”. It 
is therefore evident that a major boost in adaptation financing has to take place over 
the near future in order to cover those costs.  
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4.9.3 Governance structure 
In terms of governance structure the AF is supervised and managed by its Board 
(AFB). The Board has sixteen members, two of which represent each of the United 
Nations (UN) regional groups, one representing the Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS), one representing the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), two representing 
the Annex 1 (developed) countries and two representing the non-Annex 1 
(developing) countries. This representation reflects the UNFCCC’s principle of 
equitable and balanced representation of all parties involved and concerned within 
the governance structure. The functions of the AFB include:  
 developing strategic priorities, policies and guidelines;  
 to develop and decide on specific operational policies;  
 to decide on projects; to monitor and review implementation; to review 
performance and to establish committees;  
 working groups to provide expertise and to assist the AFB in its functions and 
finally  
 to monetise the CERs issued by the executive board of the CDM and 
forwarded to the AF (Adaptation Fund, 2010)   
 
Every decision that is taken by the Board should be reached by consensus; if this 
cannot be reached, a two-thirds majority is sufficient. The AFB aims at providing 
rapid delivery of resources to countries in need and to avoid the often very 
bureaucratic and long processes in other international finance institutions. However, 
there is no such thing as an “emergency fund” through which there could be rapid 
delivery of funds for droughts and extreme floods. There is a “project cycle” 
according to which proposals are submitted, assessed and granted funding. The first 
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stage involves submitting the project or programme to the AFB, in the second stage 
the secretariat screens the proposal for consistency, before making it public on the 
website in the third stage. In the fourth stage the Committee on Project and 
Programme Review reviews the proposals; in the next stage the AFB makes its 
decision on the project proposal and lastly in the sixth stage, project and programme 
leaders are required to submit yearly progress and evaluation reports (IIED, 2009).  
 
4.9.4 The principle of direct access 
As mentioned above, the principle of direct access aims at simplifying and 
accelerating the process by which funding is distributed to developing countries and 
also aimed at increasing developing countries’ responsibility to ensure that resources 
are used for the intended purposes. In practice this means that the Fund offers two 
options to developing countries; the first option is direct access via National 
Implementing Entities (NIEs) in the respective country or second, via Multilateral 
Implementing Entities (MIEs) such as regional banks or the UNDP. In both cases the 
implementing entities have to meet certain standards, like demonstrating financial 
integrity and management. Resources are allocated based on a set of criteria, 
including:  
 the level of vulnerability  
 level of urgency and risks  
 equitability 
 resulting co-benefits  
 adaptive capacity to adverse effects of climate change  
 lessons learned in the design and implementation of project and programme 
activities  
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Table 9 below provides an overview of these criteria, with definitions derived from 
alternative sources and this research, as the AF does not elaborate on the criteria 
itself: 
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Table 9: Resource allocation criteria according to the Adaptation Fund 
Level of vulnerability “The extent to which a natural or social 
system is susceptible to sustaining 
damage from climate change; a function 
of the magnitude of climate change, the 
sensitivity of the system to changes in 
the climate and the ability to adapt the 
system to changes in climate. A highly 
vulnerable system is one that is highly 
sensitive to modest changes in climate 
and one for which the ability to adapt is 
severely constrained” (IPCC, 2000) 
Level of urgency and risks arising 
from delay 
Imminent threat of climate change 
related effects; damages resulting from 
delay are irreversible with high socio-
economic costs 
Equitability of access to the Fund Direct access to the Fund for developing 
countries 
Regional co-benefits Where the benefit of a 
project/programme triggers further 
(additional) benefits 
Maximising multi-sectoral or cross-
sectoral benefits 
Where the benefit of a 
project/programme has a spill-over effect 
on a number of sectors 
Adaptive capacity “Adaptive capacity refer to the ability of 
natural, social and economic systems to 
accommodate change in climate, reduce 
or manage vulnerability and limit adverse 
consequences” (Folke, 2006) 
Lessons learned in 
project/programme design and 
implementation to be captured 
Incorporation of reflection upon previous 
projects/programmes with continuous 
improvements 
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The critical issue with the criteria mentioned above is, however, that the AFB does 
not specify or define those rather vague criteria, which leaves room for interpretation. 
Yet if the definitions given above (see table 9) were used and consideration was 
given to proportioning their weight vis-à-vis one another, then a plausible means of 
allocating resources will have been designed.  
 
The Adaptation Fund is still in its infancy and its innovative features are still being 
shaped. The AF has unique features and it is cutting-edge in the sense that 
developing countries play a very large and important role in funding and allocation-
decisions. In June 2010 the AFB approved the first four project proposals that will 
receive funding. These include a proposal to “tackle sea-level rise in the Solomon 
Islands”, a proposal to “adapt to climate change in the coastal areas of Senegal”, a 
plan to “improve watersheds in Nicaragua” and a project proposal to “reduce risk and 
vulnerability from glacier lake floods in Pakistan” (Climate Funds Update, 2010). In 
December 2012 disbursement of funds were approved by region as follows: 
 
Figure 3: Approved disbursements in December 2012; adapted from Climate Funds Update 
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However, the AF will most likely not cover the funding necessary to cover all 
necessary adaptation projects. As mentioned above, predictions estimate the Fund 
to contain at least US$500 million by 2012, yet even this would not be enough to 
cover the deficits in adaptation funding. Furthermore, the Adaptation Fund is often 
criticized by NGOs and developing countries for its governance structure. Until 2007 
all three funds (LDCF, SCCF and AF) were administered by the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF), which is often perceived as a “donor driven institution” 
where developing countries’ influence is limited to their participation at the UNFCCC. 
However, as the principle of direct access has been embodied in the structure of the 
AF, this criticism might not be justifiable.   
 
4.10 National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) 
In 2001 at the COP 7 in Marrakech, the decision to provide technical and financial 
assistance to LDCs was made, in order to help them identify and prioritise activities 
that follow their adaptation needs and to assist them “in preparing National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action” (UNEP). At the COP 7 the LDCF was established 
under which the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) were initiated. 
The LDCF is managed through the GEF, which so far has mobilised contributions of 
around US$172 million. The ultimate target is to reach contributions of around 
US$500 million in four years. However, looking at individual NAPAs it becomes clear 
that this target is far below what is actually needed to cover adaptation projects in 
LDCs. The Maldives NAPA estimates project costs of around US$110 million and 
Ethiopia estimates alone project costs of US$770 million, thereby already exceeding 
the US$500 million the GEF aims at in four years. Yet, this is also the amount the 
UNFCCC estimated necessary for the funding of NAPAs implementation. To date 
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there are 19 donor countries, including many EU member states, Australia and 
Japan. In April 2010 there were 44 National Adaptation Programmes of Action 
registered with the UNFCCC, supported by the LDC Fund.  
 
However, so far, according to the research undertaken herein, few adaptation 
projects have actually been financed and implemented, which is therefore in 
contradiction to the objective of addressing urgent and immediate needs, despite 
countries’ urgent need of this financial support in order to be able to adapt. NAPAs 
were initially considered by the international community as a quick, first step towards 
effective adaptation; however, as mentioned above, few projects have been 
approved and implemented until the time of writing.  By definition NAPAs “provide a 
process for Least Developed Countries to identify priority activities that respond to 
their urgent and immediate needs to adapt to climate change – those for which 
further delay would increase vulnerability and/or costs at a later stage” (UNFCCC, 
2010). Since October 2008 the UNFCCC Secretariat has received NAPAs from 38 
LDCs.  
 
4.10.1 Explanation of the NAPA process 
The following section provides an overview on the focus of NAPAs, its process and 
its evolution, followed by an analysis of a chosen NAPA. The Maldives NAPA was 
chosen as an example due to its comprehensive nature and details. Besides 
focusing on “urgent and immediate needs”, NAPAs do not require any new research 
but are solely based on existing information and knowledge. They should be “action-
oriented” and “country-driven”, flexible and based on “national circumstances” 
(UNFCCC, 2010). The NAPA process itself requires developing countries to draft an 
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assessment of current climate change challenges and extreme weather vulnerability, 
to identify areas in which risks will increase due to a changing climate, to identify key 
adaptation areas and measures as well as developing criteria for prioritizing activities 
and shortlist them. A NAPA further includes a short profile of intended projects and 
activities, which address the most urgent and immediate adaptation needs of 
developing countries.  
 
4.10.2 The Maldives NAPA 
One example of a very well structured and developed NAPA is the Maldives NAPA 
that was published in 2006/2007 (Maldives Ministry of Environment, Energy and 
Water, 2006). The Maldives belong to the most vulnerable countries to a changing 
climate and as the NAPA states “non-action is not an option” (Maldives NAPA, 2006) 
for the Maldives Government. The Maldives also played a crucial role in the 
negotiations that led to the UNFCCC and was the first country to sign the Kyoto 
Protocol to the UNFCCC in 1997. This highlights the country’s commitment for 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. The NAPA process was guided and 
shaped through stakeholder engagement, community consultations and awareness-
raising amongst the population.  
 
Existing climate data was analysed with the support of international expertise in 
order to identify vulnerabilities and adaptation activities and subsequently to prioritise 
them. The goal of the Maldives NAPA is stated as to “present a coherent framework 
to climate change adaptation that enhances the resilience of the natural, human, and 
social systems and ensures their sustainability in the face of predicted climate 
hazards” (p. 3). The first part of the NAPA presents the overall NAPA goal and 
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describes the framework the NAPA follows. Subsequently country characteristics 
and developments goals are evaluated and climate change risks and hazards are 
outlined. Furthermore, vulnerabilities to climate change as well as priority activities 
are outlined. The NAPA is concluded by an analysis of project profiles for adaptation 
to climate change in the Maldives with a total estimated cost of US$110 million.  
 
4.10.3 Criticism of the NAPA process 
The major concern with the NAPAs is related to the funding of projects. NAPA 
programmes and projects funded through the LDCF solely rely on these grants, but 
there appears to be not much effort from developing countries to develop alternative 
ways of how to contribute to a specific project and to make it feasible. This means 
that developing countries rely on the good-will of developed countries to support 
them in adaptation efforts. As mentioned above, adaptation is often not regarded a 
global commons problem and thus it appears rather risky to rely solely on other 
sources of funding. Especially in times of fiscal constraint donor countries might be 
less willing to contribute to the Fund. Incentives need to be developed in order to 
maintain funding at certain levels and potentially increase these over time. The 
approach of the NAPAs is unique in the sense that it allows developing countries to 
specifically address their needs and preferences in terms of climate change 
adaptation projects and programmes.  
 
4.11 European Union (EU): Policy Developments 
For several years, the EU has had its policy focus on measures to reduce GHG 
emissions, as well as on becoming a forerunner in the mitigation of climate change. 
However, increasingly extreme weather events, such as heat waves, floods and 
86 
 
forest fires have drawn attention towards the need to define strategies and policies to 
adapt to the already existing changes in the climate within Europe and in its 
neighbouring regions (Glatzel et al., 2012). Furthermore, the EU has recently 
decided to integrate a 20% climate finance target across its entire budget for 
covering projects and programs, both EU internally and externally, targeting the 
mitigation of and adaptation to climate change.  
 
4.11.1 European Commission: “EU action against climate change: Adapting to 
climate change”    
The European Commission published a policy paper in 2008 entitled “EU action 
against climate change: Adapting to climate change” in which it outlines the role of 
the EU in effectively adapting to the effects of climate change. The Commission 
recognises that climate change is already happening and that it will become more 
pronounced over the coming years due to the delayed effect of past emissions. 
However, at the same time the Commission also acknowledges that “a rapid 
transition to a low-carbon world economy is [therefore] the first priority of the EU’s 
global strategy for controlling climate change” (European Commission, p. 5). The 
Commission regards action on adaptation to be an “indispensable complement” to 
mitigation, reducing GHG emissions. The fact therefore is that the EU, to date, has a 
clear priority in the area of mitigation, but, however, slowly recognises the 
importance of pursuing both strategies simultaneously.  At the time of writing (April 
2013) the EU was due to launch its long-awaited Strategy on Adaptation to Climate 
Change for designing and implementing an effective adaptation strategy both for EU 
domestic adaptation and EU external adaptation strategies. This sends the strong 
signal that adaptation is not a very well explored, yet immensely important, policy 
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field and that policy makers have historically directed most attention towards the 
mitigation of climate change.  
So far, the EU has published policy papers as well as a Green Paper 
([COM(2007)354 final) and a White Paper ([COM/2009/0147 final) on climate change 
adaptation, however no explicit strategy or funding mechanism has been proposed, 
nor is there a legally binding document regulating adaptation projects. At the time of 
writing, first initiatives at EU level to develop an Adaptation Directive have been 
made6. 
 
The Commission paper places a strong emphasis on the climate change effects that 
can be observed across European countries, where temperatures have increased by 
approximately almost 1°C over the past century, a much sharper increase when 
compared to the global average rise in temperature. This rise in average 
temperatures leads to a sharp increase in rain and snowfall in northern Europe, 
whereas droughts and heat waves are becoming more frequent in central and 
southern Europe (DG Climate Action; Schiermeier, 2011). Since non-action is a 
taboo for the EU, legislation adopted in 2007 (Directive 2007/60/EC; “Flood 
Directive”) requires EU member states “to assess and manage flood risk”. Areas 
prone to potentially high risk, flood hazard and flood risk are required to prepare 
flood risk maps by 2013 (Chapter III, Directive 2007/60/EC). These maps have to 
include the (potential) consequences of extreme floods and medium-probability 
floods. In order to reduce risks of flooding and vulnerability, “flood risk management 
plans” have yet to be developed for these regions at high risk until 2015. Regarding 
the threat of water scarcity the European Commission has launched a “public 
                                                          
6
 Dr Zen Makuch, Katrin Glatzel, Helena Wright and Nikzad Oraee-Mirzamani, Centre for 
Environmental Policy, Imperial College London 
88 
 
debate” about the best ways to address this in the context of climate change. So far, 
droughts have cost the EU economies at least €100 billion in 2010 (p. 12).  One 
study estimates with a confidence of 90 per cent that the risk of heat waves similar to 
the one that hit Europe in 2003 has more than doubled as a result of climate change 
(Burton, 2006).  
 
The European Commission recognises that without immediate policy action on 
adaptation, the EU may not have any other option than sudden and reactive 
measures in response to increasingly frequent natural disasters. This will not only be 
considerably more expensive than starting to implement adaptation policies now, but 
it will also weaken Europe’s economy and risk social stability and security, with 
increased environmental migration and climate change refugees.  The EU hence 
suggests that action needs to be taken at four different levels – at the local, the 
national, the European and at the international level. This requires not only the 
involvement of public authorities and the private sector, but also the active 
engagement of individuals. The EU regards it as its duty to raise awareness amongst 
citizens in order to maximize adaptive behaviour on the individual and local level. 
One initiative is to encourage governments to invest in “climate proofing”, an 
approach that allows “the capacity of a system to function well as the climate 
changes”, especially with regards to building infrastructure (Hahn, 2010).  
 
Since the effects of climate change are likely to be spread unevenly across 
European and international territory, the Commission recommends that action needs 
to be based on the “principle of solidarity” between regions, between EU member 
states and also between the EU and third country actors (ibid.). The benefits of this 
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integrated approach are very clear and it is a logical step, in terms of information 
sharing, technological transfers and mutual support; many sectors of European 
economies are interlinked and integrated through the Single Market and common EU 
policies; sectors, such as the energy market, transport, agriculture and water 
policies. Furthermore, the Commission suggests that EU spending programmes on 
regional and rural development should incorporate adaptation aspects as well, 
recognising that adaptation is largely a matter of political will, coherence, forward-
planning and consistent, coordinated action (ibid.).  
 
The EU is often seen as a forerunner and leader in the fight against climate change 
in general (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, 2012); there is now a 
unique opportunity to set an example in the area of adaptation policy as well and to 
encourage other countries to follow lead and to intensify cooperation with the EU. In 
June 2007 the Commission published a Green Paper on adaptation to climate 
change in order to raise awareness of the need for EU action on adaptation and to 
stimulate the debate around it. In 2009 a White Paper followed suit developing a 
“European framework for action” on adaptation.  
 
The following section analyses these Commission papers in more detail and 
assesses precision in terms of adaptation actions and funding possibilities.  
 
4.11.2 Green Paper 
The Commission Green Paper (2007) examines the impacts of climate change in 
Europe, as well as the possibilities and options for action and policy responses on 
EU level (p. 3). It thereby focuses on the role of the EU, yet takes into consideration 
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the crucial role of member states and regional and local authorities in the 
development of effective adaptation strategies. As mentioned above adaptation 
policy is often not regarded a global commons problem, thereby ignoring the fact that 
climate induced migration and permanent displacement of entire populations may 
lead to political and social conflicts and hence develop adaptation from a local into a 
global commons problem. However, in the Green Paper the EU underlines the fact 
that the “adaptation challenge” is global by its nature; therefore, the Paper also 
raises the EU external dimension of adaptation policy and considers measures and 
mechanisms that could be transferred to other countries outside the EU as well and 
underlines the inherent opportunity for the EU to provide international leadership and 
guidance in this fairly new policy area (p. 3).  
 
The first part of the Green Paper focuses on the effects of climate change on Europe 
and highlights which geographical areas will be most vulnerable, including the 
Mediterranean, coastal zones and the arctic region. The Green Paper refers to the 
Stern Review, which concludes that adaptation could reduce the costs of climate 
change over the long-run and that cost-effective adaptation therefore seems a very 
logical solution (p. 9). In the following part the Commission then provides advice on 
how Europeans should adapt to the changing climate and thereby differentiates 
between soft, relatively inexpensive measures, such as water conservation, use of 
drought tolerant crops and awareness raising and costly defence and relocation 
measures on the other hand (p. 10). The Commission thereby assigns a crucial role 
to the public sector and also highlights the potential benefits of adaption, including 
new economic opportunities, job creation and exploring new markets for innovative 
products and services.  
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4.11.2.1 The Green Paper on the role of developing countries 
In terms of providing support to the most vulnerable developing countries the Green 
Paper recognises that adaptation will be crucial for securing the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) after 2015. The Commission suggests that the EU 
should share its experiences in terms of adaptation measures with developing 
countries and provide assistance to develop inclusive approaches (p.13; p.22). 
Furthermore, it is underlined that adaptation should be integrated into other 
strategies that are aimed at poverty reduction and development planning and 
budgeting (p. 22). The EU so far promotes adaptation in developing countries within 
the framework of three different levels; in the context of the UNFCCC the EU will 
continue to advance the topic of adaptation, it also aims to develop further on the 
2004 EU Action Plan on Climate Change and Development and will spend €60 
million between 2008-2010 within the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) 
system for raising awareness and jointly addressing climate change between the EU 
and the most vulnerable developing countries.  
 
The Green Paper further refers to the EU’s 7th Framework Programme for Research 
(2007-2013), which stresses on climate change, in terms of predictive capacity and 
adaptation strategies. The agenda for climate change and adaptation will consider a 
variety of different aspects, including the development of comprehensive and 
integrated methodologies for assessing the impacts, vulnerabilities and cost 
effectiveness of adaptation (p. 24).  A cost-benefit assessment of climate change 
adaptation would compare the benefits of providing adaptation support now with the 
socio-economic costs of doing nothing. The intention is to demonstrate the large-
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scale, cross-national environmental and economic benefits of early adaptation, in 
order to encourage individuals and governments in the EU, but also outside the EU’s 
borders, to actively engage in adaptation. At the same time the Programme intends 
to improve knowledge, understanding and predictions related to climate change 
impacts in Europe, including transport, industries, agriculture and human health. 
Lastly, the Programme aims at promoting cooperation, partnerships and network-
building between the scientific communities in Europe with non-EU countries, with 
special attention to developing countries and other key partners (p. 25).  
 
The following section discusses the 2009 follow-up White Paper that outlines specific 
actions for climate change adaptation. 
 
4.11.3 White Paper 
In the White Paper COM (2009) 147 the European Commission sets out a 
“European framework for action” in order to adapt to the effects of climate change, 
including the promotion for strategies “which increase the resilience to climate 
change of health, property and the productive functions of land, inter alia by 
improving the management of water resources and ecosystems” (p.5).  The objective 
of the EU’s Adaptation Framework is 1) to apply the principle of subsidiarity and 2) to 
support overarching EU objectives on sustainable development. In order to improve 
the EU’s resilience to deal with the impacts of climate change the framework adopts 
a phased approach.  
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4.11.3.1 A phased-approach to tackle the impacts of climate change 
Phase one (2009-2012) lays out the ground work for preparing a comprehensive EU 
adaptation strategy, which will be implemented during the second phase 
commencing in 2013. In detail, phase one focuses on “building a solid knowledge 
base of the impact and consequences of climate change for the EU itself”, it aims at 
integrating adaptation into key policy areas of the EU, and it employs a combination 
of policy instruments to guarantee the effective delivery of adaptation. Lastly, phase 
one also intends to accelerate international cooperation on adaptation. The 
proposals as set out in the White Paper are directed only towards the first phase of 
the framework.  
 
4.11.3.2 Knowledge and information-sharing 
The White Paper underlines the importance generating knowledge and sharing 
information. It therefore suggests improving knowledge management through a 
“Clearing House Mechanism” as an IT tool and database on climate change impacts, 
as well as on best practice with regard to adaptation (White Paper, p. 7). The 
Clearing House Mechanism will contribute to the Shared Environmental Information 
Systems which is an initiative for collaboration by the European Commission and the 
European Environment Agency (EEA) to establish an integrated and EU-wide 
environmental information system (p. 7). It will also cooperate with the Global 
Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES). Besides the need to enhance 
knowledge and information-sharing, the White Paper emphasises the need for 
enhanced integration of adaptation in already existing EU policies.    
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In chapter four of the White Paper the authors touch upon the difficulty of financing 
effective adaptation strategies. As identified by the Stern Review, the White Paper 
highlights the financial constraints as one of the main barriers to successful (i.e. 
effective and efficient) adaptation initiatives and suggests that available financial 
resources need to be targeted better in order to ensure optimum outcomes (p.13). 
The Commission suggests two alternatives on how additional financial resources 
could be generated for adaptation purposes; this includes: 
1. the proposal to use the revenue generated under the EU ETS for adaptation 
purposes and  
2. to consider Market Based Instruments (MBIs) and public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) in order to share investments, risk, reward and responsibility in the 
delivery of adaptation action (p. 14)  
 
In terms of the EU ETS the revised Directive governing the scheme from 2013 
onwards provides that at least 50% of the revenue that is generated from auctioning 
GHG allowances should be used, inter alia, for adaptation purposes in EU member 
states and also in developing countries. According to Europol (20097) the EU carbon 
market generates around €90 billion per year. This would mean that from 2013 €45 
billion could be allocated inter alia to adaptation needs.  
 
The EU seems, yet again, to be the actor most involved and keen to implement a 
strategic and effective adaptation policy across Europe and internationally, with a 
focus on developing countries. However, despite the will and enthusiasm of 
Europeans towards climate change adaptation, there are until today no specific 
                                                          
7
 In an online article on: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/press/carbon-credit-fraud-causes-
more-5-billion-euros-damage-european-taxpayer-1265, retrieved October 2010 
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proposals on how to generate sufficient funding. The two proposals, as suggested in 
the White Paper, present a first step towards funding, but are not enough to fill the 
funding gap for adaptation projects both in Europe and outside the EU. It appears as 
if there is still more work and knowledge-sharing to be done until policy-makers and 
citizens alike recognise the importance of adaptation. Despite a growing awareness 
amongst developed countries towards the threats of climate change and the 
necessity to adapt, it seems as if the urgency of the problem has not yet been fully 
recognised.       
 
At the time of writing the EU is developing an “EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate 
Change”, which will be launched in late April 2013. It is not yet clear, however, if the 
Strategy will solely focus on adaptation within the EU or also externally. In the 
context of this research, though, it is interesting to highlight that the EU will 
emphasise on “engaging with the private sector at EU level”8 in the Strategy.  
 
The following section discusses the Green Climate Fund, its purpose and 
functionality. 
 
4.12 Green Climate Fund 
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) was established under the 2009 Copenhagen 
Accord and is a mechanism through which a large share of international financial 
assistance will be distributed in a balanced share between mitigation and adaptation 
activities9. The Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun Agreements pledged funds of 
                                                          
8
 Website of DG Climate Action: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/events/0069/index_en.htm, retrieved on 
01.03.2013 
9
 The Green Climate Fund was designated as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the 
UNFCCC, in accordance with Article 11 of the Convention. Arrangements will be concluded between 
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US$10bn a year from 2010 to 2012 and increasing to US$ 100bn per year by 2020. 
However, since the Cancun COP in 2010 the actual design of the GCF has been 
under negotiation. In 2012 it was decided that the Secretariat of the GCF would be 
based in the Republic of South Korea. The GCF will play a crucial role in acquiring 
and channelling new and additional financial resources for developing countries for 
adaptation and mitigation projects alike. The GCF aims to catalyse climate finance, 
private and public, at the international level as well as at the national levels. The 
Fund will pursue a country-driven approach and aims at promoting engagement at 
the national level through effective involvement of the relevant institutions and 
stakeholders in recipient countries. The Green Climate Fund is still in its infancy and 
it is yet to be seen how projects are developed and implemented and to what extent 
funding is dispersed towards adaptation projects. In 2012 The Republic of South 
Korea was selected to host the secretariat of the GCF, however, the fund will only be 
made fully operational by early 2014.  
 
Overall, it can be concluded, that the adaptation efforts on an international scale are 
still in their infancy, yet the process of developing strategies has started and is slowly 
accelerating as the first impacts of climate change can be felt across the world. 
Europe is suffering from heat waves in the summer, parts of Asia experience 
flooding in an intensity that has never been seen before and other parts of the world 
are threatened by rising sea-levels or persistent water scarcity. However, despite 
these first, threatening effects of a warming climate, the implementation of effective 
and sustainable adaptation strategies is still lacking. The deficit for adaptation is 
estimated at a cost of several billion US$ per year (see this thesis; Pettengell, 2010), 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the Conference of the Parties (COP) and the Fund to ensure that it is accountable to and functions 
under the guidance of the COP. (Green Climate Fund website: http://gcfund.net/about-the-
fund/mandate-and-governance.html ) 
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and the funding mechanisms already in place or being developed at the moment will 
only cover a fraction of what is actually needed. The question therefore is, whether 
these newly established funds will live up to their promises.   
 
Table 10 presents an overview of climate change finance that is solely directed at 
adaptation activities.  
 
This is followed by a discussion of the role of private sector finance in funding 
climate change adaptation projects. 
 
4.13 Climate Investment Funds 
The Climate Investment Funds (CIF) are a set of unique financing instruments and 
are made up of four different funding windows and present one of the largest climate 
funding mechanisms available to date. The four funds that fall under the CIF include 
the Clean Technology Fund, the Forest Investment Program, the Scaling Up 
Renewable Energy Program and the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience. The CIF 
support developing countries in their efforts to mitigate and adapt to the challenges 
of climate change with the provision of grants, concessional funds, and risk 
mitigation instruments. Through the support of the CIF currently 48 countries are 
running pilot programmes and projects in the area of clean technology, sustainable 
management of forests, renewable energy access, and climate resilient 
development. In the context of climate change adaptation the Pilot Program for 
Climate Resilience is the most relevant. The program provides technical assistance 
and investments to support the integration of climate risk and resilience into core 
development planning and implementation of developing countries. Projects under 
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this funding window are country-led and build on the NAPA process previously 
discussed in this chapter and other national development programs and plans.  
However, in the context of this thesis it is particularly crucial to highlight that the CIF 
as the currently largest funding mechanism does not cover countries that fall within 
the group of Middle Income Countries. This reinforces the argument made in this 
thesis, that a large group of countries are not eligible for climate funding under the 
current climate finance architecture. 
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Table 10: Climate change adaptation funding mechanisms 
 FUNDING MECHANISMS 
Climate Investment 
Funds – Strategic 
Climate Fund 
 
 Pilot Program for Climate Resilience 
 Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program 
 Forest Investment Program 
 Funding is distributed in the form of grants, concessional loans and risk mitigation tools 
UNFCCC Adaptation Fund: 
- To finance concrete adaptation projects and programmes in developing countries that are Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol 
- Financed from the share of proceeds of the clean development mechanism project activities 
- Estimated funds dedicated since 2011: US$ 180 million 
NAPAs: 
- Established under the LDCF 
- Provision of a process for least developed countries to identify priority activities that respond to their urgent and 
immediate needs to adapt to climate change  
- Funding: US$ 500 million in 2014 
 
Special Climate Change Fund 
GEF  - Unites 182 countries in partnership with international institutions, civil society organisations, and the private 
sector to address global environmental issues while supporting national sustainable development initiatives. 
 
Since 1991:  
- Provision of $10.5 billion in grants and leverage of $51 billion in co-financing for over 2,700 projects in over 165 
countries 
 
Green Climate Fund - Established under the Copenhagen Accord in 2009 
- US$ 100 billion from 2020 per year for mitigation and adaptation 
 
European Union 
- Green Paper (2007) Adapting to Climate Change in Europe – option for EU action 
- White Paper (2009) Adapting to Climate Change: towards a European framework for action 
- EU Adaptation Strategy (2013) 
GCCA 
- Build an alliance between the EU and developing countries 
- Does not establish a new funding mechanism 
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4.14 Mobilising Private Sector Climate Finance 
The Copenhagen Accord in 2009 established a greater role for the private sector in 
leveraging finance for climate change mitigation and adaption activities and projects, 
as national governments are struggling with the economic climate and are reluctant 
to make more funding available for climate change adaptation purposes. The 
Copenhagen Accord explicitly states that “developed countries commit to a goal of 
mobilising jointly USD100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of 
developing countries. This funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public 
and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance”; 
furthermore, the Copenhagen Accord emphasises on the role of the GEF in 
“promoting private-sector financing and investment to address climate change 
activities”.  
 
 There is no clear structure or mechanism in place that would regulate private sector 
finance and despite the clear need to adapt to climate change, private sector 
engagement is still minimal. Whilst the case study of this research highlights in more 
detail the opportunities for mobilising climate finance from private sector sources to 
help Jordan adapt to a shrinking availability of water, this part provides a brief 
introduction to private sector climate finance in general.  Financing in the context of 
climate change adaptation finance is often defined as “making money available, ex-
ante, for investment; that money is typically repaid from the ex-post operations and 
cash-flows of the investment. Examples of finance, using legal language, are debt 
(often loans) and equity stakes” (Standard Bank. 2012).  This is in sharp contrast to 
“covering the incremental cost”, which “entails a subsidy aimed at making any given 
investment alternative commercially viable, or competitive to other conventional 
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investment alternatives. This is usually not repaid” (ibid.). In order to highlight the 
differences and possibly advantages of mobilising the private sector for climate 
finance, the table below has been adopted from the UNEP Finance Initiative (2012). 
It is important to highlight that the role of the private sector can occur in different 
forms and in different degrees of involvement. The role of the private sector can be 
twofold: purely financial or also advisory.  
 
Table 11: Financial and advisory roles of the private sector 
Function  
Financial The private sector will carry all or a large 
part of the costs of adaptation related 
projects. This can be a purely private 
sector project, or co-financed with the 
public sector. 
Advisory The private sector provides the 
technological know-how and skills, while 
the public sector pays. 
 
According to the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) (2011) private finance can 
support climate change adaptation in various ways and it argues that the private 
sector already forms an integral source of climate finance. Multilateral and bilateral 
development banks, for instance, issue generic bonds as a means of raising private 
finance from capital markets. A proportion of which is then used to finance projects 
that deliver on climate change targeted programmes. However, as the SEI points 
out, that at the time of writing10, most of the private sector capital has been directed 
                                                          
10
 March 2013 
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towards mitigation projects as these are more profitable at first glance. However, as 
this research shows later, there is increasingly a large market for private sector 
finance for adaptation activities. As discussed in more detail further in this thesis, 
there are various ways in which private finance can support adaptation, however, as 
the SEI arguably rightly points out “private finance will not be distributed evenly, but 
instead heavily concentrated in large emerging economies and resource rich 
countries”. However, with most international funding directed towards least 
developed countries and most private finance directed at resource rich countries, a 
large group of countries will be left with little financial support, including countries 
such as Jordan. 
 
Table 12 provides an overview for differentiating public versus private finances for 
climate change adaptation activities.   
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Table 12: Differentiating between public and private money for climate change adaptation investments 
Criterion Public money Private money 
Is this “finance” or “covering the 
incremental cost”?  
 
 
Can be both Can only be “finance” 
Political versus commercial motivation 
 
 
Does often not have to be repaid (of in the 
form of favourable conditions) 
Does have to be repaid (in the form of 
cash-flows of the investment and from 
operations) 
Availability (in principle)? 
 
 
Very limited, particularly under the current 
global economic situation; unlikely that 
availability will increase  
Vastly available 
Reliability and predictability over time 
 
 
Largely dependent on politics (which can 
be very volatile at times) 
Dependent of economic fundamentals, 
which tend to be stable 
Effectiveness (will finance truly lead to 
adaptation?) 
 
 
No automatically built-in guarantee for 
effectiveness 
Built-in guarantee for effectiveness: 
finance only flows at high level of certainty 
that it will be repaid. Repayment depends 
on the successful project implementation 
Efficiency (how much adaptation is 
achieved by unit of finance?) 
 
 
Given political motivation, there is no built-
in guarantee for efficiency 
Given commercial motivation there is 
built-in guarantee for efficiency  
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4.15 Summary 
This chapter provided an introduction to climate change adaptation finance and 
presented an analysis of the most relevant literature as well as of the climate 
adaptation funding instruments and mechanisms that are in place. In the beginning 
of the chapter the concept of climate change adaptation was introduced and 
supported by different definitions.  The chapter then continued to explore the 
literature on climate adaptation and thereby mainly referred to a selected number of 
publications, including the Stern Review (2006) and highlighted the absence of a 
coherent adaptation strategy as well as the funding gap between what is needed to 
cover adaptation projects in developing countries and between the funding that has 
been agreed upon until the time of writing. It is worth to note, however, that the 
majority of these estimates are for developing countries only and exclude developed 
countries and emerging economies. This elaboration was followed by an analysis of 
the Adaptation Fund, the National Adaptation Programmes of Action, the Green 
Climate Fund as well as the EU Green and White Papers. The analysis showed that 
whilst adaptation strategies on EU level remain rather vague and unspecified, the 
AF, NAPAS and GCF have set out clear targets, financial and operational. The funds 
are still in their infancy and the funding which will be disbursed through these funds 
will not suffice to cover adaptation costs; therefore, the role of the private sector is 
gaining evermore importance in the development, design and implementation of 
adaptation projects.  
 
The following chapter therefore explores the trends that will require an adaptation 
strategy and will identify the trends in climate change that this research will focus 
upon.  
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5. Determining trends which require an adaptation strategy 
 
This chapter examines the physical impacts of the changes in the global climate on 
people around the world and will, according to a set of criteria, establish which 
impacts deserve special attention and possibly priority in the development of an 
adaptation funding strategy.  
 
According to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) past mitigation efforts were too small in scale and 
came too late in terms of avoiding major damage to the global climate (Biermann et 
al., 2010). “Global adaptation governance” (ibid.) is the area within climate change 
policy that is still the least explored, yet it will affect almost all areas of world politics, 
including global food regimes, global water and health governance, as well as global 
trade in goods and the world economy in general.  
 
The number and intensity of effects climate change might have on humans’ daily life 
cannot yet be fully estimated. However, evidence and research to date have been 
able to show that there are already and will continue to be a vast range of changes in 
the climate that will affect millions of people across the world (IPCC, 2007; 
Pettengell, 2010). The intensity will vary and so will the consequences for the areas 
that are affected. The consequences, as discussed in the previous chapter of this 
thesis, can be both negative and positive and adaptation to climate change aims at 
either exploiting the beneficial opportunities or at diminishing the vulnerability. 
Adaptation to expected climatic changes is a complex topic and project costs are 
immense, exemplified by the estimated project costs of different NAPAs; it therefore 
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seems advisable to identify the climatic trends that require an adaptation strategy 
most urgently and accordingly become a focus for financial investments.  
 
5.1 Criteria-based approach 
This section aims at identifying the most pressing climate change trends. In order to 
do so, a criteria based approach is developed and applied. The three criteria 
according to which the main trends in climatic changes are identified include:  
1. the effect caused by climate change is life-threatening 
2. the trend affects a high number of people, and  
3. the trend will force people to permanently re-locate and migrate 
  
5.1.1 Criteria 1: Life-threatening effects 
“Life-threatening” refers to trends that will endanger humans’ lives in the short-term 
when extreme weather events occur, but also over the long-term as climate change 
trends develop, both in terms of frequency and intensity. Hence, this includes effects 
such as extreme flooding and droughts, water scarcity, storms, shifts in vegetation 
that lead to mal-nutrition and the spreading of diseases such as malaria and dengue-
fever, which usually affect high numbers of people in different regions of the world.  
 
5.1.2 Criteria 2: Number of people affected 
The second criteria, which refers to the number of people affected by the climate 
change trend, is difficult to estimate. However, it was decided that for the purpose of 
this research a “high number of people” would refer to entire nations or countries. 
Migration and displacement induced by climate change has received paramount 
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attention by researchers and policy makers alike and is considered a pressing issue 
under international humanitarian law (Johnstone, 2008; McAdam, 2011) and very 
closely linked to the third criteria: the temporary and permanent relocation of people 
due to climate change.  
 
5.1.3 Criteria 3: Permanent re-location and migration 
Recent examples include the 2010 Pakistan floods, which inundated around 20% of 
the country and left approximately 20 million people temporarily homeless (UNHCR, 
2012); in 2011 flooding in Australia inundated areas as large as Germany and 
France combined leaving many cities and towns isolated and stranded (Warner, 
2011).  
 
A recent study by the UNHCR (Division of International Protection, May 2011) points 
towards the questions that arise in the context of climate change-induced migration.  
 
 Is it possible for people displaced in part by climate change-related processes 
to return to their places of origin, and under what circumstances? 
 Are policies that adequately address the needs of people who have voluntarily 
left or those who have been compelled to leave their homes in place? 
 Do frameworks exist to address the needs of people who respond to slower-
onset changes in their environments that affect their livelihoods? 
 
Source: UNHCR DIP, 2011 
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Notwithstanding the importance of this research area, a detailed discussion of the 
international law revolving around the difficulty of climate change-induced displaced 
persons is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
Table13: Definitions of criteria applied in criteria-based approach 
 
Criteria 
 
 
 
Life-threatening 
 
 
Number of people 
affected 
 
 
Temporary or 
permanent 
relocation 
 
Definition 
Trends that will 
endanger 
humans’11 lives in 
the short-term 
when extreme 
weather events 
occur, but also 
over the long-term 
as climate change 
trends develop. 
Number of people 
affected exceeds 
individuals or small 
communities, but 
refers to nations 
and countries 
Whole nations and 
countries are 
forced to 
permanently or 
temporarily re-
locate and migrate 
due to climate 
change effects. 
 
 
5.2 Global warming – trends 
This section looks at some of the main trends of global warming. Scientific data 
suggests that global warming is one of the biggest global threats facing the world in 
the 21st century as well as in the decades and centuries following (IPCC, 2007; 
2012). The earth’s climate is rapidly changing, predominantly as the result of sharp 
increases in GHG emissions through human activities (Stern, 2006; IPCC, 2007). 
Most climate models indicate a very high likelihood of a doubling of pre-industrial 
levels of GHGs, committing the Earth’s global mean temperature to rise by 2-5°C. 
This level of GHGs will probably be reached between 2030 and 2060.  In addition to 
this, a warming of 5°C on a global scale would be far outside our experience and 
                                                          
11
 This research focuses on the impact of climate change on humans and ecosystems, and excludes 
animals due to the specific nature of the research question. 
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comparable to the difference between temperatures during the last ice age and 
today (Stern, 2006). All of the ten warmest years on record have occurred since 
1990 and research indicates that the years between 1995 and 2006 rank amongst 
the twelve warmest years that have ever been recorded since global temperatures 
have been measured from 1850 onwards. Chances for a warming above 5°C are 
estimated at around 20%. As Stern highlights, the first signs of changes in the 
climate can be seen in many biological and physical systems; many species have 
been moving closer towards the pole, on average by 6km each decade during the 
past 30-40 years. Furthermore, changing seasonal events such as egg laying and 
vegetation shifts such as flowering have occurred 2-3 days earlier each decade in 
many Northern Hemisphere temperate regions (Stern, 2006).  
 
Table 14 below provides a definition of the Likelihood Scale according to the IPCC 
(2010)12 
Table 14: Likelihood scale according to the IPCC (2010) 
Term  Likelihood of the Outcome 
Virtually certain  99-100% probability 
Very likely  90-100%  probability 
Likely  66-100% probability 
About as likely as not  33 to 66% probability 
Unlikely  0-33% probability 
Very unlikely  0-10% probability 
Exceptionally unlikely  0-1% probability 
 
Current projections and climate models predict that even if global GHG emissions 
were to be stopped or stabilised today, the world would experience a warming of a 
further 0.5° - 1°C over several decades due to the level of past emissions (IPCC, 
                                                          
12
 The scale describes the likelihood of the degree of certainty in findings of the assessment process 
of climate change models and predictions for evaluating and communicating findings.  
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2007; Stern, 2006). This is due to the time lap between the point of GHG emissions 
and the point when the effects of such emissions can be felt in the atmosphere and 
hence in obvious changes in the climate. This warming is already smaller than the 
warming expected if ambient concentrations were stabilised at 430ppm13 CO2e 
(Stern, 2006). If, however, annual emissions were to continue at today’s level, GHG 
levels are going to be almost double to pre-industrial levels by the middle of the 
century (2050). If this concentration was to be sustained, projected temperature rise 
would be around 2-5°C with a probability of being even higher. 
         
The impacts of a warming climate will be felt across the world, yet with variability 
from region to region and will be “superimposed” on existing temperature patterns 
(Stern, 2006; IPCC, 2012). Therefore, anticipating and adapting to these impacts of 
climate change is crucial in order to minimise human and environmental losses. This 
is a challenge for all nations and at all levels of society. Thus, action at multiple 
levels is needed, from the local to the international, involving public and private 
actors alike (Burton, 2006, p. 2). The smallest temperature increases will occur over 
the oceans and some tropical coastal regions (Stern, 2006). The largest temperature 
increases though, will be felt in high latitudes, where melting snow and ice will 
reduce the reflectivity of the surface, leading to temperature increases that are 
significantly higher than the global average (ibid.). 
 
In Part III of the Stern Review, Stern addresses the impacts of climate change on 
growth and development and how it will affect people around the world. It will be 
those most vulnerable to climate change, who are least responsible for it and who 
                                                          
13
 ppm: part per million 
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have the least means of adapting (Burton, p.2). If no adaptation occurs, climate 
change will threaten the basic elements of life for people around the world, including 
the access to food and water.  
 
The following section looks at the physical impacts of the changes in the climate on 
people around the world and, according to the criteria as set out above, establishes 
which impacts deserve particular attention in the development of an adaptation 
funding strategy.  
 
5.3 Vulnerability and adaptive capacity  
According to Stern, climate change is likely to increase the economic costs of 
extreme weather events, by increasing the probability of those extreme weather 
events and by intensifying the water cycle, which increases the number of heat 
waves and flooding, droughts and storms at the same time (Stern, p. 59). Changes 
in the variability of the climate in the future are difficult to predict though, but could 
have severe impacts on livelihood around the world. As an example, Stern refers to 
India, where the economy and social infrastructure is closely linked and tuned to the 
(to date) stability of the monsoon. Fluctuations in the timing and the strength of the 
monsoon could therefore lead to significant flooding or drought, with major 
repercussions for the Indian economy. Considering the uncertainty of what will be 
happening in the future and based on cost-benefit analyses, in the majority of cases 
the best option would be to adapt to these eventualities, in order to minimise damage 
and hence higher costs for global economies and the loss of lives of millions of 
people.  
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Furthermore, the impacts of climate change will become more severe at higher 
temperatures, including the rising risks of triggering extreme and large-scale events, 
such as the loss of the Amazon Forest or the melting of the Greenland ice sheet, 
drought and water scarcity in many regions of the world, such as Jordan and the 
MENA region. The consequences and effects of climate change are also dependent 
on how the physical impacts interact with socio-economic factors. Economic growth 
and strength often reduces a society’s vulnerability to climate change and 
furthermore increases their capacity to adapt to the impacts. However, population 
growth and movement as well as a weak economy might exacerbate the impacts of 
climate change by an increased exposure of society to extreme weather events, 
without having the option of adaptation beforehand.  
 
Smit et al. (2001) define vulnerability as the “degree to which a system is susceptible 
to injury, damage, or harm” and describe the concept of adaptive capacity as “the 
potential or capability of a system to adapt to [to alter to better suit] climatic stimuli or 
their effects or impacts” (p. 894). In addition to this, the economic condition of 
nations and regional communities is a very strong determinant of adaptive capacity 
and it is widely acknowledged and accepted that wealthy nations are in a better 
position to bear the costs of adaptation to the impacts of climate change than poorer, 
less developed countries are (Smit et al. 2001; Burton, 2006). It is also a widely 
accepted fact that poverty is directly linked to vulnerability and that it is usually the 
poor who are most vulnerable to malnutrition, famine and diseases (Pettengell, 
2010). Furthermore, the level of technology, information and skills as well as 
infrastructure, institutions and governance models have strong impacts on the 
degree to which a society is able to adapt to climate change-related impacts without 
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suffering too severe damages. A lack of technology limits the number and variety of 
possible responses to implementing adaptation; a large range of the adaptive 
strategies identified in the management of climate change involve, directly or 
indirectly, the use of technology. Hence, if there is a low level of technology and the 
ability to rapidly develop new technologies is rather low, a society’s level of adaptive 
capacity will be low as well. The same applies to the amount of information available 
and the level of skills present; “successful adaptation requires a recognition of the 
necessity to adapt, knowledge about available options, the capacity to assess them, 
and the ability to implement the most suitable ones” (Fankhauser and Tol, 1997 in 
Smit et al.).  
 
Building adaptive capacity therefore requires a strong, unifying vision within a 
population, a scientific understanding of the threat, a certain degree of openness in 
dealing with the challenges and problems and commitment as well as pragmatism in 
developing solutions and mostly of all, sufficient finances to implement adaptation 
projects and technologies. In terms of (social) infrastructure, less developed 
countries might not have the possibilities of adjusting quickly or at all to climate 
change-induced weather events; an example would be the flooding of urban areas, 
with people having no possibility of retreat or accommodation elsewhere. During 
urban renewal, grounds could be raised in order to decrease vulnerability to rising 
sea-levels, flooding and extreme storms.  
 
5.4 Climate change-induced climatic variations 
Oxfam (2010) generated a list which comprises the changes in climate that might 
occur due to a warming world and the impacts these changes might have on the 
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environment, humans and animals and provides intervention examples as to how to 
adapt to these possible changes. The list is not exhaustive, and includes (1) 
increases in temperature, (2) sea-level rise, (3) increase in rainfall, (4) decrease in 
rainfall and (5) changed seasonality (p. 37). These five trends in climate change are 
analysed herein in terms of the impacts they might result in and specific adaptation 
strategies are developed. However, many impacts are not included in the list, such 
as heat waves and droughts as well as options for adaptation.  
 
Taking into consideration that adaptation policy is still in its infancy and that there is 
a big funding gap for adaptation-related projects it may appear sensible to focus on a 
specific set of climate change-related impacts and adaptation mechanisms. In order 
to do so, a criteria-based approach was applied in this research to determine which 
impacts should be considered in making adaptation funding decisions. Since the 
precise impacts of climate change and its effects on humans, animals and ecological 
systems cannot be predicted in their full dimension, the criteria-based approach 
developed in this chapter will have to be subject to constant review and adjustment.  
 
5.5 Developing criteria for prioritisation  
In the following pages, the criteria-based approach explained earlier in this chapter is 
further developed, aiming at providing a mechanism with which adaptation projects 
could be prioritised and thereby providing a base according to which projects could 
be funded and made politically-acceptable.  
 
For selecting climate change induced effects to which there is a need to adapt 
special consideration should be given to factors such as:  
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1. how many people are affected  
2. is the effect life-threatening and  
3. would the effect force people to permanently re-locate (climate refugees14) 
 
As established throughout the literature, as the result of a warming climate the 
following effects belong to the most threatening and prevalent:  
1. water scarcity  
2. sea-level rise  
3. flooding  
4. droughts and  
5. extreme weather events,  including all additional side-effects resulting out of 
these five weather events  
 
5.6 Water: too little or too much 
5.6.1 Water scarcity 
People will feel the impact of the changing climate most strongly through shifts in the 
distribution of water across the world (UN Water, 2007). In addition to these shifts 
there will be a seasonal and annual variability of water distribution. Water is essential 
for good health, sanitation and a resource for maintaining life across the world and is 
therefore crucial for sustainable growth and development. Climate change, however, 
will alter patterns of water availability and the frequency of droughts and floods will 
increase over many years, as will the shrinking availability of water in certain regions 
                                                          
14
 "people who have to leave their habitats, immediately or in the near future, because of sudden or 
gradual alterations in their natural environment related to at least one of three impacts of climate 
change: sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity" (Biermann, 2010) 
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of the world (Stern, 2006). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, there will be more 
rain in high latitudes and less rain in the dry subtropics. Furthermore, hotter land 
surface temperatures trigger more powerful evaporation and thus more intense 
rainfall, which increases the risk of flash flooding15. Already existing differences in 
water availability between different geographical regions will become even more 
pronounced in the future; areas that are already comparatively dry, such as the 
Mediterranean, the Middle East and parts of Southern Africa and South America are 
likely to experience further shortages in water supply. Figures in the Stern Review 
indicate a decrease of up to 30% in annual runoff in the above-mentioned regions for 
a 2°C, and 40-50% for a 4°C global temperature rise (Stern, 2006). Areas such as 
South Asia and parts of Russia and Northern Europe, on the other hand, are likely to 
witness relatively high increases in water availability, 10-20% for a 2°C global 
temperature rise and slightly more for an increase in global temperature by 4°C 
(Stern, 2006).   
 
Approximately one-third (~2.2 billion) of the global population live in countries 
experiencing moderate to high water stress and 1.1 billion people lack access to safe 
water (UN Water, 2007). Water stress is a good indicator, yet not necessarily reliable 
in reflecting access to safe water (potable water). According to Stern (2006), even 
without climate change, population growth itself, in addition to economic 
development, could result in billions of people without or with very limited water 
availability. Figures estimate that with a temperature rise of 2°C approximately 1-4 
billion people will experience growing water shortages, in Africa, the Middle East, 
Southern Europe and South and Central America (ibid.). These regions are already 
                                                          
15
 Flash flooding: The result of heavy or excessive amounts of rainfall within a short period of time, 
usually less than 6 hours, causing water to rise and fall quite rapidly. Source: Kansas Water Science 
Center http://ks.water.usgs.gov/waterwatch/flood/definition.html , retrieved 23.08.2010 
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dependent on good water management for growth and development and additional 
water stress could set back the efforts made during the past decades. At the same 
time, other regions like South and East Asia may receive more water (ibid.). This 
additional water could give rise to more serious flooding during the wet seasons. A 
recent example are the Pakistan 2010 floods in which close to 20 million people 
were affected and 2000 died because of the floods or related side-effects, like 
Malaria and diarrhoea (Oxfam 2010; Thomson Reuters Foundation 2010).  
 
5.6.2 Sea-level rise 
Whereas some regions of the world will experience an increasing lack of water, other 
regions will encounter the opposite. In addition to water stress, sea level rise 
presents the other major threat to millions of people across the world. The warming 
that has occurred over the past century has already committed the world to rising 
sea levels for the coming centuries. If warming continues then this commitment will 
be further increased.  
 
Rising sea levels present a threat to the living space and land of many people, 
leading to people being displaced due to permanent inundation. The costs of sea 
walls will rise “approximately as a square of the required height” (Stern, p. 76). 
Coastal areas belong to the most densely populated areas in the world, and not only 
provide land to those living there, but also support important ecosystems on which 
locals depend. In many cases important infrastructure is concentrated around 
coastlines, including nuclear power stations, port and industrial facilities as well as oil 
refineries. According to Stern, there are currently around 200 million people living in 
coastal floodplains, including one-quarter of Bangladesh’s population (~35 million 
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people). Many metropolises are also at risk of flooding and sea-level rise, with New 
York, London, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Buenos Aires and Shanghai being at particularly 
high risk in the coming decades to centuries (Pettengell, 2010). Almost every city 
relies on very costly flood defences for protection and early warning systems. Even if 
protected, these cities face the major threat of a residual risk of flooding. However, 
adaptation allows cities to be prepared and to avoid damages that would lead to 
extremely high socio-economic costs; costs which are much higher than if adaptation 
was happening pre-emptively.  
 
Sea-level rise is considered a confirmed effect threatening the existence of small 
island states, such as the Maldives, and other coastal areas and cities (ibid.). The 
global mean sea-level rose by 1 to 2mm per year to up 10 to 20cm during the 20th 
century. Projections for future sea-level rise estimate a rise in the range of 9 to 88cm 
between 1990 and 2100, depending on the rise in global mean temperature (Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, 2010).    
 
5.6.2.1 Example – The Maldives 
The Maldives offer a good illustration of the consequences of sea-level rise on 
countries and its citizens. The Maldives is a Small Island State and is amongst the 
most vulnerable countries to climate change: since 1987, the Maldives government 
has repeatedly re-emphasised the need for adaptation to climate change. According 
to former Maldives President Maumoon Abdul Gayyoom (2001) “...there must be a 
way out. Neither the Maldives nor any small island nation wants to drown. That’s for 
sure. Neither do we want our lands eroded nor our economies destroyed, nor do we 
want to become environmental refugees either. We want to stand up and fight”. The 
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Maldives further played a crucial role in the development of the UNFCCC and related 
negotiations and was amongst the first countries to sign the Kyoto Protocol in March 
1998.  For the Maldives the predicted long-term trend in sea-level rise for the capital 
Male’ is 1.7mm per year (Maldives NAPA, 2007, p. 14). At the same time over 80% 
of the total land area of the Maldives lies less than 1m above mean sea level (MSL) 
and the highest point measuring 4m above MSL (p. 20). As mentioned above, if sea-
levels were to rise within the range of 9 to 88cm until 2100, the Maldives islands 
would be submerged, under the worst case scenario.  
 
According to the Maldives NAPA currently 44% of all settlements on all islands are 
within 100m of coastline; this is equivalent to 42% of the total population (p. 20). 
Thus, given the close proximity of housing and other infrastructure to the sea and 
considering the projected sea-level rise, homes of people are at severe risk of 
submerging with higher sea-levels. Furthermore, the small size of the islands - the 
largest island being Gan with 6 km² - and the low elevation, make human 
settlements defenceless and unprotected against severe weather events and 
dramatic changes in sea-levels, which renders retreat inland or to higher altitudes 
impossible (p. 22). Thus sea-level rise does not only present a threat to the living 
space of humans and animals alike, but might also lead to a disruption of tourism in 
the shorter term, thereby damaging the Maldivian economy, which is heavily 
dependent on tourism1617.  
 
                                                          
16
 In 2011: Tourism is accountable for 30% of GDP, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5476.htm, 
retrieved 17.09.2012  
17
 For an in-depth analysis on the impacts of sea-level rise on the Maldivian economy, see the 
Maldives NAPA, pp. 26 
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The Maldives are just one example of the consequences of sea-level rise, which 
underlines the importance, on the one hand to mitigate climate change, and on the 
other hand to try to adjust as much as possible to the predicted and already 
irreversible effects of a changing climate, i.e. to develop a sound adaptation strategy 
tailored to countries’ individual adaptation needs.   
 
5.6.3 Drought 
Drought is another major impact of climate change affecting millions of people 
across the world and is most severely felt in many parts of Africa (Pettengell, 2010). 
An example of a particularly strongly affected country is Ethiopia, due to its low 
capacity to adapt and its high vulnerability to climate change effects. Droughts in the 
past have led to huge losses in life and property, as well as to mass migration 
(Ethiopia NAPA, 2007). In 2006 Ethiopia was affected by the most serious drought 
experienced in years, followed by another major drought in 2009. Close to 14 million 
Ethiopians (approximately 20% of the total population) were experiencing difficulties 
in finding sufficient food and lacked access to safe drinking water and sanitation. 
Amongst them were 62,000 children treated for acute malnutrition (The Time, 2009).  
Drought and lack of water is considered the “single most important climate related 
natural hazard impacting the country” (Ethiopia NAPA, 2007), leading to malnutrition, 
famine, and the destruction of livestock.  
 
The causes for its high vulnerability lie in Ethiopia’s high dependence on rain fed 
agriculture, under-development of water resources, low health service coverage, 
high population growth rate, low economic development, low adaptive capacity, 
inadequate infrastructures, weak institutions and lack of awareness amongst the 
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population (ibid.). According to the Ethiopian NAPA analysis “the most vulnerable 
sectors to climate variability and change are Agriculture, Water and Human Health” 
(ibid.), which form essential components of human existence. Traditionally, 
Ethiopians adapt to this variability by changing cropping and planting practices, by 
reducing consumption levels, collecting wild foods as well as temporary and 
permanent migration. These reactions are not specific to the Ethiopian case, but are 
wide-spread amongst countries similarly affected by climate change. However, with 
an increase in climate variability and the probability of a permanently changing 
climate, these coping mechanisms will not suffice in the future any longer; 
alternatives will have to be explored, whilst other, permanent means of adaptation 
will become necessary.  
 
5.6.4 Flooding 
A further major effect of climate change that will impact millions of people across the 
world is flooding. The example referred to in this chapter is Bangladesh. Bangladesh 
is one of the largest deltas in the world and except for a few hilly regions and terrace 
land, 80% of the land is floodplain (Bangladesh NAPA, 2005, p. 1). All land types 
(except the highlands) are exposed to Monsoon flooding during part of the year or 
even throughout the whole year. Thus, the major natural hazards in Bangladesh are 
floods, flash floods and landslides. According to the Bangladesh NAPA, “floods affect 
about 80% of land in Bangladesh in a normal year; 20-25% of the country is 
inundated by river spills and drainage congestions. Approximately 37%, 43%, 52% 
and 60% of the country is inundated with floods of return periods of 10, 20, 50 and 
100 [years] respectively” (p. 6).  
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Looking at the floods that hit Bangladesh worst over the past decades, one can see 
that the socio-economic costs of floods are enormous. Between 38% and 61% of the 
land was inundated in each flood, with a total of 12 000 deaths in seven floods and 
average costs of US$ 1-6 billion per flood, with another 30 000 deaths as a result of 
famine and millions of homeless and otherwise affected people (ibid.). The floods in 
Bangladesh have tremendous effects on the economy, especially agriculture18, and 
set back development efforts, due to its low level of adaptive capacity and high level 
of vulnerability to climate impacts. According to the Bangladesh NAPA flooding will 
increase in frequency over the coming years and will become even more 
devastating, thus creating major problems of livelihood and macro-economic 
dislocations, thereby exacerbating development efforts and poverty levels (ibid.). 
 
After the devastating 2004 floods, which affected 600 000 people, Oxfam was one of 
the aid agencies calling for efficient climate change adaptation strategies. According 
to Oxfam these strategies should range from raised houses, cluster villages and 
flood shelters to the provision of rescue boats, a disaster preparedness committee 
and the provision of clean water (Karim and Mimura, 2008). The Bangladesh NAPA 
estimates total adaptation costs of around US$ 80 million, in order to implement 
projects that allow the country to be sufficiently prepared for coming natural disasters 
(p. 25).  
 
Droughts and permanent water scarcity, floods and sea-level rise are probably the 
most threatening consequences of a warming climate and most expensive in terms 
of socio-economic costs and adaptation requirements. Other impacts of climate 
                                                          
18
 In 2006: Contribution of agriculture to GDP: 23.5% ; Ministry of Agriculture Bangladesh, 
http://www.moa.gov.bd/statistics/bag.htm, retrieved 17.09.2012 
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change, such as extreme storms and the spread of diseases should not be 
underestimated though and heat waves19 are another more frequently observed 
climate change induced impact that is felt across the world (Stern, 2006).  
 
As can be seen from the analysis above, climate change will affect different regions 
in the world differently, and hence specific, needs-tailored adaptation strategies will 
have to be developed. In some cases, there is need for cooperation, as climate 
change does not know boundaries and only joint efforts will lead to the desired 
results. Therefore, it should be decided which effects deserve attention and be given 
priority in the process of developing adaptation strategies and on which levels – 
regional, national, cross-boundary. This should be done according to the selection 
criteria explained determined in the beginning of this chapter –  
1. the effect caused by climate change is life-threatening  
2. it affects a high number of people and  
3. the effect would force people to permanently re-locate and migrate  
 
However, it is very difficult to obtain accurate data on the number of people already 
affected and of those who will be affected in the future; these estimates vary greatly. 
The same holds for the costs of adaptation projects and programmes as outlined in 
the NAPAs. The total estimated project costs for projects related to adapting to sea-
level rise, floods and droughts listed in the Maldivian, Ethiopian and Bangladeshi 
NAPAs amount to approximately US$ 920 million.  
                                                          
19
 “A heat wave is a prolonged period of excessive heat, often combined with excessive humidity. 
Generally temperatures are 10 degrees or more above the average high temperature for the region 
during summer months, last for a long period of time and occur with high humidity as well.” 
(International Red Cross, 
http://www.redcross.org/portal/site/en/menuitem.86f46a12f382290517a8f210b80f78a0/?vgnextoid=8c
c6a5f0f013b110VgnVCM10000089f0870aRCRD, retrieved 09.09.2010) 
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The tables below provide a brief summary and overview of the different climate 
change-induced effects and the selection criteria that were chosen in order to 
determine the trend in climate change this research will focus upon.  
 
Overview of climate change effects and their impacts 
Climate change effect Life-threatening? 
Sea-level rise Yes 
Floods Yes 
Droughts/water scarcity Yes 
 
Climate change effect Re-location necessary?  
Sea-level rise Permanently 
Floods Temporary/permanently 
Droughts/water scarcity Temporary/permanently 
 
Climate change effect Number of people affected  
Sea-level rise Millions 
Floods Millions 
Droughts/water scarcity Approximately 1/3 of world population (rising) 
 
Country Costs of adaptation for selected countries 
(estimates) 
Bangladesh US$ 1.5 – 23 mio; total costs: US$ 58 mio
20
 
Ethiopia US$ 2 – 700 mio; total costs: US$ 759 mio
21
 
Maldives US$ 1.6 – 60.6 mio; total costs: US$ 103 mio
22
 
                                                          
20
 Including relevant NAPA projects 1,2,3,5,10,11,12,13,14 
21
 Including relevant NAPA projects 1,2,3,4,6,10,7 
22
 Including relevant NAPA projects: 1,2,3,7,8,10,12  
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Thus far this chapter has discussed several effects of climate change and its impacts 
on the global population. Although each of them – flooding, drought, sea-level rise 
and water scarcity – presents a threat to humans, ecosystems and animals alike, for 
the purpose of this research it was decided to focus on water scarcity. Water scarcity 
and hence the lack of safe drinking water and sanitation has profound impacts on the 
well-being of billions of people around the world, with wide reaching implications on 
political and social stability, mass-migration and the status of the global economies. 
The remaining part of this chapter will therefore examine the impacts of water 
scarcity in particular on the Mediterranean and the Middle East and North Africa, 
regions that will be affected by a high degree by water scarcity and its effects.    
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5.7 Water scarcity as a trend that requires an adaptation strategy  
 
“Climate change is expected to account for about 20% of the global increase in water 
scarcity” (UN Water, 2007) 
 
5.7.1 Definitions of water scarcity 
Very simply stated, water scarcity occurs when the demand for water exceeds the 
supply in a certain region and sector. Water scarcity is recognised as one of the 
most significant world risks; however, unconstrained water usage in the private 
sphere, industry and agriculture has grown at global level to a rate more than twice 
the rate of global population increase in the 20th century, and has now reached a 
point where reliable water services can no longer be delivered in many regions of the 
world (UN FAO, 2012). Agriculture alone accounts for 70% of global freshwater 
withdrawals, and more than 90% of its consumptive use. According to a 2012 UN 
report, “under the joint pressure of population growth and changes in dietary habits 
food consumption is increasing in most regions of the world. It is expected that by 
2050 an additional billion tonne of cereals and 200 million tonnes of meat will need to 
be produced annually to satisfy growing food demand” (FAO, 2012). Hence, even 
without climate change the global stress on water will increase, with an increase in 
global population, industrialisation and higher levels of development in developing 
countries and therewith connected higher living standards and consumption of water. 
However, climate change is predicted to exacerbate water availability in many arid 
regions of the world even further.  
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“Water scarcity is the point at which the aggregate impact of all users 
impinges on the supply or quality of water under prevailing institutional 
arrangements to the extent that the demands by all sectors, including 
the environment, cannot be satisfied fully”  
(UN Water, 2007) 
"Most of us do not appreciate water. We just take it for granted. Someone with a 
lavish life, we say he is spending money like water." 
Ban Ki Moon, Davos World Economic Forum, January 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
The generally accepted definition for the concepts of water shortage and water 
scarcity is derived from the “Falkenmark Water Stress Index”, developed by Swedish 
scientist Malin Falkenmark in 1989 (Stockholm International Water Institute). 
According to the water stress index a country has no stress in the availability of 
potable water if its annual renewable freshwater resources exceed 1,700m³ per 
person. If the resources total 1,000 to 1,700m³ per person a country is experiencing 
water stress. Chronic water scarcity exists at values between 500 – 1,000m³ and a 
country is said to be “beyond the water barrier of manageable capacity” (Heymann, 
2010) if renewable water totals less than 500m³ per person per year.  
 
Another widely accepted definition defines water scarcity as “the point at which the 
aggregate impact of all users impinges on the supply or quality of water under 
prevailing institutional arrangements to the extent that the demands by all sectors, 
including the environment, cannot be satisfied fully” (UN Water, 2007). Scarcity of 
water may hence be occurring as a social construct under rising demands and 
consumption expectations or as the consequences of altered supply patterns, for 
example induced by climate change or as a combination of both. However, the roots 
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of water scarcity can often be found in drought and in the already arid and semi-arid 
regions of the world; it is in these regions that droughts, climate variability, economic 
development and population growth intensify the problems and consequences of 
water scarcity and become most acute. If all the freshwater availabilities globally 
were divided equally amongst the global population, the per capita allowance per 
year would equal 5000 – 6000m³, which compared to the 1700m³ threshold, provides 
an impression of abundance. However, the global freshwater resources are not 
equally distributed, and also the world’s population is unevenly distributed across 
regions and countries. Many countries, including Jordan, are already well below the 
threshold level and with shifts in the climate and other added factors these cases will 
become more extreme in the years to come (Heymann, 2010).  
 
According to a study by Deutsche Bank, the total global average renewable 
freshwater resources total approximately 8,550m³ per person per year, with Canada 
totalling 91,000m³, Germany 1,900m³, Egypt slightly below 800m³ per year and 
Jordan with only around 165m³ per person per year (Heymann, 2010; Aquastat, 
2008). However, the index only serves as a rough guideline. The index does not take 
into consideration individual countries’ adaptability levels to inadequate natural 
supplies of freshwater.  
 
5.7.2 Agriculture as the largest consumer of freshwater 
In the majority of countries, as pointed out above, agriculture is the largest consumer 
of freshwater availabilities, with consumption levels of up to 70%. In the past large-
scale water projects were aimed at alleviating poverty and providing food security, at 
protecting communities and regions from flooding and droughts and at expanding 
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employment opportunities. In particular, irrigated agriculture has played a major role 
in driving economic development, reducing poverty and strengthening economies. 
However, at the same time poorer communities have and are still suffering from 
inadequate supplies of freshwater for sanitation and food production as well as safe 
drinking water. Therefore, although water has played such an important role in 
driving agricultural production and strengthening economies, its scarcity hinders 
developing countries abilities to break through the cycle of poverty. At the World 
Economic Forum in Davos in 2013, water scarcity was described as the “second 
most important world risk” and hence growing water scarcity and competition for 
water not only stand as major threats to political, social and economic stability but 
also as major obstacles to poverty alleviation and continuous development. It is 
hence no surprise that increasingly the poor in rural areas regard water as more 
critical than access to primary healthcare and education (UN Water, 2007).  
 
5.7.3 Supply-driven and demand-driven approaches to water management 
Several factors further drive the trend towards water scarcity and the over allocation 
of water. Often this is caused by a purely supply-driven approach to water resource 
management that does not take into account the limits of the water system, whilst 
the demand-side is often left ignored in water management decisions.  Conflicts 
amongst users – often transboundary – are caused by logics based on increased 
supply levels and a lack of understanding of the interrelations of the different sectors 
that are dependent on water resources. In many cases, as this research will later 
show for the case of Jordan, the overriding political nature and sensitivity of water 
takes precedence over the hydrological feasibility or projects and other decisions, 
whilst the social consequences of such decisions are more often ignored than taken 
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into account. The most appropriate scale for understanding the issue of water 
scarcity is probably the local, regional and sometimes national level rather than the 
global level. In many countries both, water scarce and water abundant areas can be 
found, and the given water resources can be derived from diverse means of water 
resources, including rainfall or large perennial rivers. It is hence often easier to 
approach the matter of water scarcity from a local perspective than from a fully 
national or global approach, depending on the given circumstances.  
 
Table 15: Falkenmark Water Stress Index (1989) 
          
Classification 
 
No water stress Water stress Chronic water 
scarcity 
Beyond the 
water barrier 
of 
manageable 
capacity 
 
 
Definition 
Annual renewable 
freshwater 
resources: exceed 
1,700m³ per 
person 
 
 
 
Example: 
Germany, Canada 
Annual renewable 
freshwater 
resources: 1,000 
to 1,700m³ per 
person 
 
 
 
Example: 
India 
 
Annual renewable 
freshwater 
resources: 500 – 
1,000m³ per 
person 
 
 
 
Example: 
Egypt 
Annual 
renewable 
freshwater 
resources: 
less than 
500m³ per 
person  
 
Example: 
Jordan 
 
 
5.7.4 Water scarcity and poverty – a vicious cycle 
Water and poverty are very closely interlinked. To some degree one might even say 
that without water there will not be poverty alleviation and without poverty alleviation 
and development successful water supply and demand management will be difficult 
to achieve. Unclean water and lack of sanitation affects the poorest people across 
the world; one in five people in developing countries lack access to sufficient clean 
water, which has been suggested at 20 litres per day (FAO, 2008). Average water 
consumption in Europe and in the United States equals about 200 to 600 litres per 
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day (UN Water, 2007). For many poor people in developing countries and emerging 
economies water is predominantly about the guarantee to fair and safe access to 
drinking water, and not so much about droughts, decrease in annual precipitation 
and dried out river basins. In many countries of the world institutions struggle with 
the equitable distribution of water and the ones who suffer most are the rural poor, 
often referred to as the “water losers” (UN Water, 2007). In many regions, rainfall is 
not considered or integrated in water resource management and the focus is usually 
directed towards groundwater aquifers or surface water availabilities; it has been 
widely recommended for rainwater to be officially integrated into strategies for coping 
with water scarcity (GIZ, 2012; Eco Consult, 201223). Many small-hold farmers have 
already integrated rainfall into their irrigation systems but there are few large-scale 
approaches.  
 
5.7.5 Water scarcity and population growth 
As mentioned above, if global freshwater availabilities were divided equally amongst 
the global population, the per capita allowance per year would equal 5000 – 6000m³, 
which, compared to the 1700m³ thresholds, provides an impression of abundance. 
However, the global freshwater resources are not equally distributed, and also the 
world’s population is unevenly distributed across regions and countries. During the 
20th century the global population has tripled and it is expected to rise from about 6.5 
billion (in 2005) to about 8.9 billion by 2050 (UN, 2004). Water use on the other hand 
has grown at more than twice this rate and although there is no global water scarcity 
as such, increasing number of regions are experiencing chronic shortage of water. 
According to UN Water (2007), by 2025 about 1.8 billion people will be living under 
                                                          
23
 During interviews in Amman, 2012 
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absolute water scarcity whilst two thirds of the global population will live under 
conditions of water stress. The rapid growth in population is going hand in hand with 
increasing urbanisation and industrialisation and hence leads to increasing per 
capita consumption of water. In addition to this climate change will have an effect on 
freshwater resources, including greater variability of precipitations, and hence longer 
periods of drought.  
 
Overall, climate change is expected to account for about 20% of the global increase 
in water scarcity (UN Water, 2007).  
 
5.8 Water in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East and North Africa 
This section aims to highlight the particular vulnerability of the Mediterranean region, 
as well as of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to a shrinking availability of 
water. Increasing populations and economic development have negative impacts on 
the water that is available, even in the absence of climate change. However, with 
climate change there will be even further pressure on existing water resources. 
Irrigated agriculture presents the largest percentage of demand in the countries in 
that region. Agriculture is also usually the first sector of the economy that is affected 
by water scarcity, leading to a reduced capacity to maintain per capita food 
production whilst meeting water needs for domestic and industrial purposes. Water 
strategies in the MENA should therefore be all-encompassing and aimed at 
maximising the economic and social returns of the limited water resources whilst 
managing the demand side.  
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Jordan has been chosen as the case study of this research; hence this part of the 
work will elaborate on the water situation in the Mediterranean and MENA region. 
The pressures and impacts of scarce water resources often result in tension and 
conflict amongst users, in a specific country and between countries. An apparent 
lack of responses towards sustainable water management is arguably due to poor 
institutional structures and legislative frameworks, a discussed in interviews in 
Jordan in 2012.  
 
5.8.1 The effect of climate change on water resources in MENA 
In general, it can be stated that usable water resources in a given country or region 
are usually less than potential water resources and that demand for water exceeds 
supply in the Mediterranean and the MENA region in particular. Climate change 
projections derived from global climate models (IPCC, 2001) result in a projected 
increase of temperatures, an overall precipitation decrease, a greater likelihood of 
drought and variability in precipitation. This renders it difficult to make advanced 
decisions in water management; although, greater extremes in weather events and 
long-term changes in the regional climate require governments to design adequate 
adaptation projects. The economic cost of drought in the Mediterranean over the 
past 20 years is about five times more than in the United States (Iglesias et al., 
2007). Looking at current conditions in the Mediterranean and the MENA, all 
countries will face an increasing uneven distribution of water resources, which leads 
to conflicts amongst users and countries and will be further intensified by climate 
change. As Iglesias et al. state “the human dimension of climate change in the 
Mediterranean may not stop at the country’ boundaries, since there is the potential 
for more pronounced water conflicts with neighbouring regions”.  
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5.8.2 Societal pressures 
The management of water resources in the MENA and Mediterranean is particularly 
challenged and rendered more difficult by the population dynamics in the region. 
Population growth, rising demands and upgraded standards of living that come 
hand-in-hand with economic and social development, water consuming technologies, 
urbanisation and increasing levels of tourism24 lead to higher water demands and an 
overall reduction of per capita water availability.  
 
At the same time societal pressures not only affect water supply directly, but also 
have impacts on policy making in their respective countries. In light of the Arab 
Spring that started in Tunisia in January 2011, many governments regard water as a 
potential source of domestic tensions and uprising and are hence reluctant to 
implement a water strategy that would pave the way for a sustainable water 
management. The impacts and implications of this in Jordan are discussed in further 
detail in a following chapter.  
 
5.8.3 Adaptation strategies in the water sector 
Albeit the countries of the Mediterranean and the MENA have developed, or are in 
the process of developing, policy or legislation25 that encourages better water 
management and aims at addressing all aspects of water, water scarcity has 
multidimensional implications for society. Therefore, no single management action 
will be sufficient to address all such aspects of water and more comprehensive 
                                                          
24
 275 golf courses around the Mediterranean require extremely high levels of water and water 
consumption by tourists in general exceeds the water demand of locals multi-fold. (WWF, 2004)  
25
 Eg. “Water for Life: Jordan’s Water Strategy 2008-2022  
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approaches will be required, including cross-boundary initiatives and better 
cooperation between institutions (Iglesias et al.). At the EU level the Water 
Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) presents an example of a regime designed to 
develop coherent water management legislation and to promote the creation of 
institutions that are responsible for the planning, management and control of water 
resources (ibid.). Such a legislative instrument would be desirable in the MENA 
region over the long-term; however, such harmonisation requires political and 
economic stability as a prerequisite.  
 
Water scarcity as such induces competition on many different levels, between 
sectors of the economy, between users, as well as between countries and regions. 
Often, many different interests are at stake and solutions have to be found between 
governments, cities and rural areas, local stakeholders and centralised authorities, 
rich and poor, public and private. In the absence of clear developed and 
implemented rules water will continue to be distributed inequitably. Emphasis should 
be placed on sharing the benefits of water. According to UN Water (2007), research 
has shown that over the past decades water has been a source of cooperation 
between nations rather than a source of conflict. Clearly, this will be more difficult in 
some regions of the world than in others, but cooperation is generally expected to 
continue. Climate change will exacerbate climatic conditions for many regions in the 
world and as much as cooperation in politically sensitive contexts will be difficult, it 
will also increase the pressure on governments and people alike to find means of 
cooperation in order to be able to cope with and adapt to the adverse effects of 
global warming. 
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5.9 Summary 
Though there are numerous trends that will require an adaptation strategy, it was 
decided that this research would focus on water scarcity and in particular its effects 
in the MENA region. Water scarcity will affect billions of people globally, it will lead to 
mass migration and permanent relocation of whole nations, it will most likely become 
the source of regional and national conflicts if not dealt with appropriately and it will 
affect the overall economic performance and development of countries.  As water is 
becoming increasingly scarce, strategies need to be developed that support the 
different stakeholders in managing their needs under increasing demands, 
increasing competition for water and greater interdependencies.  
 
The Mediterranean and the MENA region is undergoing rapid and fundamental 
socio-economic, political and technological changes that further increase the 
pressure on its existing water deficit and it puts into question the ability to maintain 
the current management philosophy prevalent in so many countries of the region. In 
addition to this, climate change projections indicate a decreasing availability of water, 
which governments will have to take into consideration in the design of adaptation 
strategies in the water sector. Institutions and organisations, such as designated 
ministries for water and irrigation and water councils in the region are evolving to 
respond to the above-mentioned pressures and to ensure, over the long-term, a 
more sustainable water resources management and adequate adaptation strategy. 
 
The following chapter investigates the different sources of funding for climate change 
adaptation programmes in general and will discuss who should pay and why. It 
investigates the different approaches to cost allocation for climate change adaptation 
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related projects and programmes. The chapter thereby touches upon historical 
responsibilities of climate change, as well as responsibility versus burden-based 
approaches to funding adaptation projects.  
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6. Determining who should pay and who should receive  
Cost allocation in climate change adaptation-related projects 
and programmes 
 
“My family is meeting this Christmas to discuss moving (from our ancestral land). We 
cannot stay, as the heat has stopped the grass growing, and there will be nothing to 
feed our livestock. So the very little we have managed to preserve through slavery, 
colonialism and apartheid, we are about to lose to climate change. That is why we do 
not understand why climate finance is so difficult to deal with (in these talks). What I 
have paid is all I have. Whatever it is your ancestors have done, I appeal to you to 
not leave this to your children.”  
(Yvette Abrahams, Oxfam partner, South Africa, at the Doha climate talks, 2012) 
 
I’ll tell you one thing I’m not going to do is I’m not going to let the United States carry 
the burden for cleaning up the world’s air, like the Kyoto Treaty would have done. 
China and India were exempted from that treaty. I think we need to be more even-
handed. 
(George W. Bush, during the second televised presidential debate of 2000) 
 
This chapter investigates the different approaches to cost allocation for climate 
change adaptation-related projects and programmes and thereby draws on a loss 
allocation scheme developed by Farber (2007) as well as research conducted by 
Caney in 2005. The principles described in this chapter do not cover all varieties of 
possibilities, however, they do stimulate a debate and provide a basis for the 
formulation of concrete adaptation financing strategies and highlight deficiencies of 
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different financing models. This chapter eventually argues that the costs of 
adaptation-related projects should be shifted towards the entities that have emitted 
GHGs in the form of national governments, whilst the role of the private sector will 
become increasingly indispensable in an adaptation context. This chapter argues 
that the role of the private sector will not be defined under an international regulatory 
framework, but will be increasingly underlined and emphasised in international 
climate change agreements26.  
 
It has been established that adaptation to climate change cannot longer be regarded 
as “mitigation’s poor cousin” in the climate change debate, but should rather be seen 
as an essential complement to mitigation (Ayers and Huq, 2009). As discussed in the 
introductory chapter of this thesis, even if GHG emissions were to be stopped or 
stabilised with immediate effect, the first effects of climate change will be felt over the 
coming 50 to 100 years already, before any mitigation measures can result in any 
real impact. This is due to the time gap between the point of emissions and the 
moment the side effects of GHG emissions can be witnessed in the climate. The 
effects will vary in type and strength from region to region, with some regions 
experiencing the positive effects of a changing climate, whereas other regions will 
witness the negative impacts of climate change. Under both scenarios, adaptation is 
essential; but, adaptation is costly.  The overall costs of adaptation are very difficult 
to estimate and vary between US$9 and 109 billion per year globally, due to 
uncertainty about the specific impacts of climate change and its effects on societies 
(Parry et al., 2009; Glatzel et al., 2012).  
 
                                                          
26
 COP Copenhagen, 2009 
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Arguably, one of the most important and controversial questions in the context of 
climate change adaptation, however, is - who will absorb the costs for adaptation 
related projects, especially in Low and Middle Income Countries? Adaptation is in 
general considered a priority for developing countries, whose adaptive capacity to 
climate change is very low while at the same time their vulnerability to climate 
change is very high (Pettengell, 2010; Stern, 2006). Failure to adapt may have 
disastrous effects on developing countries, setting back development efforts and 
economic development. According to a senior economist at the World Bank27, 
without adaptation to climate change there will be no development progress in Low 
and Middle Income Countries. Mitigation on the other hand tends to be prioritised by 
industrialised countries, which, arguably, also hold the greatest historical 
responsibility for climate change (Farber, 2007). Since adaptation has only recently 
entered the stage of international climate change negotiations28, it is yet to be fully 
defined what is considered as adaptation, where the borderline between adaptation 
and development is drawn – if one can be drawn at all - and how adaptation projects 
are going to be financed and by whom. In general, adaptation measures can range 
from purely technological, to policy, to managerial and through to behavioural 
changes (ibid.). 
 
6.1 Responsibility and burden-based approaches to climate finance 
This chapter analyses and elaborates on the responsibility held for funding climate 
change adaptation projects. There are two basic and rather general approaches to 
funding climate change adaptation projects:  
 
                                                          
27
 At a conference in September 2012, Climate Change Coordinator MENA, World Bank 
28
 IPCC 4
th
 Assessment Report, 2001 
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1. a responsibility-based approach and  
2. a burden-based approach 
 
Under a responsibility based approach, those countries that have historically emitted 
or are now emitting the highest amounts of GHG emissions should also take the 
responsibility of financing mitigation and adaptation strategies.   
Under the burden-based approach those countries carrying the highest burden i.e. 
facing the highest effects of global warming have to finance adaptation projects 
themselves.  
 
Table16: Approaches to climate finance 
 
Responsibility-based approach 
 
Burden-based approach 
 
Polluter-pays-principle: those responsible 
for climate change and its effects are 
held accountable  
 
 
Actors (i.e. 
countries/governments/societies) are 
responsible for their own adaptation 
needs  
 
 
It has been widely accepted amongst moral philosophers and ethicists that the 
responsibility-based approach will be applied to adaptation funding strategies 
(Gardiner, 2004). Within this approach there are seemingly another three different 
options according to which funding responsibilities could potentially be distributed:   
 to distribute the financial responsibilities in equal shares between the 
governments of industrialised countries  
 to allocate financial responsibilities according to the respective strength of 
each member state economy, i.e. the strongest economies also carry the 
highest burden with respect to adaptation funding 
142 
 
 taking into account the role of the highest emitters; according to this approach 
the highest GHG emitters take responsibility for the highest financial burden 
with respect to adaptation financing, i.e. the “polluter-pays-principle”  
 
Each of the options outlined above includes three parties: a) governments, b) 
citizens and c) the private sector.  
 
Assuming, though, that within a burden-based approach to climate change 
adaptation finance, not every country will be capable or willing to contribute the same 
financial inputs, funding will be attributed according to either the strength of the 
respective domestic economy or according to the level of GHG emissions in the 
present and past. Caney (2005), then, distinguishes between ‘mitigation burdens’ 
and ‘adaptation burdens’ that are imposed by the recent changes to the global 
climate and argues that ‘adaptation burdens’ should be defined as “the costs to 
persons of adopting measures which enable them and/or others to cope with the ill-
effects of climate change” (p. 751). In this context Caney further refers to the 
polluter-pays-principle as described above; it is a very intuitive concept according to 
which those who have caused the environmental problem or climate change in 
general should “foot the bill” (p. 752). Besides having intuitive appeal, the concept 
has also been recognised by a number of international organisations (OECD, EU) 
and legal agreements29. Caney’s analysis examines the micro and macro-levels of 
                                                          
29
 The OECD recommended the adoption of the polluter-pays-principle in Council Recommendations 
of May 26 1972 and 14 November 1974: “The Polluter Pays Principle: Definition, Analysis” 
Implementationhttp://books.google.co.uk/books?id=iWm_aApITJcC&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+poll
uter+pays+principle:+definition,+analysis,+implementation&source=bl&ots=Kgklm0QtzC&sig=HJUXD
SuMB-p-
gjZr_HzyG3OzZvw&hl=en&ei=JV_FTPfFK9uN4gbdiry5Aw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=
4&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false 
On 21 April 2004 the EU and the Council of Ministers passed a Directive affirming the polluter-pays-
principle (Directive 2004/35/CE). “Directive on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and 
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the polluter-pays-principle and in how far the principle could be applicable in the 
context of climate change adaptation policy.  
 
6.2 The micro and macro-levels of the polluter pays principle 
The micro-level of the polluter-pays-principle implies that if actor X performs an 
action that results in the pollution of the environment, then this actor should be liable 
for the damages caused by his action. The macro-version on the other hand implies 
that a number of actors X, Y and Z perform actions which, together, result in some 
form of pollution; if this is the case, they should be held liable for the costs in 
proportion to the level of pollution they have caused (Caney, 2005). To sum up, the 
difference between the two versions Caney discusses is the direct link on the micro-
level between an actor’s actions and the pollution caused, which affects others. On 
the macro-level, however, there is only an indirect link between the actions of a 
group and a certain level of pollution. Climate change clearly falls into the latter 
version, whilst the micro-level would require the identification of a specific damage 
that results from a specific action, which is very difficult to establish (Caney, p. 753).  
The macro-level furthermore allows to ascribe responsibility to groups and to 
discover which groups are more responsible for climate change than others. Thus, 
when interpreting the polluter-pays-principle in the context of climate change 
adaptation, it appears sensible to consider the macro-level approach.  
 
In order to apply the polluter-pays-principle to climate change adaptation policy, it 
has to be established ‘who’ constitutes the polluter. In the majority of cases 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
remedying of environmental damage”: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:143:0056:0075:en:PDF 
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governments are considered the relevant unit of analysis; according to Neumayer 
(2000) countries should be held “accountable for the amount of greenhouse gas 
emissions remaining in the atmosphere emanating from a country’s historical 
emissions. It holds that the major emitters of the past also undertake the major 
emission reductions in the future as the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere is mostly their responsibility and the absorptive capacity of nature is 
equally allocated to all human beings no matter when or where they live” (p. 186).  
 
However, there are other possibilities, including individuals, economic corporations, 
industries as well as international institutions. Considering the individual as the 
relevant unit of analysis, it could be argued that by using electricity, lighting, 
computers, cars and air planes, the individual contributes to a very large extent to 
global warming; such energy-intensive lifestyles could be “fined”. Hence, each 
individual would be required to contribute its share to climate change adaptation 
funds. However, it is highly doubtful, that such an approach would be feasible on a 
global level and politically debateable if governments decided to pass on adaptation 
funding to their citizens alone. Alternatively, one could argue that the primary origin 
of pollution is economic corporations that are responsible for high levels of GHG 
emissions, consume high amounts of fossil fuels, cause deforestation etc.  
 
Farber (2007) on the other hand makes a more sophisticated distinction between 
four possible approaches to cost allocation for adaptation finances:  
 “Beneficiaries pay”  
 “Emitters pay”  
 “Public pays” and  
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 “Winners pay”  
 
Farber also distinguishes between two main loss allocation schemes: those that are 
deterring harmful conduct and those that implement corrective justice. He 
furthermore refers to the overall goal of societal cohesion in the context of loss 
allocation systems, which implies social solidarity with victims, in this case of the 
adverse impacts of climate change. The following section investigates the concepts 
as set out by Farber (2007).      
 
6.3 Loss allocation schemes according to Farber (2007) 
The following section analyses the behavioural aims and objective of different loss 
allocation schemes. These include: 
- Incentives for emitters 
- Moral hazard 
- Loss-spreading 
- Just deserts 
- Distributive and social goals 
 
This analysis is then followed by an analysis of the cost allocation approaches 
mentioned above, in order to be able to make a decision about where the funding 
should be sourced from: 
 “Beneficiaries pay”  
 “Emitters pay”  
 “Public pays” and  
 “Winners pay” 
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6.4 Behavioural goals according to Farber (2007) 
6.4.1 Incentives for emitters 
One of the goals of loss allocation schemes is to deter certain behaviours in the 
future that have caused the losses in the first place (Farber, 2007). Clearly, a goal of 
an effective loss allocation scheme would aim at providing incentives to reduce GHG 
emissions over the long term, especially taking into consideration that an effective 
international regulatory framework does not exist to date, in relation to adaptation 
and mitigation. Retrospective liability in the form of a loss allocation scheme may 
provide the precedent for liability schemes that deter conduct causing environmental 
damage and harm.  
 
6.4.2 Moral hazard 
Loss allocation schemes can also have an effect on the behaviour of those affected 
by the losses, in this case the damages and losses suffered as a result of a changing 
climate (Farber, 2007). Loss compensation can potentially encourage behaviour that 
increases overall losses. A good example of moral hazard in the context of climate 
change adaptation is that having desalination plants in operation will increase water 
consumption and decrease efficient water management in the household.  
 
To summarise, the optimal loss allocation scheme would have a two-fold behavioural 
effect: it would on the one hand encourage optimal mitigation of GHG emissions and 
on the other hand it would provide disincentives for counterproductive adaptive 
behaviour. 
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6.4.3 Loss-spreading 
The concept of loss-spreading refers to a situation, where losses are predictable 
(even if only to a certain extent) and hence non-insurable, amid which a society 
might have an interest in “loss-spreading” (Farber, 2007). Those who are affected 
negatively by the effects of climate change, i.e. water scarcity, might become the 
source of political instability, mass-migration and permanent displacement. Loss-
spreading can hence be seen as a form of social compact in which fellow citizens – 
or on a larger scale, governments – undertake a moral mutual duty of assistance and 
solidarity, in order to avoid social unrest amid the influx of climate refugees, for 
example. This concept is applicable on a national scale, however, can be equally 
applied to an international setting. The potential of social conflict caused by climate 
change is considerably high, and loss-spreading may be an option to avoid 
animosities and polarisation.  
 
6.4.4 Just Deserts 
The concept of Just Deserts refers to the complexity of moral issues that are 
involved in corrective justice measures and hence in loss allocation schemes 
(Farber, 2007). Clearly, GHGs were not made to cause harm to others; the climatic 
consequences were for a long time unknown. However, in developing a loss 
allocation scheme compensating those suffering from the adverse effects of climate 
change, it appears arguable that at a certain point in time, the failure to take 
measures for reducing GHG emissions becomes negligent. Farber argues that 
retrospectively a point in time should be chosen, from which onwards companies and 
governments alike, would have to be held accountable for negligent behaviour 
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towards their citizens and future generations; such a date could be 1992, when the 
UNFCCC was signed.  
This argument goes hand in hand with the concept of “unjust enrichment”, which 
refers to the duty of those who in some way or the other have benefitted from a 
certain situation have a duty to compensate those who have missed out on that 
opportunity due to the other group’s behaviour. In the context of climate change, this 
refers to the fact that while some countries where able to benefit from GHG 
emissions in the process of industrialisation and development,  other countries now 
are arguably more restricted and limited.  
 
6.4.5 Distributive and Social Goals 
In the design of any adaptation strategy the social policy aspect cannot be left aside. 
In the context of climate change the issue of income distribution can be very clearly 
seen at the international level, a concern that is widely debated and disputed 
between countries. Relatively wealthy and highly developed nations figure as high 
emitters, whereas the victims of the negative effects of climate change are generally 
the poorer, less developed countries (Farber, 2007). As discussed in detail in 
chapters 1 and 4 of this research, poor countries generally have the least capacity to 
adapt and for Low and Middle Income Countries, financial constraints are the major 
obstacles to successful adaptation. Consequently, high emitters and industrialised 
countries bear a historical responsibility under which they should be held 
accountable and liable for adaptation related payments. Adaptation measures that 
are directed towards climate change effects that particularly impact on the most 
vulnerable seem a good option under redistributive allocation schemes.   
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6.5 Who should pay – Four principles 
Farber (2007) discusses four principles under which the costs for adaptation-related 
projects could be allocated. The principles build on the two principles discussed 
earlier in this chapter, namely the burden-based and responsibility-based 
approaches. However, the distinction that is made here goes one step further: it 
differentiates between the winners, i.e. those who benefit most from a specific 
adaptation strategy; the taxpayers; the highest emitters and those, who benefit from 
climate change as such (i.e. certain industries, countries, regions and individuals).  
 
6.5.1 Principle One: Adaptation Beneficiaries Pay 
Under the first principle discussed here, those who will directly benefit from specific 
climate change adaptation projects will carry the costs of adaptation-related projects 
and programmes. This approach may appear logical from a market economy based 
perspective, however, taking into consideration the norms discussed earlier in this 
chapter, such an approach is highly debateable. Holding beneficiaries of adaptation 
projects accountable for the costs of such projects is illogical in itself; as established 
earlier in this research and elsewhere, the most vulnerable societies will be most 
severely affected by climate change and are equally the least capable to adapt, due 
to lack of technological expertise and skills and funding. Hence, the beneficiaries of 
adaptation projects are usually those who are in financial need from others to 
implement adaptation projects in the first place. Thus, making the beneficiaries pay 
does clearly not advance any other social goals; on the contrary, it fails to serve any 
redistributive goal and would only lead to increasing animosities and tensions 
between societies.  
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6.5.2 Principle Two: The Public Pays 
An alternative to the first principle described above is to pass on the adaptation costs 
to the taxpayers. The overall costs of international adaptation projects would 
presumably be divided between nations according to economic strength and then 
transferred to individual citizens. This principle ranks highly in terms of loss 
spreading, as it expresses the idea of global solidarity in the face of global climate 
change impacts. However, the principle is problematic from the perspective of 
historical responsibility; high emitters escape any responsibility and liability towards 
reducing their GHG emissions. Furthermore, the principle appears rather problematic 
from a political point of view; in light of the current economic crisis, which affects the 
European Union as well as the United States, governments will be reluctant to 
increase spending for, in the widest sense, development aid. To support this, 
according to several studies, Overseas Development Aid (ODA) has decreased by 
2.7% in 2011 from the previous year and the impacts of the Euro Crisis are 
particularly felt in the attitude towards development aid3031. Hence, European and US 
governments will be reluctant to increase spending in this policy area, while cutting 
budgets in other – domestically presumably more important – areas.  
 
6.5.3 Principle Three: Emitters Pay (Polluter Pays Principle) 
The justification behind principle three is “Just Deserts”; although one may argue that 
emitters did not cause damage by emitting GHGs intentionally, at least not since the 
last quarter of the 20th century, there is strong ground for emitters to know that GHG 
emissions would cause harm to the climate over the long run. A logical cut-off date 
                                                          
30
 Atwood, J.B. (2012), “The Euro Zone Crisis and its Impact on ODA”, OECD Geneva June 2012 
31
 BBC, “Eurozone crisis causes aid cuts to poor, report says.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
europe-18554986, retrieved 20.09.2012  
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could be the signing of the UNFCCC in 1992; latest since then global awareness of 
the negative impacts of GHG emissions started emerging. There is hence, arguably, 
a strong case of unjust enrichment and grounds to assume that emitters in the past 
were able to enjoy high rates of technological development, causing harm on the one 
hand while on the other hand, they were able to do so at relatively low costs, than 
they would have using alternative or renewable energies (Farber, 2007). There 
hence seems to be a strong case for allocating adaptation costs towards the emitters 
of GHGs. Furthermore, the “emitters pay principle” might provide a good incentive for 
emitters to reduce GHG emissions so as to avoid extra costs in the form of 
adaptation payments in the future. Signs for such an approach are already visible in 
the form of governments of high emitting countries contributing to adaptation 
initiatives in the form of international funds (i.e. Adaptation Fund) or specific, 
adaptation-directed projects in Low and Middle Income Countries. This is naturally 
closely tied to the second principle; a share of development aid, which is raised 
through taxes, is directly invested in adaptation related programmes, especially 
where the borderline between development and adaptation is such a thin one. There 
are clearly different options as to how to allocate the adaptation costs between 
emitters, and many research projects and reports have dealt with this question. 
However, it would be beyond the scope of this research to present a detailed 
discussion of these options here.  
 
6.5.4 Principle Four: Winners Pay 
The “winners pay principle” states that those who will be positively affected by 
climate change should carry the costs for adaptive measures in regions that are 
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adversely affected. According to the Stern Review32, “a broad distribution of impacts 
across many sectors might stimulate a broad northward shift in economic activity and 
population in regions such as North America or Europe, as southern regions begin to 
suffer disproportionate increases in risks to human health and extreme events, 
coupled with loss of competitiveness in agriculture and forestry, reduced water 
availability and rising energy costs”. Belonging historically to the highest emitters, 
Europe and the US would under this principle also further social solidarity goals. At 
the same time, this principle might encourage “moral hazard” as high emitters in 
adversely affected countries may continue on a high GHG emitting pathway, relying 
on adaptive measures to be implemented.   
 
6.6 Summary 
Table 17 summarises the different approaches to the cost allocation of adaptation 
projects, taking into consideration the norms and effects of each such principle.   
 
Table 17: Approaches to adaptation finance strategies (adapted from Farber, 2007) 
 Beneficiaries 
pay 
Public pays Emitters pay Winners pay 
Incentives for 
emitters 
NO NO YES NO 
Moral hazard NO YES YES YES 
Just deserts NO NO YES Possible 
Loss spreading NO YES Partial Partial 
Distributive 
benefits  
NO YES International Some 
 
  
Considering that there are no legally binding legislative frameworks in place that 
would regulate and ensure the costs of adaptation in Low and Middle Income 
Countries, it appears that a combination of Public Pays and Emitters Pay principles 
                                                          
32
 Stern Review (2006) Part II, Chapter 5 
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will be most realistic for now and in the near future. However, such a framework 
would still need to be developed, designed and implemented. At the COP in 2009 in 
Copenhagen, it was established that the role of the private sector with respect to 
climate change adaptation would have to be re-defined. The Copenhagen Accord 
(2009) clearly states that a more active participation of the private sector in (co-) 
financing adaptation projects in Low and Middle Income Countries will be 
indispensable and that large shares of such costs will be carried by private sector 
companies.  
In the context of this research it was hence decided to focus on the potential role of 
private sector companies in financing climate change adaptation projects at home 
and abroad and to investigate into the potential drivers and barriers for such 
investments and to disregard conventional approaches to financing adaptation 
projects.    
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7. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Background 
information 
 
"Our water situation forms a strategic challenge that cannot be ignored. We have to 
balance between drinking water needs and industrial and irrigation water 
requirements. Drinking water remains the most essential and the highest priority 
issue ".  
(H.M. King Abdullah II November 7, 1999) 
 
This chapter provides an overview to the given geographical, political, 
environmental, societal and economic circumstances that influence the way water as 
a commodity is perceived in Jordan. It also provides an overview of demography, 
water tariffication, and the role of agriculture and unaccounted-for water usage.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand water in a broader context, to refer to 
the factors that need to be considered in the wider context of this thesis and to fully 
understand the sensitive nature of water in the Middle East, and in particular in 
Jordan. Furthermore, this chapter examines the water resources of Jordan, thereby 
referring to groundwater reservoirs, precipitation, and flows of surface water and 
consequently assesses the adequacy of these water resources in meeting the 
demand for freshwater now and in the future.  
 
7.1 Demographics 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is classified as a Middle Income Country by the 
World Bank, with a population of about 6 million in 2012. When the Emirate of 
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Jordan was still in its infancy in 1922, its population was an estimated 225,000. Amid 
an influx of Palestinian refugees between 1948 –1951, the population increased to 
around 600,000. Within only 60 years the Jordanian population increased to 
approximately 6 million by 2012 and the population is projected to increase further, 
including high numbers of refugees from neighbouring countries.  
 
Table18: Population Jordan 1922 - 2012 
Year Population 
1922 225,000 
1938 300,124 
1947 473,222 
1951 599,562 
2004 2,840,000 
2012 6,000,000 
Source: Haddadin, M.J. (2006) 
 
Around 80% of Jordan’s population today lives in urban areas, with Amman as the 
capital and the most densely populated city in the country (Haddadin et al., 2006). 
Amid the Arab Spring since 2011 and unrests in neighbouring Syria approximately 
175,000 refugees arrived in Jordan by January 2013 (UNHCR, 2013). The delivery 
of water services in urban areas is generally described as fairly reliable by locals33; 
while some areas receive water deliveries twice a week, other neighbourhoods are 
dependent on water delivery once a week.  
 
Furthermore, Jordan’s population ranks amongst the youngest in Upper Middle 
Income Countries, with 38% of inhabitants under the age of 14 years (World Bank 
Country Brief, April 2012). Geographically, Jordan is located within the eastern 
margins of the Mediterranean climatic zone, with much of the country classified as a 
                                                          
33
 Although in summer months, water deliveries tend to be less regular and less reliable, i.e. summer 2012.  
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semi-desert (Consolidated Consultants, 2004). The temperatures can vary greatly, 
with the Highlands enjoying a rather moderate climate and the desert and other 
regions experiencing up to 45ºC in the summer and temperatures just above zero in 
the winter and occasional snowfall (Jordan Valley, Wadi Rum, Wadi Araba and 
Aqaba).  
 
7.2 Water resources 
Jordan’s renewable freshwater resources are a combination of precipitation and the 
flows of watercourses, the Jordan River and the Yarmouk (Haddadin et al., 2006). 
The average annual rainfall equals less than 200 mm in 95% of the country; only 
about 2% of the land area, in the north-western highlands, receives an annual 
precipitation exceeding 300 millimetres (ibid.). The rainy season usually lasts from 
October until April, peaking in January and February. However, under climate 
change it has been observed that the rainy season is shifting, with some months 
hardly experiencing any rainfall and other witnessing flash flooding (WHO34). 
Precipitation is occurring with increasing irregularity, both in terms of occurrences 
and intensity.  
 
The literature does not elaborate on a decrease in precipitation, however, 
emphasises on the shifting patterns of precipitation. With Jordan’s available 
freshwater resources highly dependent on precipitation, it has been calculated that 
climate change impacts could potentially reduce freshwater availability by up to 15% 
by 2020 – comprising 9% in surface water flow from the Jordan River and 5.5% in 
                                                          
34
 WHO: “Climate Change Adaptation to Protect Human Health”, 
http://www.who.int/globalchange/projects/adaptation/en/index5.html, retrieved 29.10.2012 
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groundwater recharge. In addition to this, the quality of the water available is likely to 
deteriorate, affecting both river and groundwater supplies (Yorke, 2013). 
 
Geographically, Jordan can be divided into three different zones: the Jordan-Rift 
Valley, the Highlands and Badia. The Jordan-Rift Valley is a north-south strip, 
containing the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea. The majority of this strip lies below 
sea-level, with the shorelines of the Dead Sea at -418.3 metres in 2006 and 
decreasing further each year (Haddadin et al., 2006). The strip reaches from the 
North through the Jordan Valley, along the Dead Sea, through the Southern Ghors, 
Wadi Araba and to the Gulf of Aqaba. The Highlands, often also referred to as the 
Jordanian-Plateau, is a north-south strip that is traversed by the Yarmouk River and 
several other side wadis that discharge into the Jordan River. The majority of 
Jordanian cities are located in this strip. Finally, Badia is semi-desert steppe that 
forms the rest of the country, to the east, north and south.  The highest rate of 
precipitation falls over the Highlands. According to Haddadin et al. only about 1.3% 
of Jordan’s territories receive an average annual precipitation of more than 500mm, 
while the majority – 80.6% - receives less than 100mm per year. The climatic 
conditions in Jordan not only affect the amount and distribution of precipitation, but 
also the evaporation; evaporation amounts to about 80% and thus places Jordan at 
about 141% above the world’s average.  
 
Jordan has several distinct surface drainage basins; a drainage basin by definition is 
a water body, such as a river, lake, reservoir, sea, ocean or wetland that is joined by 
surface water in the form of precipitation or snow melt (Chen et al., 2003). Table 19 
below provides a summary of basins in Jordan: 
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Table19: Basins in Jordan 
 
Dead Sea Basin 
 
The Dead Sea basin comprises several other 
basins: Yarmouk, Jordan River, Zarqa River, 
Dead Sea side wadis, Mujib Basin, Wadi 
Hasa, Wadi Araba North 
 
 
Red Sea 
 
 
 
 
Azraq 
Hamad 
Jafr 
Sirhan 
Southern Desert 
 
 
Although the catchments are sizeable, water 
contributions of these basins is modest 
(excluding the Red Sea) 
 
  
In addition to these drainage basins, Jordan also has twelve groundwater reservoirs 
and groundwater basins. Four of these flow from Syria and are hence considered 
trans-boundary reservoirs; trans-boundary, shared water resources increase 
dependencies and in many cases have led to conflict in the past, as in the case of 
Sudan as well as between Jordan, Syria and Israel. However, as this thesis 
highlights later, in the majority of cases shared groundwater resources increasingly 
serve as a means of cooperation instead of conflict.   
 
According to Haddadin et al. the total natural recharge averages 395 MCM/year and 
inflow from Syria was estimated at around 68 MCM/year. This inflow is constantly 
declining due to abstractions upstream in Syria. Subsequently, total recharges 
should theoretically average 463 MCM/year with the natural spring outflow of 
197MCM/year. This yields a sustainable level of all aquifers in Jordan at 
266MCM/year. Abstraction from the aquifers has exceeded this sustainable level 
since the 1970s. The over abstraction from groundwater resources has affected the 
non-renewable water resources permanently and has “impacted the aquifer water 
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levels, discharge of springs and the resulting base flow, and the water quality 
extracted from these aquifers” (Dweiri et al., 2005 in Haddadin et al.). In the course 
of interviews that were conducted over a period of several weeks in 2012 for this 
thesis, many interview partners highlighted the problem of farmers abstracting water 
illegally or in excess of the water that had been allocated for their usage (also 
referred to as water theft) as a major problem, causing damage to what is widely 
considered a public good in Jordan (see chapter 9). In 2011, total renewable water 
resources per capita equalled 145m³ per year, compared to a basic need of 1,000m³ 
per capita (World Water Forum, 2011).   
 
The presence of climate change leads to an increase in water resources in some 
areas of the world, while in other parts of the world it increases water stress, 
including the Mediterranean and the Middle East, with Jordan among the most 
adversely affected in the world (Arnell, 2004). While water has been considered a 
scarce resource in Jordan for decades, climate change is expected to accelerate the 
process of diminishing water resources and to increase the variability in precipitation, 
i.e. whereas there will be more precipitation in some years, there will be hardly any 
precipitation in other years (Iglesias et al., 2007).  
 
Climate change occurs in addition to demographic changes and depending on 
differing population scenarios the effect on water availability can be estimated. 
According to Iglesias et al. (2007) no matter under which climate change scenario, 
available water resources in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East will decrease 
whereas the demand for irrigation will increase steadily. Water scarcity is already the 
cause for significant problems in the region, due to unbalanced distribution of water, 
160 
 
conflict amongst different users, i.e. industry, private households and farmers, and 
between countries due to shared groundwater resources. These problems are likely 
to intensify under climate change. An efficient water management strategy that is 
aimed at adapting to decreasing water resources in Jordan in particular is challenged 
by an increasing population, development pressures and hence agricultural 
demands (Arnell, p. 781, 2004). As will be emphasised in this research, greater 
innovative approaches are needed for managing the demand side of water, such as 
behavioural change programmes and projects that target the reduction of water loss 
in domestic households and individual irrigation systems. Water management 
strategies that tackle the supply side solely will not suffice under the given socio-
economic circumstances in Jordan.  
 
7.3 Pressure on water resources 
Over the past decades Jordan has experienced an influx of refugees from the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, Iraq and other neighbouring countries including 
Syria (since 2011); the Jordanian population is hence increasing steadily with an 
estimated growth rate of 2.5% according to the Jordanian Government (2012). At the 
same time, Jordan has very limited natural resources in comparison to other 
neighbouring countries such as Saudi Arabia or the Gulf states, with potash and 
phosphate as the main export commodities, and lacks land suitable for agricultural 
use – only about 6% of land is arable and agriculture only accounts for 
approximately 4%GDP (Pitman, 2004). The situation is further exacerbated by water 
scarcity in the country. Although estimations vary, Jordan currently ranks fourth 
globally in terms of water scarcity (World Bank, 2012). At the same time, agriculture 
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accounts for almost 70% of renewable freshwater resource use35 and national water 
consumption was 63% above sustainable levels in 2004. Due to unsustainable water 
consumption in agriculture in addition to the other factors discussed herein, water 
demand is increasingly met from non-renewable freshwater resources such as 
aquifers. Water consumption at 63% above sustainable levels would risk that non-
renewable freshwater resources run out by 205036. 
 
The demographic conditions described above and the rapid urbanisation on the one 
hand provide Jordan with a young and comparatively well educated population; on 
the other hand they create a strain on the already very limited natural resources, in 
particular raising the demand for water. In terms of human development37, Jordan 
ranks above average when compared to other Middle Income Countries.  
 
Recently, Jordan has been simultaneously affected by the economic crisis as well as 
by the Arab Spring, which started in early 2010. In 2011 the debt-to-GDP ratio rose 
from 61% (2010 figure, World Bank) to 65.6% and although the Government aims to 
achieve economic growth of 3% in 2012, the heightened instability in the region and 
the financial crisis, especially in the energy sector, pose a high risk to the fiscal 
outlook (World Bank, 2012). Besides these challenges, Jordan additionally has high 
                                                          
35
 In an interview with the German Deputy Ambassador to Jordan in Amman in March 2012 
36
 Jordanian Water Minister at a conference in Hamburg, Germany in September 2012 
37
 The Human Development Index is a summary measure of human development. It measures the 
average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development:  
1. a long and healthy life (health),  
2. access to knowledge (education) and  
3. a decent standard of living (income)  
Data availability determines HDI country coverage. To enable cross-country comparisons, the HDI is, 
to the extent possible, calculated based on data from leading international data agencies and other 
credible data sources available at the time of writing. (UNDP) 
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energy import dependence, with 96% of its energy imported38 from other 
neighbouring countries and through the Arab Gas Pipeline and is dependent on gas 
supplies from Egypt; unemployment is estimated at around 13% (Jordanian 
Department of Statistics, 2012); the country has a strong reliance on remittances 
from the Gulf economies and is increasingly experiencing pressure on its natural 
resources, in particular on its water resources.  
Figure 4: Map of Jordan (CIA World Factbook, 2012) 
 
                                                          
38
 Heinrich Böll Stiftung. "Jordan has to reduce its dependency on foreign energy sources": 
http://www.boell.de/ecology/resources/resource-governance-ecology-interview-jordanian-energy-
sector-11236.html, retrieved March 2013 
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7.4 Water management and policy 
As mentioned above, Jordan ranks as one of the most water-scarce countries in the 
world. Despite water scarcity, water usage and management is inefficient, levels of 
unaccounted-for-water are high and agriculture consumes around two thirds of water 
resources on very low tariffs39 (Pitman, 2004; World Bank, 2012). In 1978 the British 
firm Humphrey and Partners was commissioned to survey and to forecast the 
municipal water demand for the Northwest of Jordan, where roughly 90% of the 
population lived (Haddadin et al.). The results showed that national water resources 
would not be sufficient to meet the industrial and municipal water demand of the year 
2000, unless the Government took immediate action to ensure further additional 
water supplies.  In 2013, at the time of writing, water resources are indeed not 
sufficient to cover the demand for freshwater supplies, and several so-called mega 
projects aim at dealing with the supply side.  
 
Overall demand for water is increasing over time, both for agricultural and non-
agricultural usage. In 2005 the Jordanian Department of Statistics estimated annual 
rainfall at around 6000 million cubic metres (MCM), with the Yarmouk basin receiving 
an additional 2065 MCM. However, as mentioned above high evaporation rates and 
infiltration lead to a rather small annual stream flow of around 878 MCM, which 
excludes the Jordan River flow (Raddad, 2005). The available water in Jordan, as 
discussed above, mainly consists of groundwater resources and fossil water, which 
can be found in aquifers, and surface water.  
 
                                                          
39
 Water tariffs in the Jordan Valley are considerably lower than urban or industrial water prices 
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7.5 Water tariffs in Jordan 
The main supplier for surface water in Jordan has traditionally been the public 
sector40, with this trend still being visible now, albeit the creation Miyahunna, a quasi-
private public entity41. Ground water supply in Jordan is generally abstracted by both, 
public and private sectors alike; most agriculture users abstract water for their own 
use. The Government tries to monitor how much groundwater is abstracted in this 
way, in order to reduce un-accounted-for water. The Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) 
provides the farmers in the Jordan Valley with surface water for irrigation. According 
to Pitman (2004), the average JVA tariff between 1995 – 2000 billed was 
US$0.008/m³, while the amount actually collected was on average US$0.006/m³; at 
the same time the 2001 urban water tariff was 90 times greater (US$0.54/m³). 
Industrial and non-residential consumers are charged US$1.42/m³ by the Water 
Authority Jordan (WAJ). Those minimal fees do not cover the costs of operation and 
maintenance and have not been raised notably since the 1990s (Starr, 1991). 
However, relative to their income, Jordanians perceive the tariffs as high.  
 
A comparison of the Jordanian pricing strategies with those of other countries42 
shows the inadequacy of Jordanian tariffication, especially when taking into 
consideration that water is a scarce commodity. As water as a commodity is scarce, 
the tariffs that are set by a government should reflect this scarcity. However, the 
Jordanian Government heavily subsidises water tariffs for all aspects of water 
consumption, including agriculture, industry and domestic usage, and hence there is 
a negative correlation between water availability and water prices; this is not 
                                                          
40
 Water is seen as a God-given gift under Islam and should therefore be provided by the public 
sector, i.e. the state/government. 
41
 Miyahunna operates like a private company, but is owned by the state.  
42
 As an example: Germany = US$2.49/ m³. 
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exclusive to Jordan, as Global Water Intelligence (2012) observes that “in general 
hot dry places such as Riyadh pay very little for their water, but cold wet ones such 
as Glasgow pay a lot. To make matters worse, people who live in hot dry places tend 
to use a lot more water per head than people in cold wet places. Pricing exacerbates 
this inappropriate pattern of demand.” Water continues to be heavily subsidised in 
Jordan, with the Government reluctant to pass on the additional costs to the 
consumers in order to achieve adequate pricing. Whereas global water tariffs rose by 
an average of 6.8% between 2010 and 2011, the tariffs in Jordan have remained 
largely unchanged. Pricing and delivery of water also varies according to 
neighbourhood and region in Jordan.  
 
During this research it was found that whilst some areas receive water two to three 
times a week, other neighbourhoods only receive one delivery per week (according 
to interview partners, March/April 2012). In summer 2012 water was rationed, which 
reduced deliveries of water in some areas of the country to once every two or three 
weeks. A sound water and agricultural management regime based on best practice 
will be indispensable in the future, though attempts to apply and enforce regulations 
for agricultural water use have been met by strong resistance by the influential 
agricultural lobby in addition to wide-spread societal concerns at the time of writing.  
  
7.6 Water theft, regulation and enforcement 
Although water measuring devices have been installed at many wells in rural areas, 
farmers withdrawing the scarce groundwater are often not billed. Only recently (since 
2009), a project supported by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the KfW Bank in cooperation with the Jordanian 
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Government43 was developed, which aims at reducing losses in the water network 
on the technical and administration side. The project is designed as a joint venture 
between the private and the public sector, whereas the private sector is contracted 
on a performance based contract and is responsible for adequate billing and 
enforcement of relevant regulations to achieve greater efficiency in the domestic and 
agricultural water usage (GIZ, 201244).  
 
In 1997 the Jordanian Government established the Programme Management Unit45 
(PMU), an organisation which is responsible for the management and administration 
of multiple projects, including the Al-Meyyah project46. Initially the role of the PMU 
was to restructure and rehabilitate a capital investment programme for the water 
supply in Greater Amman, supported by GIZ and JICA (Japan International 
Cooperation Agency). 2005 saw the development of the Al-Meyyah project, 
“Supporting Management of Water Services in Jordan” (Programme Management 
Unit website, 2012). According to the Jordanian Government47 the aim of Al-Meyyah 
                                                          
43
 Led by the Programme Management Unit (PMU). 
44
 At an interview in March 2012 in Amman. 
45
 The PMU is responsible for: 
- Technically monitoring and auditing the performance of the private water companies in the 
country by applying agreed upon indicators, which enable a fair basis for comparison among 
the utilities and provide tools to evaluate their performance aspects as well as the 
effectiveness of service provisions. 
- Promotion of Private Sector Participation (PSP) in water services and management. 
- Development of Public Private Partnership (PPP).  
- Planning and providing strategic advisory to decision makers. 
- Application of commercial principles on the retail side 
Retrieved from: http://www.pmu.gov.jo/Home/AboutUs/RolesofPMU.aspx, 29.10.2012 
46
 The aim and objective of the Al Meyyah project is the transformation of the current structure of the 
water services in the Kingdom into a service industry that, in the long-run, provides these vital 
services in a cost-efficient yet socially responsive manner. At the same time ultimate focus has to be 
extended towards resource conservation and exploration and development of additional resources. 
47
 At a meeting at the Ministry of Water and Irrigation in Amman in April 2012. 
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is to ultimately transform the structure of the water services in Jordan and to provide 
water in a more cost effective manner, while preserving a socially equitable 
structure. Recent developments show an indication for a greater role of private 
sector companies in the water sector; however, it is yet to be seen in how far current 
legislation and institutional set-up will allow an active private sector involvement.  
 
The Jordan Water Company (Miyahunna) was established jointly by the MWI and the 
WAJ as an O&M (Operations and Maintenance) private company, which, however, is 
fully owned by the WAJ. The aim is to achieve greater customer satisfaction as well 
as improved technical and financial performance of water services (PMU, 2012). 
Miyahunna manages its budgets and revenues but is bound by Jordanian law and 
regulations. In how far this quasi privatised company can be seen as an indicator of 
greater privatisation in the water market is debatable. Private sector participation in 
the Jordanian water market is currently governed by Article 28 of the WAJ Law48, 
which makes provision for the private sector to get involved in the form of lease 
contracts and commercial vehicles. However, as the water sector in Jordan develops 
towards privatisation, the current legal and regulatory framework would have to be 
amended to facilitate investments and incentivise private sector participation further. 
This could have positive effects not only on water management in general but also 
                                                          
48
 According to the MWI the current Water Law is in the process of being re-drafted (status: April 2012 
and ongoing). 
 Article 28 reads: 
a- The Council of Ministers may, upon the Minister’s [Ministry of Water and Irrigation] 
recommendations, assign any of the Authority’s [Water Authority] duties, or any of its projects or the 
execution of any of the projects’ stages, or any part thereof to any other party whether public or 
private or to a public shareholding company or to a limited liability company that are wholly or partially 
owned by the Authority, and this may include assigning the management of these projects or the 
lease thereof or assignment of the title thereto to any of these parties upon the conditions and for the 
terms specified in the contracts to be executed with such parties for the above purposes provided that 
the applicable legal rules pertaining to lease and assignment of title are observed.  
b- Where contracts for the assignment of the management of the projects or the lease thereof are 
being executed the Council of Ministers’ resolution may include an authorisation to the contracting 
parties’ employees to assume the authorities of the Water Authority’s employees in accordance with 
the enforceable legislation with respect to the execution of the said contracts. 
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on tariffication in Jordan. According to different stakeholders in Jordan, interviewed 
for this research, a rapid increase in private sector participation in the management, 
maintenance and provision of water will be both inevitable and desirable.  
 
Renewable water resources in Jordan are projected to decline to less than 88m³ per 
year by 2025, which would be a level considered to be “insufficient to meet minimum 
needs for safe drinking water, sanitation and a basic self-supporting economic 
activity” (Pitman, 2004).  
 
Figure 5: Water balance Jordan, 1998 - 2020 
 
Historically and also at the time of writing, heavy agricultural subsidies, extremely 
low water tariffs and import restrictions provide little incentive to use water more 
efficiently and to switch to more sustainable agricultural activities, i.e. to abstain from 
growing water-intense fruits such as bananas and strawberries, usage of different 
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crops and lower quality water, i.e. grey water (Starr, 1991). Unaccountable-for-water 
will have to be eliminated by stopping illegal underground water drilling and by 
reducing the production and export of water-intensive agricultural products as 
discussed below. Although awareness amongst the public appears to be high, 
willingness to reduce water consumption remains low (JOHUD, 2012; EBRD, 2012). 
This is due partially to societal, i.e. tribal, structure in Jordan, as well as due to a lack 
of education in remote, rural areas and fear of lack of alternatives; alternatives could 
include a shift in agricultural production to other, less water-consuming fruits or 
vegetables as well as breaking with the tradition of agriculture and focusing on an 
entirely new source of income.   
 
7.7 GIZ and JOHUD initiatives: findings from stakeholder engagement 
Many farmers in Jordan have traditionally grown water-intense fruits and vegetables 
and appear reluctant to change production to less water-intense crops; according to 
GIZ this is mainly due to the concern that switching production will yield less revenue 
and hence decrease welfare. GIZ, however, found that if there were adequate 
alternatives and support from the Government, farmers would indeed be willing to 
switch their production49. Furthermore, poor and antiquated technologies result in 
inefficient usage of water in irrigation; however, one-off payments for new 
technologies can often not be afforded by small farmers. Some of the research 
conducted for this thesis has demonstrated that an initiative by JOHUD and GIZ 
“Water Wise Women” aims at educating women in rural and remote areas to use 
water more consciously and efficiently in households and hence reduce unnecessary 
water loss in private consumption. Training took place in nine regions in the country 
                                                          
49
 In an interview with GIZ representatives in Amman, April 2012.  
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in order to build sustainable awareness and to incentivise behavioural change on the 
local level in water resource management. In each region, fifteen to twenty women 
participated and were trained to pass on their knowledge to their communities. 
According to a project manager at JOHUD the project was received very well by 
local communities; however, challenges such as water theft, which is common with 
some tribal groups, remains a problem that has yet to be dealt with and so is 
poverty.  
 
The “Highland Water Forum” (on-going since 2010) allowed farmers to raise their 
concerns and to discuss options for a water strategy with politicians, as well as with 
foreign aid agencies and other stakeholders. According to GIZ, such forums allow 
one to scope for alternatives to traditional agriculture and provide farmers with a 
voice in the consultation and decision making procedures, which had been missing 
until then.  According to ACWUA (Arab Countries Water Utilities Association) priority 
should be given to improve the efficiency of water management, however, over the 
long term wastewater treatment and desalination was described as a “must” for 
Jordan. Although energy intensive and costly, a senior representative at ACWUA 
confirmed that these two solutions would be inevitable over the long term, strategies 
for which investors will be needed.   
 
 An additional challenge, which makes water an even more politically sensitive topic 
for Jordan, is the hydrological interdependence, i.e. the fact that Jordan shares its 
surface and groundwater resources with its surrounding neighbours, creating 
dependencies and competitiveness. Some scholars see this as a “catalyst for peace” 
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and cooperation between states (Asmal 200050; Allan 2000, 2002) whilst others 
argue that water might indeed lead to conflict or war (Bulloch & Darwish 1993; Starr, 
1991). In the south of the country the main groundwater resource is the groundwater 
fossil aquifer Disi51 and in the north the Upper Yarmouk. The Yarmouk is over-
exploited not only by Jordanian farmers, but equally by Syrian farmers and 
municipalities. Furthermore, Jordan shares the Jordan River and the Dead Sea coast 
with Israel, as well as joint borders along the Jordan Valley. Although the 1994 
Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel governs water related matters52, there 
remains tension along the borders and illegal water usage is common practice on 
both sides. In the 1980s an informal, non-binding agreement was reached between 
Israel and Jordan with regards to the Yarmouk River for sharing its water (Pitman, 
2004). The agreement did not constitute a formal agreement and was accomplished 
by adjusting a sand bar along the riverbed in order to raise the water level and 
increase the diversion flow (Shamir, date unknown). This informal agreement laid the 
basis for the formal negotiations in the 1990s, which resulted in the Peace Treaty 
between the two countries. Article 653 and Annex II of the Treaty govern the shared 
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 At the opening session, Stockholm Water Symposium, 2000 
51
 Disi-Mudawarra to Amman Water Conveyance System; the Disi aquifer extends from the southern 
edge of the Dead Sea in Jordan to Tabuk area in northwest Saudia Arabia. Exploitation of the 
Jordanian part started in 1980. The largest infrastructure project yet undertaken in Jordan, the project 
will cost an estimated $1.2 billion. But there is a serious drawback: Tests on some wells feeding the 
Disi pipeline have revealed high levels of radioactivity, raising public concern about the long-term 
health risks of drinking Disi water (New York Times, November 28, 2012). 
52
 Annex II, Article VI 
Article VI: Co-operation  
1. Israel and Jordan undertake to exchange relevant data on water resources through the Joint 
Water Committee.  
2. Israel and Jordan shall co-operate in developing plans for purposes of increasing water 
supplies and improving water use efficiency, within the context of bilateral, regional or 
international cooperation.  
53
 Article 6 Peace Treaty: Water 
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water sources; namely, the Jordan River, Yarmouk River and the Araba ground 
water basin.  
 
Large scale projects aim to optimise the usage of the Yarmouk and Disi water 
resources in addition to mega projects such as the “Red-Dead Canal”54. Disi is a 
shared groundwater aquifer which contains non-renewable water; it was discovered 
in the 1980s, and used as a short-term solution by Jordan in the 1990s when the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
With the view to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all the water problems between 
them:  
1. The Parties agree mutually to recognise the rightful allocations of both of them in Jordan 
River and Yarmouk River waters and Araba/Arava ground water in accordance with the 
agreed acceptable principles, quantities and quality as set out in Annex II , which shall be fully 
respected and complied with.  
2. The Parties, recognising the necessity to find a practical, just and agreed solution to their 
water problems and with the view that the subject of water can form the basis for the 
advancement of co-operation between them, jointly undertake to ensure that the management 
and development of their water resources do not, in any way, harm the water resources of the 
other Party.  
3. The Parties recognise that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs. More 
water should be supplied for their use through various methods, including projects of regional 
and international co-operation.  
4. In light of paragraph 3 of this Article, with the understanding that co-operation in water-related 
subjects would be to the benefit of both Parties, and will help alleviate their water shortages, 
and that water issues along their entire boundary must be dealt with in their totality, including 
the possibility of trans-boundary water transfers, the Parties agree to search for ways to 
alleviate water shortage and to co- operate in the following fields:  
a. development of existing and new water resources, increasing the water availability 
including co-operation on a regional basis as appropriate, and minimising wastage of 
water resources through the chain of their uses;  
b. prevention of contamination of water resources;  
c. mutual assistance in the alleviation of water shortages;  
d. transfer of information and joint research and development in water-related subjects, 
and review of the potentials for enhancement of water resources development and 
use.  
5. The implementation of both Parties' undertakings under this Article is detailed in Annex II. 
 
54
 Red-Dead Canal is a joint Arab-Israeli project designed to save the shrinking Dead Sea using water 
from the Red Sea. 
173 
 
political situation did not allow for larger scale projects such as the Red-Dead Canal. 
In the 1990s the Jordanian Government subsequently drafted a project proposal 
which laid out the plan for a 325km long pipeline from Disi to Amman, where the 
water demand is the greatest in the country. The overall cost for the pipeline was 
then estimated at around US$625 million. The project proposal envisaged 65 wells to 
tap the aquifer and the building of numerous plants for pumping the water along the 
250m difference in altitude between Disi and Amman (Ferragina & Greco, 2008). 
The most controversial aspect of the project was, at the time, considered to be the 
environmental impact with the aquifer containing non-renewable water. Furthermore, 
the tense relationship with Saudi Arabia raised concerns at the World Bank, as 
World Bank investments require “non-objection by Saudi Arabia under the Bank’s 
safeguard policy”. This led to a suspension of the project by the World Bank, and 
Disi did not receive any World Bank or other international grant or funding.  
 
Disi was often considered as an international political issue which could result in a 
pumping race with Saudi Arabia. Some authors (Ferragina & Greco 2008; Allan 
2002) argue that Disi, as a political issue, is silenced and securitised by both 
governments, with silence seen as a method of control and power in future water 
conflicts. The Jordanian Government subsequently decided to carry out the Disi 
project in the form of a BOT scheme, for which, in 2007, the Turkish company GAMA 
Energy AS won the bid. Following an investment of US$ 1 billion and operation and 
maintenance over a period of 25 years, the facilities will be transferred back to the 
Jordanian Government. This project highlights the increasing importance of the role 
of foreign private sector companies in the delivery and implementation of water-
related projects in Jordan. The Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers are the largest rivers in 
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Jordan and failure to develop a unitarian approach for joint usage has been 
dominant in the past. Unilateral water development has affected Jordan adversely, 
with Syria at the Upper Yarmouk basin and by Israel at the Upper Jordan River and 
Golan Heights. Jordan received only 199 and 92 million m³/year respectively from 
Yarmouk water and Lake Tiberias in 2004 and 2005 despite agreements with Syria 
and Israel (Ferragina & Greco, 2008).  
 
These water conflicts with neighbouring countries underline the need for Jordan to 
become increasingly independent from neighbouring countries in the development of 
a sustainable water strategy under climate change and other factors. This research 
and its recommendations are therefore valuable for Jordan to manage its water 
resources and to be able to guarantee water supply.   
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7.8 Summary 
The aim of this chapter has been to contribute to a better understanding of the 
complex nature of water as an environmental, political and socio-economic topic in 
Jordan. This thesis focuses on the role of private sector companies in the water 
sector; however, as water touches upon so many different aspects of policy-making, 
society and the economy it has been considered necessary to introduce the 
challenge of water scarcity in the Jordanian context. This chapter has provided an 
insight into the water tariff system in Jordan, available freshwater resources, 
challenges such as population increase and inefficient use of water in agriculture and 
has introduced some initial findings from the interview process that took place in 
Amman in March and April 2012. It can hence be summarised that the Jordanian 
Government will have to address 1) the water tariffication system, 2) the dependency 
on neighbouring countries for water and energy, 3) infrastructure investments for 
water supply and 4) a more effective way to manage water demand. These 
conclusions are particularly important in the context of this research, as they 
highlight the ever so importance for Jordan to reform its approach to water policy and 
provide a good basis for the analysis in the following chapters.  
 
In the following chapter the theoretical drivers and barriers to private sector 
investments in Jordan, as derived from the literature, are analysed and the 
theoretical framework of this thesis is developed.  
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7.9 Illustration of geographical diversity in Jordan 
Figure 6: Wadi Rum Jordan 
 
Figure 7: Northern Jordan
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Figure 8: Al Mafraq Jordan (Getty Images, 2012) 
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Figure 9: Jordan Valley, Jordan (Getty Images, 2011) 
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Figure 10: King Talal Dam, Jordan  
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Table 20: Water authorities in Jordan 
 
  
Government Body  Responsibility 
Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) 
The official body responsible for the overall 
monitoring of the water sector, water supply 
and wastewater system and the related 
projects, planning and management, the 
formulation of national water strategies and 
policies, research and development, 
information systems and procurement of 
financial resources. Its role also includes the 
provision of centralized water-related data, 
standardization and consolidation of data 
Programme Management Unit (PMU) 
A body to carry out the management and 
organisation of specific projects 
Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) 
Established in with the mandate to carry out 
integrated socioeconomic development of the 
Jordan Valley area; 
• Develop and protect water sources for 
exploitation in all fields. 
• Improve and develop the Jordan valley 
economically, agriculturally and socially. 
• Provide appropriate climate for investments. 
• Tourism development. 
• Preserve the environment in the Jordan 
valley. 
Water Authority Jordan (WAJ) 
Development and protection of water 
sources, provision of water and sewerage 
services, including operation and 
maintenance to ensure the requirements of 
citizens, and improvement of infrastructure to 
preserve environment and public health. Sets 
tariffs.  
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8. Drivers and barriers to private sector adaptation 
investments in the water sector 
According to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC, 2010) past mitigation efforts were too small in scale and 
came too late in terms of avoiding major damages to the global climate, now and in 
the future (Biermann et al., 2010). Recent examples include the 2010 flooding in 
Pakistan, increased frequency in heat waves in Southern Europe and the 
Mediterranean (France, summer 2003) as well as an increased frequency in flooding 
in Bangladesh and droughts in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. 
  
According to the research undertaken for this thesis, global adaptation governance is 
the area within climate change policy that is still, arguably, the least explored, yet it 
will affect almost all areas of world politics, including global food regimes, global 
water and health governance, as well as global trade in goods and the world 
economy in general (Biermann et al., 2010). The number and intensity of effects 
climate change might have on our daily life cannot yet be fully estimated. However, 
evidence and research to date have been able to show that there are and will be a 
vast range of changes in the climate that will affect millions of people and also 
animals across the world (Stern, 2006; Biermann et al., 2010; Pettengell, 2010). The 
intensity of these effects will vary and so will the consequences for the respective 
areas. Hence it has been established that adaptation to climate change cannot 
longer be regarded as “mitigation’s poor cousin” in the climate change debate, but 
should rather be seen as a necessary complement to mitigation (Ayers and Huq, 
2009, p. 754).  
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Water scarcity in particular presents a threat to many countries and regions across 
the world. Ranging from Southern Europe, to Africa and the Middle East the lack of 
freshwater availability is a challenge many governments will have to manage; see 
Chapter 6 for more analysis. For some, this will be easier – due to geographical 
location, financial capabilities and technical know-how – whereas for others, it will be 
almost impossible to achieve.  The increase of the global population, by around 2.5 
billion people by the year 2050, goes hand in hand with a growth in demand for food, 
energy and other consumer goods and services. As a result, global demand for 
freshwater will increase accordingly. However, there is only a limited supply of 
freshwater. Freshwater harbouring is a natural process, which requires adaptation on 
part of governments and populations; however, as an effect of climate change, 
freshwater availabilities will become scarce quicker, which in turn provides another 
incentive for addressing water scarcity on a global level. This additional 
consideration highlights that a “business as usual” approach to water scarcity is not 
adequate anymore and on the contrary calls for urgent strategies to solve water 
scarcity problems across the world.  
 
8.1 The global water market 
The impacts of climate change will be felt most severely in Low and Middle Income 
countries; the countries that are most vulnerable and least capable of adapting to 
these impacts through their own means (Pettengell, 2010; IPCC 2007). Large annual 
financial investments will be needed to avoid the adverse impacts of climate change 
to become an additional burden on development efforts. According to Oxfam (2010), 
investment between US$ 49 and US$171billion p.a. are required. During the COP in 
Copenhagen in 2009, ambitious commitments were made by developed countries to 
183 
 
raise US$30bn between 2010 and 2012 (Copenhagen Accord, 2009). It was stated 
that half of the funding would be directed towards adaptation (ibid.). Looking at the 
already existing financial architecture for adaptation finance, it becomes apparent 
that the Copenhagen commitments could prove to be too ambitious to be achieved 
by public sector commitment alone, amid developed countries governments’ 
reluctance to add more finance towards climate change in light of the global 
economic crisis and severe budget constraints. It has hence been established by the 
international community and researchers that it is vital to mobilise the private sector 
for financing adaptation projects (COP 2009); the risk of non-action on behalf of the 
private sector will jeopardise the financial targets as set out by the Copenhagen 
Accord will not be met.  
 
The Copenhagen Accord explicitly refers to the private sector and “alternative 
sources of finance” in order to achieve the funding targets and states that private-
sector financing and investment to address climate change activities should be 
promoted more widely by the Global Environment Facility (Copenhagen Accord, 
UNFCCC/CP/2009/11/Add., p. 19).   However, there is no mechanism in place yet, 
that regulates private sector participation in climate change finance in general, not to 
mention in adaptation funding. It is yet to be seen if the negotiations during the 
COP17 in Durban in December 2011 are going to result in any progress with regards 
to the role of the private sector in adaptation financing. Amongst the key decisions 
that resulted from Durban was the agreement to make the Green Climate Fund 
(GCF) operational from 2012 onwards and to help developing countries prepare to 
access the Fund in order to adapt to specific climate change effects. A standing 
committee consisting of 20 members will oversee long-term climate finance 
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strategies and a second committee composed of 16 members will aim at improving 
the coordination and collaboration of adaptation actions globally. These decisions 
will help address water stress-related adaptation projects and programmes in the 
MENA region.  
 
8.2 Potential drivers and barriers to private sector funding 
In this chapter, potential drivers and barriers to private sector involvement are 
identified and discussed. While the chapter does not address one country in 
particular, the drivers and barriers discussed here are applicable to Middle Income 
Countries55 and in particular to the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. In 
the context of this work and to narrow down the research further, the water sector 
(specifically water scarcity, i.e. the lack of sufficient available freshwater resources 
per capita) has been chosen as the investment area. Water scarcity is directly linked 
to adaptation to climate change, as more severe temperatures in addition to the rise 
in global population will result in less water available per capita in certain regions of 
the world.  
 
“Access to safe water is a fundamental human need and therefore a basic human 
right” 
Kofi Annan, United Nations, 31.03.2001 
 
                                                          
55
 Middle Income Country definition according to the World Bank: Income group: Economies are 
divided according to 2011 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups 
are: low income, $1,025 or less; lower middle income, $1,026 - $4,035; upper middle income, $4,036 
- $12,475; and high income, $12,476 or more. Retrieved November 2012: 
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications  
185 
 
As highlighted previously, the increase of the global population, by around 2.5 billion 
people by the year 2050, goes hand in hand with a growth in demand for food, 
energy and other consumer goods and services. As a result, global demand for 
freshwater will increase accordingly. However, there is only limited supply of 
freshwater. According to Heymann (2010) usage conflicts are inevitable and are 
already happening; this is best exemplified by looking at the example of Sudan. 
Growth in population and a developing economy inevitably leads to increasing 
urbanisation and industrialisation and hence to an increase in water demand. There 
will be greater water demand through an increased need for food production, energy 
production and continued economic growth. Agriculture represents more than 90 per 
cent of the global water consumption and is expected to further increase by 50 per 
cent with population increase and economic development (Veolia Water Impact 
Index, 2008).   
 
However, as mentioned, potable water resources are limited and people will 
compete to fulfil their basic needs for freshwater. Furthermore, in some regions and 
countries access to potable water is and will not be equally distributed amongst a 
society, which may result in further tensions and competition.  In 2010 Deutsche 
Bank estimated global investment requirements for the water sector at roughly €400-
500bn p.a. (Heymann, 2010), with an overall increase in fresh water demand of 3% 
per year (Deutsche Bank, 2011). Veolia Water has developed the so-called Water 
Impact Index (WII), which presents a methodology that enables the assessment of 
the impact of human activity on water resources and supplies. According to the 
Veolia Water White Paper (2009) the WII methodology incorporates factors such as 
volume, resource stress and water quality to reach a comprehensive assessment. 
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Furthermore the WII provides a tool to establish the positive and negative 
implications of how water is managed. The aim of the WII is to allow decision makers 
to “develop a much more detailed, holistic and inter-related understanding” (p. 6) of 
the quantity of water used, the level of stress upon water resources and overall water 
quality.  What is clear, is that investment in water infrastructure – desalination, water 
re-usage – will have to increase in the next few decades in order to meet this 
growing demand for freshwater.  
 
The generally accepted definitions for the concepts of water shortage and water 
scarcity are derived from the “Falkenmark Water Stress Index”, developed by 
Swedish scientist Malin Falkenmark in 1989 (Stockholm International Water 
Institute). According to the Water Stress Index a country has no stress in the 
availability of portable water if its annual renewable freshwater resources exceed 
1,700m³ per person. If the resources total 1,000 to 1,700m³ per person a country is 
experiencing water stress. Chronic water scarcity exists at values between 500 – 
1,000m³ and a country is said to be “beyond the water barrier of manageable 
capacity” (Heymann) if renewable water totals less than 500m³ per person per year. 
According to Deutsche Bank, the total global average renewable freshwater 
resources total approximately 8,550m³ per person per year, with Canada totalling 
91,000m³, Germany 1,900m³, Egypt slightly below 800m³ per year and Jordan with 
only around 165m³ per person per year (Heymann, 2010; Aquastat, 2008). However, 
the index only serves as a rough guideline. The index does not take into 
consideration individual countries’ adaptability levels to inadequate natural supplies 
of freshwater.  
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In addition to the above mentioned growth in global population, global climate 
change worsens the freshwater situation further and presents an additional 
challenge. Disparities in distribution of water and competition about water are key 
considerations for understanding the wider context and consequences of water 
scarcity.   
 
8.3 Water - demand and supply management 
In general, one may differentiate between two adaptation strategies to water stress 
and scarcity.  
1. The first option is to increase water availability, by transferring water from 
areas with substantial freshwater resources to arid regions or to purify 
seawater and wastewater.  
2. The second option is to push efforts in reducing the amount of water used and 
wasted   
 
The different forms of purifying and transferring freshwater, under option one, are 
currently very costly (Shannon et al., 2008). Hence, there is a vast need for 
investment in the global water sector, albeit the focus of investment varies from 
country to country. In the MICs and emerging markets, the challenge is to ensure 
that infrastructure develops at the same pace as population growth; industrialisation 
takes place and the demands for agricultural products increases. These factors put 
demand on water usage. In the past this challenge has not been met. The 
development of the adequate infrastructure has lagged behind the increase in water 
demand. Consequently, there is huge demand for investment and as mentioned 
above, public sector budgets are tight and insufficient to close this funding and 
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investment gap. It is therefore the private sector that will increasingly be considered 
responsible for investing in the global water sector. If water becomes scarce 
businesses can suffer in a number of different ways. For example, business risks 
can emerge from increased costs, from tighter government regulation and from 
reputational risk of over exploiting scarce water resources at the expense of the 
environment and the local communities (Lloyds, 2010).  
 
It is not yet clear if the obstacles and barriers to private sector investment outweigh 
the drivers or vice versa. This chapter provides the initial basis for such an 
evaluation. However, amid the growing global demand for freshwater, private sector 
investors increasingly discover the potential for entering a new market. In this 
context it is also worth having a closer look at the shadow water price, i.e. the link to 
energy prices and carbon intensity; because of the knock-on policy considerations 
and because energy price linkages can provide an enhanced understanding of 
present and future water prices. In particular, seawater desalination is very energy-
intensive and costly (Trieb, 2007, p. 2); between 2000 and 2007 the prices of fossil 
fuels, oil and gas increased by 300%  and amid growing concerns about the effect of 
carbon emissions on the global climate the conventional energy system does not 
seem adequate for a sustainable and competitive supply of water (ibid.). The 
population of the MENA region will grow by approximately 600 million in 2050 (ibid.) 
and with increasing urbanisation and industrialisation the stress on the already 
scarce water resources will lead to even more deficits of freshwater. Taking into 
consideration that the MENA region has an outstanding potential for solar energy, a 
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promising approach could be to use concentrating thermal power (CSP) plants to 
power seawater desalination to solve the water scarcity problem in the region56.  
 
8.4 The case of Jordan 
In 2007, the Jordanian Aqaba Water Company (AWC) revealed its plans for the 
construction of a desalination plant with an initial capacity in the region of 
50,000m³/day (Global Water Intelligence, 2009); at the same time the Jordanian 
Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) started approaching investors to fund the 
Jordan National Red Sea Water Development Project (JRSP). The project would 
desalinate seawater in Aqaba and involve a transmission to Amman, as well as to 
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (ibid.). This shows that the demand 
for seawater desalination is growing amid shrinking availabilities of freshwater 
resources and a growing population (US Aid57; Office of King Hussein58; Water 
Technology59). However, an affordable and sustainable way of securing these water 
resources has yet to be determined and if done right, it could even address 
mitigation. Hence, there may be a strong preference for supporting low carbon 
energy sourced desalination technologies, based on – for example – solar power. 
 
Hence, in the following section barriers and drivers are identified and discussed; it 
goes without saying that each driver and barrier weighs differently, also between 
companies and industry sector. So going forward with this analysis, an approach to 
weighing each driver and barrier has to be developed. Only this allows one to draw 
                                                          
56
 For further information see: Trieb, F. (2007), Concentrating Solar Power for Seawater Desalination, 
MENAREC 4, Damascus, Syria, June 20-24 
57
 http://jordan.usaid.gov/sectors.cfm?inSector=16, retrieved 10.11.2011 
58
 http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/geo_env4.htm, retrieved 10.11.2011 
59
 http://www.water-technology.net/projects/greater_amman/, retrieved 10.11.2011  
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conclusions that are useful to investors and other stakeholders, such as regulators. 
Drivers and barriers can roughly be divided into three groups:  
1. Drivers and barriers as a result of governmental decisions, regulations and 
such;  
2. Drivers and barriers as a result of private stimuli and  
3. Drivers and barriers as a result of corporate environmental and social 
sustainability 
 
However, in some cases and under certain circumstances what is classified as a 
driver can also be regarded as a barrier and vice versa. These three areas of activity 
have great explanatory power in shaping the drivers and barriers. It can be conceded 
that much of the time they can act in the service of adaptation if designed that way 
but each area can also work against adaptation, for example draining away 
important resources. Another good example is making investments predominantly in 
mitigation, thereby neglecting adaptation. This thesis does not look at drivers and 
barriers that only arise as a result of an adaptation strategy being in place for each 
group. Instead, it identifies the largest drivers and barriers to adaptation. This is in 
order to be able to identify the best drivers and use this information strategically to 
decide how best to address the most significant barriers to investments. Hence, this 
chapter is structured by listing and analysing the (primary) drivers, followed by the 
(primary) barriers to private sector investments in water adaptation technologies, 
dividing them according to the three groups mentioned above. If appropriate, it will 
be indicated whether a driver is also classified as a barrier and vice versa. This 
chapter presents a starting-point for further development of survey mechanisms and 
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detailed evidence gathering to be able to draw conclusions with regards to the 
drivers and barriers.   
 
 
 
8.5 Drivers and Barriers 
One can differentiate between a number of drivers for private sector investments in 
the water sector60. 
1. Regulatory drivers, as developed by national or international law, legally 
oblige private sector companies to operate according to certain 
(environmentally friendly) restrictions;  
                                                          
60 Whereas the drivers are applicable on a global scale, the barriers to investments differ from region 
to region (see “Barriers”).   
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2. new market or business opportunities drive the private sector to invest in 
order to expand their area of influence and to increase their turn-over;  
3. direct and indirect exposure to climate change can function as a driver to 
private sector participation when companies’ production and/or supply chains 
get disrupted by climate change;  
4. investment drivers are a way to engage private sector companies to manage 
climate risks and financial drivers set incentives for companies to take action 
by providing concessional loans, grants, tax breaks and other forms of 
monetisable benefits, including relevant third party research funds;  
5. Another, rather rare, albeit increasingly becoming important, driver is 
corporate social responsibility and sustainability (CSR)/corporate citizenship 
and fear of reputational damage that drives the private sector to engage in the 
global water sector (EBRD 2011; PWC 2010).  
 
One would assume, since the majority of countries in arid regions belong to the more 
politically unstable and developing countries, that there are as many barriers to 
investing in the water sector as there are drivers. However, this does not seem to be 
the case. As it appears there are only a few - albeit crucial - barriers to investment: 
political instability, corruption, investment risk and reputational damage/risk. 
 
8.6 Government-based  
8.6.1 Intergovernmental Agreements 
Intergovernmental agreements (IGAs), such as regulatory mechanisms have the 
obvious benefit of establishing a legally binding framework for the private sector to 
support adaptation funding and in this case more specifically the global water sector. 
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In the case of non-compliance, sanctions61 can be applied, for example in the form of 
financial sanctions (freezing of funds or economic resources), trade restrictions 
(import or export bans), diplomatic sanctions or restrictions on admissions (visa or 
travel bans). Examples of regulatory mechanisms are the pricing of water supply or a 
waste discharge. However, establishing such a legally binding framework is not 
uncomplicated, especially at the international and supranational legislative 
processes. Looking at the European Union, one might see potential for reforming 
Directive 85/337/EEC62 on Environmental Impact Assessment for it to be applicable 
to climate change adaption. The Directive as it stands now applies “to the 
assessment of the environmental effects of those public and private projects which 
are likely to have significant effects on the environment...” (Directive 85/337/EEC, 
Art.1). However, the usual procedure to amend a piece of EU legislation is through 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council and through co-decision procedure 
with the European Parliament, following the legislative proposal by the European 
Commission. This is a very long-lasting procedure and often takes up to a few years.  
 
EU regulations are relevant to the MENA states in the context of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which envisages building an increasingly close 
relationship with its neighbours, including “a zone of stability, security and prosperity 
for all” (European Commission, 2011). Partner countries under the ENP are: Algeria, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, [Libya63], 
Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. The 
                                                          
61
 “Sanctions are an instrument of a diplomatic or economic nature which 
seek to bring about a change in activities or policies” European Commission, 2008: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/index_en.pdf, retrieved 09.11.2011  
62
 Directive 85/337/EEC: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1985L0337:20090625:EN:PDF  
63
 The application procedure has been put on hold. 
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idea behind the ENP is to give new impetus to cooperation with the EU’s 
neighbouring countries (after the EU-27 enlargement), to contribute to the settlement 
of conflict in the region and to achieve the objectives that were set under the 
Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean (today: Union for the Mediterranean 
EUMED). The Action Plans that are agreed between the EU and individual ENP 
partner countries focus on a number of different pillars, including commitment to 
shared values, a more effective political dialogue, economic and social development, 
trade and internal market, justice and home affairs and connecting the 
neighbourhood. The aim of the Action Plans under the ENP are to encourage further 
integration into the European economic and social structures, as well as to advance 
the approximation of the respective countries’ legislation, norms and standards to 
those of the EU (EU-Jordan Action Plan, 2010, p. 1). The Action Plans are reviewed 
and progress is measured on a regular basis64.   
 
8.6.1.1 The EU – Jordan ENP Action Plan 
The EU-Jordan Action Plan, the latest published in May 201065, presents a good 
example, as it touches upon the many different pillars of joint action. The Action Plan 
in particular mentions the importance of protecting the environment and “thereby 
contributing to the long-term objective of sustainable development” (ibid.). § 2.5 (57) 
states that “steps [need to be taken] to ensure that conditions for good environmental 
governance are set”; this is to be achieved by strengthening the Jordanian Ministry 
of Environment, reviewing the National Environment Action Plan (NEAP) and by 
completing the Environmental Protection Law (EPL). §58 of the EPL refers 
                                                          
64
 ENP Actions Plans: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm, retrieved 08.09.2011 
65
 EU-Jordanian Action Plan: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/jordan/documents/news/20101026_01_en.pdf, retrieved 
08.09.2011 
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specifically to the “rational use of natural resources” and mentions as a priority area 
“water issues”. Acknowledging that the Action Plan does not present a legally 
binding document for either party involved (i.e. Jordan and the EU), the vague 
formulations of the document in general, and in particular in relation to the 
environment, stand out. There is no mentioning of climate change as such and water 
scarcity is not identified as a major concern to Jordan, though it is in fact according 
to the World Health Organisation (WHO) and others66. Furthermore, the Action Plan 
only tackles the “what”, but not the “how” questions and leaves much room for 
interpretation. Although, the introductory part of the Action Plan sets out a timeframe 
of three to five years, it does not present specific deadlines by when certain targets 
are to be achieved, let alone mentioning specific targets.  
 
This is not only the case for the Jordanian Action Plan; the Egyptian Action Plan67, 
though slightly more elaborate in particular on the environment, is as vaguely 
formulated as the Jordanian Action Plan.  
 
The legal framework governing the bilateral relations between Jordan and the EU is 
the 2002 Association Agreement6869. With regards to the environment Article 65(1) 
                                                          
66
 “Jordan: Water is Life” http://www.who.int/heli/pilots/jordan/en/index.html, retrieved 08.09.2011  
67
 EU-Egyptian Action Plan: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/egypt_enp_ap_final_en.pdf, retrieved 08.09.2011 
68
 “Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part”, 
Official Journal of the European Communities, L129/3, 15.5.2002 
69 “Jordan was among the first Mediterranean Partners to embark on new association ties with the 
EU: negotiations were initiated on 18 July 1995 and completed on 24 November 1997, the date of 
signature of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement. This agreement was subsequently ratified by the 
European Parliament in July 1998 and the Jordanian Parliament in September 1999. The Association 
Agreement entered into force on 1 May 2002.”, retrieved from: Association Agreements: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/jordan/eu_jordan/political_relations/agreements/association_agree
ments/index_en.htm, 14.09.2011  
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states that “cooperation is aimed at preventing deterioration of the environment, 
controlling pollution and ensuring the rational use of natural resources, with a view to 
ensuring sustainable development and promoting regional environmental projects”. 
Article 65(2) more specifically refers to cooperation in the field of, amongst other 
things, desertification, water resource management, water quality, and salinisation. 
The focus of the Association Agreement is clearly on the economic and political 
cooperation between the EU and Jordan, whereas the environment is of only little 
importance within the framework. This is, on the one hand, surprising as the issue of 
water, as mentioned above, is of crucial importance to Jordan and the EU strives to 
present itself as a forerunner in climate change-related topics; yet, on the other hand 
it does not come as a big surprise when regarding the EU more as a community of 
economic interests.  
 
8.6.1.1.1 Example: Morocco 
In this context, for Morocco, as for many of its neighbouring countries, water quality 
and water quantity presents a major challenge. Several ministries and government 
agencies are involved in water and wastewater planning. The National Office of 
Potable Water (ONEP) controls the protection and monitoring of freshwater as well 
as the enforcement of any related legislation. In 1995 Morocco passed Loi 10-95 “Le 
Code des Eaux”, the so called “New Water Resources Law”. This code relates to the 
protection and preservation of water resources, wastewater discharge and the reuse 
of treated wastewater. Under Loi 10-95 basin agencies were created to plan and 
manage water resources within their hydrographic catchments (METAP, 
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Mediterranean Environmental Technical Assistance Program)70. In 2000 the ONEP 
was given more responsibilities with regards to wastewater, enabling it to collect, 
treat and re-use wastewater if so required by the municipalities (DG Environment, 
2006)71. The re-use of waste water is an important part for the successful adaptation 
to water scarcity; therefore, any regulatory mechanisms can be regarded as drivers 
for adaptation to water scarcity and thus climate change.  
 
However, under exceptional circumstances, intergovernmental agreements can also 
develop into a barrier. If, for instance, an IGA promotes oil exports to Jordan at a 
preferred price, a barrier could be created with regards to renewable, low-carbon, 
energy sources for de-salination.  
 
The next section discusses the option of government-based financial incentives to 
address water scarcity, 
 
8.6.2 National government-based financial incentives to address water scarcity 
Financial drivers require governments or international organisations to set financial 
incentives, in the form of concessional loans or grants to businesses for them to take 
action on adaptation, i.e. in the water market. To date, there are only few examples 
where financial drivers have been effective in stimulating private sector development; 
however, these examples are not related to climate change and hence not relevant 
to this piece of work. Theoretically however, this is a very interesting and promising 
                                                          
70
 Mediterranean Environmental Technical Assistance Program, Morocco: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTMETAP/Resources/WQM-MoroccoP.pdf, retrieved 10.09.2011 
71 Support to DG Environment for development of the Mediterranean De-pollution Initiative “HORIZON 
2020” 
No 070201/2006/436133/MAR/E3 
198 
 
option. Yet, in some countries concessional loans to domestic companies might not 
be perceived well. Concessional loans furthermore raise issues of historical 
responsibility and the fact that developed countries should also be held responsible 
for adaptation finance, not only mitigation. Financial drivers are a very sensitive issue 
and might be controversial in the context of climate change finance. More research 
into this field might be necessary, which could be done through validation with 
experts and stakeholders. There is one example, however, that highlights the 
controversial nature of government-based financial incentives. David Richard Boyd 
(2003) refers to the Canadian example of water pricing strategies: “The method used 
for pricing water in Canada also contributes to high levels of water use. Fifty-six per 
cent of Canadian utilities charge a flat rate for water […]. Many studies confirm that 
price increases result in significantly lower household consumption”. Boyd 
furthermore compares the Canadian model to the European water pricing systems 
and finds that “The European philosophy is that a certain level of water is required to 
meet basic human needs and water above that level is a luxury” (p.48). It follows that 
a government, which heavily subsidizes water usage, may unintentionally create an 
additional burden on the supply of water. In a country where water is abundant this 
may be seen “only” as a waste of a public good; in a country, however, in which 
water is scarce, such pricing policies may be fatal, as shown later in this thesis, is 
the case of Jordan.   
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8.7 Private stimuli 
8.7.1 Revenue Earning Opportunities  
Business opportunities and new markets can be very powerful drivers for investors. 
Global demand for water is rapidly increasing, which opens new geographical 
markets, leads to innovation of new products and demand for new consumer 
services. According to Deutsche Bank (2011), “it is to be expected that private 
companies will be increasingly involved in future water-related projects and will also 
benefit from higher investment in the sector”. The reason for this is that water and 
the lack thereof is very ‘topical’ and as mentioned above entire new markets are 
going to open up for the water sector. As private sector companies are strongly 
revenue-driven it can be expected that interest in the water sector will sharply 
increase over time. Investing in adaptation, with regards to the water sector, would 
hence appear as an attractive rather than burdensome opportunity, due to the 
prospects of revenue-earning opportunities. In recent years new desalination 
technologies have been developed; desalination is a process for purifying water and 
is still very costly and energy-intensive. At present, many of the richer countries in 
the Middle East (for example the UAE and Israel) are applying desalination 
technologies and draw around 40% of freshwater from desalination.  Desalination 
costs the UAE about US$3.2bn each year. Abu Dhabi produces around 67% of the 
UAE’s desalinated water, whereas Dubai and Sharjah produce 18% and 10% 
respectively72. Israel can be seen as a forerunner with regards to desalination 
technologies, having recently revealed plans to build one of the world’s largest 
desalination plants to date in the coastal city of Hadera, applying reverse osmosis 
technologies that require less energy and are more environment-friendly. Large 
                                                          
72
 “Desalination Costs UAE $3bn a Year”: http://www.water-technology.net/news/news93758.html, 
retrieved 14.07.2011 
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desalination plants can also be found in Saudi Arabia, which use a thermal-based 
technology to desalinate sea water (Reuters, 2010).  
 
Desalination appears to be a possibility, however costly. It opens up a relatively new 
market, where plenty of innovation is still required and competition needed.  
 
Companies like Veolia increasingly shift their focus towards the Middle East and the 
water sector, and also financial institutions like Deutsche Bank recognise the 
importance of water and the business opportunities that are linked to it. Recently, the 
IFC (International Financial Corporation) and PROPARCO73 have invested around 
EUR 25 million capital stock in Veolia Water Africa, Middle East and India (Veolia, 
2008). In June 2011 Deutsche Bank published a report stressing the attractiveness 
of certain countries with regards to the world’s water market. Based on a set of 
eleven criteria Deutsche Bank ranked 78 countries, taking into consideration 
variables like the political environment in the Arab world (Heymann, 2011). Pike 
Research (2010) predicts that desalination plant investments are to double by 2016 
and that “the Middle East/North Africa region will continue to be the global hub of 
desalination plant construction...”74. Pike Research forecasts that by 2016 the top 
five markets (in terms of installed capacities) will be Saudia Arabia, the UAE, the US, 
China and Israel. Deutsche Bank on the other hand forecasts that Qatar, the UAE, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain rank top five in terms of attractiveness of 
investors. This shows that countries that are faced with water shortages and are also 
economically stable are the most attractive to investors. Knowing this, and 
                                                          
73
 PROPARCO is a Development Finance Institution, created over 30 years ago on the conviction that 
the private sector plays a key role in the development of the countries in the South: 
http://www.proparco.fr/lang/en/Accueil_PROPARCO, retrieved 07.03.2013  
74
 The same trend was confirmed in a speech by Ed Daniels, Chairman of Shell UK, at Imperial 
College London on 12.03.2013 
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considering the eleven criteria Deutsche Bank has ranked, can be a potential way 
forward for other Middle Income, arid countries of the Middle East and elsewhere.  
 
In this context it is important to analyse the structure of the investment; the analysis 
has to focus hereby on the question whether Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in a de-
salination plant constitutes an investment in climate change adaptation. For the 
country into which the FDI flows, de-salination technologies are clearly a means to 
adapt to an increasing water scarcity and hence FDI constitutes investment in 
adaptation. The investors, on the other hand, might see their investment as a straight 
business regardless of climate change and a country’s need to adapt.  
 
One might argue that for the recipient government this differentiation does not really 
matter; for some recipients, technologies constitute a “luxury” and only the end-
product, i.e. the de-salination of water, is what really matters. Hence, if FDI is meant 
to facilitate adaptation to climate change or not is not so important anymore.   
 
At the time of writing (March 2013) no evidence could be found that indicates that 
FDI in de-salination is made due to climate change adaptation reasons. There is 
awareness amongst investors of increasing problems with water scarcity; however, 
there is no explicit statement that this is also the reason behind the investments.  
 
8.8 Investment Conditions  
Investment drivers involve investors setting standards and conditions for their clients 
to manage climate risks that might otherwise threaten their investment. Investment 
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drivers can also come in the form of water-related disclosure requirements75. This is 
the case already for the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Equator 
Banks (EBRD, 2011).  
 
Amongst other banks, HSBC and Standard Chartered have recently adopted the 
Equator principles76, a framework for managing environmental and social risk within 
project financing. More specifically, the Equator Principles are a credit risk-
management framework that allows banks to determine, assess and manage 
environmental and social risks in project finance transitions (Equator Principles 
website77). Project finance is generally used to finance major infrastructure and 
industrial projects, usually environment-related. The Principles are adopted 
voluntarily by banks and other financial institutions and are applied where project 
costs exceed US$ 10 million. The Equator Principles are primarily used to ensure 
basic due diligence to support risk decision-making with regard to investment 
finance. The Principles follow four phases to assess a projects’ investment risk level. 
In the first phase, impacts are assessed with regards to their degree of potential 
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The Pacific Institute: Assessment of Current and Emerging Practice in Corporate Water Reporting, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9.1_news_archives/2009_03_11/Water_Disclosur
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 Equator Principles: http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/about-ep and http://www.equator-
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impact and are divided into three categories78. In phase two an action plan is 
developed to address those impacts and in phase three an agreement to lend money 
is made, given that risks are manageable and meet a certain set of standards (as set 
by the Equator Principles and the HSBC internal sector policies). Lastly, in phase 
four, the project’s development is monitored. For HSBC the Principles form a core 
part of the banks’ approach to manage sustainability risk and are applied to all 
projects HSBC finances, as well as when giving financial structuring advice (HSBC, 
2011)79.  
 
Hence, investment drivers are a good means to require private sector companies to 
comply with a certain set of standards and to operate in a sustainable way. This has 
manifold benefits. First, it ensures that companies operate according to a certain set 
of standards; second, it ensures that companies and investors are aware of certain 
environmental conditions; third, in combination with reputational risk it might attract 
companies to go along the line with the Equator Principles to ensure that their 
projects are carried out in an environmentally friendly and sustainable way.  
 
It is important to note that within the structure of the Equator Principles Association 
there are a number of thematic working groups.  The Equator Principles (EP) 
Working Groups are created by the EP Association Steering Committee to discuss 
and provide guidance to Equator Principles financial institutions, associates and/or 
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diverse, irreversible and unprecedented. 
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their stakeholders on issues associated with the management, administration or the 
development of the EPs. Equator Principles financial institutions and associates are 
not required to join a working group; however, they are encouraged to do so if they 
have a specific expertise or interest. There is direct reference to the climate change 
working group, which is responsible, together with the International Finance 
Corporation, for the implementation of their climate change strategy in the 
Performance Standards and to share good practice in climate risk management 
practices. Of the 72 members, the following financial institutions and associates are 
member of the climate change working group: Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, 
Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citi, HSBC, UniCredit Bank AG, ING, Itau Unibanco S/A, 
Mizuho, RBS, Standard Bank Group, Standard Chartered and WestLB80. However, 
no evidence could be found in the available literature as to whether any of the banks 
interpret the Equator Principles in relation to climate change adaptation.  
 
8.9 Technology – Human understanding of how to address water 
scarcity  
As mentioned in the introductory part of this chapter, the increasing freshwater 
demand and stress on groundwater in the MENA region requires technological 
creativity and hence opens the opportunity for new technologies to enter the market 
and to compete for the most competitive and sustainable method to close the deficit 
in freshwater availability. There is an extensive need and room for innovation and the 
market is far from being saturated. There are a number of ways the deficit in 
freshwater availability could be solved, with desalination being the most prominent at 
the time of writing in March 2013. Desalination, despite being investigated as a 
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suitable option for the MENA region, is still very costly and energy-intense; hence, 
new ways of making desalination more affordable and sustainable at the same time 
need to be elaborated. In this context, solar power presents another area worthwhile 
further research for to making desalination more climate-friendly. Saudi Arabia, in 
cooperation with IBM, is currently building a new energy efficient desalination plant 
with a capacity of 30,000m³/day using a ultra-high concentrator photovoltaic 
technology; a system with a concentration greater than the power of 1500 suns81.  
 
This is an indicator that there is an innovation path for desalination technologies; the 
sources of energy used to generate power for the desalination plants can either stem 
from fossil fuels or renewable energies. Fossil fuels stand in sharp contrast to a low 
carbon development pathway (high CO2 emissions) and are still costly; renewable 
energy sources are very expensive, yet there is, as mentioned above, room for 
innovation and room to explore cheaper ways of using renewable energies for power 
generation.  
 
8.10 Political Risks 
In light of the Arab pro-democracy movement, current political unrest and instability 
may represent a “knock-out criterion” (Heymann, 2011) for many investors. However, 
looking at the long-run the pro-democracy movement is likely to open new and very 
attractive markets to investors once the region becomes more stabilised and 
democratic. Yet, conflict also creates a significant amount of economic instability as 
well as high inflation, unstable currencies and public sector borrowing. This level of 
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instability stops foreign companies from investing; according to Frost & Sullivan82 this 
will only fade once political and economic stability return. 
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter though, even in 2011 amid the uprisings in the 
Arab world, the top five attractive locations for investors in the water sector are 
countries in the Middle East (Heymann, 2011). Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 
and Bahrain are all countries rich in oil and gas deposits, yet at the same time 
located in one of the most arid regions of the world. Also Jordan, with one of the 
lowest per capita (per year) reserves of freshwater, might in the medium-term 
develop into an attractive region to invest in; as one of the most politically stable 
countries in the region it offers an optimal starting position for new investors.  
 
It appears then that despite political instability presenting a potential deterrent for 
investors, the business opportunities behind the region and the sector are likely to 
outweigh the associated risks.  
 
Although corruption is listed as one of the major obstacles for foreign direct 
investment, no evidence could be found as to how far this would deter investors from 
entering the global water market of the Middle East. Similar to the argument 
presented in section 8.8, it seems here that the benefits of investing – or the 
business opportunities – outweigh the ethical dilemma of corruption. This closely 
interlinks with reputational risk, as no multinational company would risk being 
associated with a corrupt, non-democratic government. However, by following a 
sound risk management strategy and being aware of the difficulties a company could 
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face by investing in a country ruled by a corrupt government, most companies would 
still follow the business opportunities. However, as mentioned above, there is so far 
no evidence that would allow any drawing of conclusions in that respect. 
 
8.11 Financial Risks 
Investment risks always exist. However, in the context of the global water sector and 
taking into account the regions where these investments are necessary and popular, 
investment risks appear higher than usual. Technologies are fairly new – 
desalination as the most prominent example – and rather expensive. Furthermore, 
making an investment in certain regions can be risky in the sense that political and 
economic instability make it hard to plan and to assess the risk associated with an 
investment. However, as in sections 8.8 and 8.9 there is no evidence either that 
would show companies refraining from investments because of investment risks. It 
has to be added though, that it would require further research and further analysis, 
as well as interviews with companies in order to draw more solid conclusions. 
 
8.12 Intellectual Property Rights 
Access to technology and Intellectual Property Rights (IP Rights) constitute two 
further barriers to investments in climate change adaptation. In some of the recipient 
countries there might be a lack of the basic infrastructure requirements, shortage in 
labour and there might also be a lack of important technological tools that are 
necessary for the proper functioning of the (i.e.) de-salination plants, which, 
however, might be too costly to import. Hence, this is a deterrent to companies from 
making investments in a given country, finding it too costly and too risky and 
therefore not profitable enough for FDI. Investors tend to be more risk-averse and 
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tend to focus on investments for which they can estimate costs and profits more 
accurately. IP rights could potentially act as a barrier to investments in adaptation if 
they raise the cost of (adaptation) technologies beyond the reach of smaller and also 
domestic companies. Protecting key information on certain technologies will hinder 
market development and expansion and hence leave it dominated by a few 
oligopolies. As Branstetter et al. (2007) state “stronger IPR enforcement will hamper 
the ability of local firms to experiment with and assimilate advanced foreign 
technologies at low cost and hence slow down the rate of global technological 
diffusion”. Strong IP rights confer monopoly power to the creators of certain 
technologies and may generate a welfare loss over the medium- and long-term. 
Similar to the other barriers identified in this chapter, there is lack of evidence to 
confirm whether technology barriers identified herein are indeed stopping investors 
from entering certain markets or if the risks associated are outweighed by the 
potential benefits of investments. There should be a preference for domestic 
ownership and control of IP Rights and guarantees in place that IP Rights are 
available at market rates and not withdrawn entirely.  
 
8.13 Corporate Environmental and Social Sustainability 
8.13.1 Corporate Environmental Sustainability  
Direct or indirect exposure of a company to climate change effects is another very 
powerful driver.  
 
In the case of direct exposure, there is a direct climate change impact on the 
business and its assets; examples are water scarcity, extreme weather events or 
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unsafe work conditions for the workforce. Investing into adaptation in this case is not 
an option but a necessity for firms that depend upon responses to these challenges.  
 
Indirect exposure to climate change impacts, on the other hand, might have an 
impact on the overall operation of a business, e.g. impacts on markets, disruption of 
supply chains and disruption of local infrastructure as well as rising prices of water 
itself or of commodities grown using water (Lloyds, 2010). In this case as well, 
adaptation will be considered a necessity by the respective company as the costs of 
doing nothing will exceed the costs of adapting over the long-term.  
 
Many companies and businesses might not be affected by climate change during the 
near future and might not realise the importance of adapting yet. However, the 
majority of multinational companies, like Coca-Cola and BASF, are already 
developing sound strategies to adapt their business to expected climate hazards.  
 
In its Sustainability Review 2009/10 Coca-Cola addresses the challenges of climate 
change and water scarcity, stating that “climate change has the potential to 
significantly affect the sustainability of our business and supply chain” and further 
that “as the main ingredient in our products and an important part of our 
manufacturing processes, water is essential to the sustainability of our business”. 
Recognising this, Coca Cola increasingly focuses on energy efficiency, but in 
particular on improving water efficiency, recycling waste water and replenishing 
through community water access and watershed restoration and protection (Coca 
Cola, 2010). According to the Sustainability Review, in 2009 Coca Cola achieved its 
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seventh consecutive year of improved water use efficiency83, with a 13% reduction in 
water use ratio84 since 2004.  
 
BASF, as one of the world’s leading chemical companies, uses water predominantly 
in the manufacture of products, for cooling and cleaning. BASF also sees itself as “a 
leading supplier to the water treatment industry and continues to strengthen its 
position” (BASF, 2010). The company has set out a Responsible Care Management 
System (RCMS), with the top priorities being 1) the protection of its employees, 2) its 
neighbours and 3) its own productivity. Therefore, BASF aims to decrease its water 
usage as much as possible. The RCMS forms a framework for environmental 
protection, safety and security; it sets out globally applicable standards, which are 
defined by binding global directives85.  
 
Other examples are SAB Miller and Levi Strauss. SAB Miller has set company water 
efficiency targets to reduce water consumption per litre beer by 25% and Levi 
Strauss has set waste discharge standards. Companies that are not yet affected by 
water scarcity in one way or the other are required to operate on a forward-looking 
basis, taking into consideration the eventuality of rising water prices, water scarcity 
and other effects that may have an impact on production and turnover. Since 
turnover is what drives businesses, direct and indirect exposure to water scarcity can 
be a very efficient driver. 
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8.13.2 Corporate Social Sustainability and government legitimation as a driver 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is defined as “achieving commercial success 
in ways that honour ethical values and respect people, communities, and the natural 
environment” (Business for Social Responsibility, BSR) and as “actions that appear 
to further some social good, beyond the interest of the firm and that which is required 
by law” (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility and reputational risk is a powerful and established 
driver for the private sector as well. “Doing something good” might help companies 
boost their reputation, which is then in turn linked to business opportunities. Running 
the risk of being perceived a polluting company causing environmental damage is 
not an option for the majority of companies today. In 1970 Friedman and other 
neoclassical economists argued that socially responsible firms have a competitive 
disadvantage, as they incur costs that reduce overall profit, while these costs could 
be carried by individuals or governments (Aupperle et al., 1985). However, in a more 
recent study carried out by the Haas School of Business on the relationship between 
CSR and financial performance, Tsoutsoura (2004) finds that there is a positive 
linkage. In the course of her study, Tsoutsoura evaluated the responses from 422 
companies (all S&P 50086 firms); though the author acknowledges the difficulties of 
measuring CSR in terms of financial performance (short term vs. long term 
performance), her findings suggest a positive relationship. Socially responsible 
companies have an enhanced brand image and a positive reputation among 
consumers, they are able to attract more accomplished employees and business 
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partners, there is less risk of negative events, companies that value CSR tend to be 
more transparent and less corrupt and they also have less risk of negative social 
events that costs millions in litigation or advertising campaigns (Tsoutsoura, 2004). 
In 2010, Echo Research, one of the leading reputation and stakeholder analysis 
specialists, conducted research in the same field. Echo carried out 330 interviews 
and analysed around 5000 journal and newspaper articles in order to establish a link 
between financial performance and CSR. According to the Doughty Centre for 
Corporate Responsibility “...the environment, diversity, human rights, the community 
– these used to be soft issues. Now they are hard issues: hard to ignore, hard to 
manage and hard for businesses to get it wrong” (Grayson, 2008)87. There is 
increasing stakeholder pressure and media attention devoted to CSR; companies 
tend to think long-term and respond to a growing societal and business mind-set.  
 
Although CSR is difficult to be monetisable as such, the linkage between CSR and 
financial performance has been growing stronger over the past decade and is a 
factor companies will not be able to disregard.  
 
8.13.2.1 Example: Coca-Cola India 
The famous case of Coca-Cola vs. Kerala State India 2004 (1) KLT 7388 is quite 
exemplary for the reputational damage unsustainable operations can cause a 
company. The following section presents a brief overview and background to the 
Coca-Cola groundwater exploitation case in Kerala, India, in order to highlight the 
increasing importance of CSR. In 1999 the Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages Ltd., a 
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subsidiary of the Coca-Cola Company, established a plant in Kerala in Southern 
India. The village Council gave a licence to the company to begin production in 2000. 
Coca-Cola pumped around 510,000 litres of water each day from boreholes and 
open wells. In 2002, two years after production had commenced, local residents (the 
Adivasi) began protests, complaining that the groundwater level had dropped from 
45 to 100m below the surface, forcing them to walk 5km every day to fetch water and 
arguing further that water pollution and extreme water shortage were endangering 
their lives. They also argued that the little water that was left was undrinkable and 
causing rashes and stomach aches when used89. 
 
Figure 11: Demonstrators in front of Coca-Cola Kerala (Flickr/Skasuga, 2006) 
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Consequently, in April 2003 the Village Council refused to renew Coca-Cola’s 
licence to operate on the grounds that it was not in the public interest to renew the 
licence. This decision was first challenged by the Kerala State Government, but in 
December 2003 the Kerala High Court ruled in favour of the Village Council, that 
under Article 21 of the Indian constitution the Government had “the duty to act to 
protect against excessive groundwater exploitation”.  In 2005 Coca-Cola appealed 
against the judgement, which led to the compromise of the Village Council having to 
renew the licence to operate and Coca-Cola having to comply with 13 conditions, the 
most notable one being that the bottle plant would not use the local groundwater for 
production (and thereby infringe the “Rights to Water and Sanitation”). Coca-Cola 
rejected the three month conditional licence. In 2010 the High Power Committee in 
Kerala ruled that Coca-Cola was liable to pay US$ 48 million for damages caused 
(India Resource Centre, March 2010). The controversial legal dispute continues until 
today (March 2013) and although Coca-Cola claims that many water allegations 
remain unproven, Coca-Cola’s reputation in India has suffered enormously from this 
case (Fleischmann, 2005)90.  
 
This case study highlights to what extent reputational risk plays a major role in 
environmental management for private sector companies. Companies have realised 
that CSR and an environmentally friendly strategy in their production processes and 
management results in an increased popularity and trust with the consumers. The 
contrary is also the case, as highlighted by Coca-Cola vs. Kerala.  
One could hence argue that water is a socially constructed driver for firms; society 
cannot exist without water and hence using water in a corporate environmentally and 
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socially sustainable way may enhance a company’s good reputation in the eyes of 
the consumers, which in turn increases revenue.  
 
8.14 Social and Cultural Risks 
Reputational risks as a barrier to investment in the water sector is very important for 
companies. Looking back at CSR and reputational risk as drivers for investments, 
and in particular considering the case Coca-Cola vs. Kerala, it is clear that the risk of 
damaging a company’s reputation exists and why it can be a barrier for investments. 
Yet again, there is lack of evidence that would confirm this hypothesis and hence this 
barrier is categorised as a theoretical barrier, which yet needs to be confirmed 
through expert and stakeholder interviews. 
 
Cultural barriers are very closely related to this; when entering a new market and 
hence a new cultural region, there might be a number of barriers a company or 
investor might encounter. One barrier that can be identified is linked to the question 
of project ownership; governments may place a number of conditions on investors 
that seek to expand into their domestic market, which can even determine the 
degree to which foreign ownership is allowed (Berglöf et al., 2004). In some 
countries, government permits full foreign ownership, while in other countries foreign 
investors are only allowed to minority ownership and participation in the domestic 
market and domestic companies. According to Berglöf et al. governments can be 
very reluctant to grant foreign participation in sectors that are strategically important 
or culturally sensitive to them; this includes the water sector in many countries. 
Before investments can be made, foreign investors may have to overcome a number 
of obstacles in relation to the question of ownership, which could eventually lead to 
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their withdrawal from the project. Furthermore, with limited foreign ownership 
permitted, companies might struggle to recruit the workforce needed for a successful 
completion of their projects. However, the evidence for this barrier is limited to 
research studies only and no evidence could be found to confirm this barrier.  
 
8.15 Summary 
In theory the drivers and barriers for financial institutions and private sector 
companies to invest in the global water sector in Middle Income Countries (in 
particular in the Middle East) are now clear. However, as indicated above there is 
hardly any evidence to validate many of the drivers and barriers analysed in this 
chapter. In order to be able to draw conclusions and provide policy 
recommendations, further research will have to be conducted. The drivers and 
barriers that were discussed here can therefore be divided into sub-sections – 
theoretical and actual drivers and barriers. The following tables summarise the 
drivers and barriers into actual and theoretical and provides an overview in which 
areas further research will be necessary. For identified drivers and barriers that lack 
evidence, there will be further validation (or not, as the case may be) by reference to 
stakeholder and expert dialogue; theoretical drivers and barriers are hence not 
proven and this research and subsequent validation have confirmed (or denied, as 
the case may be) that they are valid in the context of Jordan.   
 
The following chapter validates the theoretical framework as set out in this chapter. It 
does so through expert and stakeholder validation in the form of interviews and 
surveys and provides the basis for informed policy recommendations.  
 
  
217 
 
Table 21: The relevant role of water technologies and practices 
Supply Demand 
Agriculture 
- Move away from growing water-
intense crops 
- Use drip irrigation 
- Brackish water use 
- Potentially use GM crops 
- Grow crops, fruits and vegetables 
that consume less water 
- Enforce legislation against over-
use of water in agriculture 
- Encourage and support farmers to 
switch to other water saving 
devices and less water intense  
Municipal 
- Update infrastructure 
- Re-usage/recycling 
- Use of grey water 
- Rainwater harvesting 
- Reduce unaccounted for water 
levels 
- Install water saving devices  
- Encourage and implement water 
saving practices in the households 
- Substitute old hoses for use in 
gardens and for washing cars 
Commercial/Industrial 
Tourism: 
- Water saving appliances 
 
Industry: 
- Update infrastructure and replace 
old piping systems 
- Recycling of water 
Tourism: 
- Highlight water scarcity to tourists 
– green tourism 
- Customer practices (e.g. towel 
saving) 
 
Industry: 
- Encourage industry in the country 
that consumes less water 
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9. Validation of the theoretical framework through 
stakeholder and expert consultation 
 
The aim of this chapter is to validate the theoretical findings and the framework as 
presented in chapter 8 of this thesis and to implement and execute the methodology 
of chapter 3. In order to do so, a case study was chosen and various stakeholders 
and experts were consulted over a period of eight months from March to October 
2012, in the form of semi-structured interviews and questionnaires. Previous 
chapters have discussed in detail why the particular case study of the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan (hereinafter, Jordan) was chosen and chapter 7 of this thesis 
presented a detailed overview of the political, economic, geographic and 
environmental circumstances in Jordan. This chapter presents how the methodology 
was implemented and executed and validates the theoretical framework through the 
findings of the interviews and questionnaires. Chapter 11 provides an extensive 
discussion of the general findings, of the drivers and barriers as well as other 
findings from the stakeholder process and it analyses and interprets the findings in 
the wider context of this thesis.  Chapter 11 then derives as set of policy 
recommendations for the government from the findings and the discussion and 
finally highlights questions and research areas that are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, yet would provide the basis for further research.  
 
The following paragraphs provide a brief summary of the methodology that was 
applied in this research; a detailed account of the methodology was already 
presented in chapter 3. The remainder of this chapter presents the findings.  
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9.1 Identification of stakeholders 
In order to be able to develop a comprehensive questionnaire in preparation for the 
semi-structured interviews as well as for the company surveys the most relevant 
stakeholders were identified. Purposive sampling was considered the best approach 
for this specific research, given the level of technical expertise required by 
stakeholders in order to be able to participate in the interviews or to complete the 
survey. Due to the complexity of the research area, it was decided that semi-
structured interviews would be conducted with government entities, international 
organisations and institutions and consultancies, whereas surveys would be sent by 
email to private sector companies. The questions that were asked in interviews and 
in surveys varied according to stakeholder type and a full list of these can be found 
in the Appendix of the thesis.  
 
Table 22: Approach to stakeholder engagement 
Semi-structured interviews Surveys 
Government ministries and agencies Private sector companies 
NGOs, think tanks  
International Aid Agencies and Development 
Organisations 
 
International Institutions  
Consultancies  
Individual experts and stakeholders  
 
 
Governmental and other public sector stakeholders included multiple government 
ministries in Jordan, NGOs, foreign aid agencies, development banks, consultancies 
as well as local associations, individual academics and humanitarian funds. These 
stakeholders were identified through literature analysis, policy documents, referral, 
conferences and websites. A complete list of stakeholders can be found in the 
Appendix.  
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Private sector companies were predominantly identified through web-based research 
and through the analysis of project reports, as well as through participation in 
conferences and referral. Due to the narrow nature91 of the case study only a small 
number of participating companies could be identified. Furthermore, due to the high 
sensitivity of the information private sector companies proved very reluctant to 
cooperate or to provide information and therefore the desired number of survey 
responses could not be achieved.  
 
The private sector stakeholders were subsequently divided into three further groups: 
 Private sector companies that have operation in the MENA region 
 Private sector companies that have operation in Jordan 
 Private sector companies that do not operate neither in Jordan nor in the 
MENA region 
 
It has been noted, that private sector experience in the water sector in the Middle 
East and in particular in Jordan is still limited and expertise is still in the process of 
being developed.   
 
9.2 Questionnaire design 
Questionnaires were sent to all private sector stakeholders via email. A copy of the 
questionnaire can be found in the Appendix. The same questionnaire was sent to the 
three groups identified earlier. After developing the questionnaire, it was peer-
reviewed by PhD researchers, academics and consultants alike. The feedback that 
was provided was used to amend the content, the format and style of the survey in 
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order to achieve the best-possible outcome of the surveys, i.e. the most relevant 
information to the research question. Having identified 62 companies to which the 
questionnaire would be sent, each company was contacted via email and phone 
initially, in order to obtain the contact details of a participant with enough expertise to 
complete the questionnaire. Upon receiving these contact details, a survey was 
emailed.  
 
The majority of the 14 questions were listed in multiple choice formats, while some 
options were presented in a ranking scale. Some of the questions allowed 
respondents to comment and to provide personal feedback. The advantage of 
allowing respondents to comment is that ideas can be expressed freely without prior 
predefined choice by the questionnaire designer. However, the use of open ended 
questions also often results in the respondent reacting spontaneously without 
necessarily reflecting actual company policy.  
 
All questionnaire respondents indicated that they would like their responses to be 
treated confidentially and remain anonymous, i.e. that their answers would not be 
seen by any third party and that individuals and companies would not be named and 
that publication of the research would not lead to the subsequent identification of an 
organisation or an individual. Questionnaire participants were asked if they would 
participate in a follow-up interview, however, only one respondent gave consent. It 
was thus considered obsolete to conduct a follow-up interview with only one 
respondent. 
 
222 
 
According to Saunders et al. (2000) response rates for business-oriented 
questionnaires have reportedly been as low as 15 – 20%. In this research it was 
found that responses were generated only after multiple persistent enquiries on part 
of the researcher and that numerous companies declined completing the survey due 
to company policies, lack of personnel capacity and time, and most importantly, lack 
of expertise in the chosen case study’s geographical area. This was anticipated and 
considerable effort to attempt to get responses was made. As discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3, an initial list of 62 companies was compiled; first contact was made by 
email describing the research project and purpose and to enquire about the contact 
details of the most suitable person to complete the survey. If no replies were 
received within a week to ten days, follow-up emails were sent and subsequently 
contact was made via phone. It was found that in the majority of cases, responses 
were delayed, calls not returned and email requests left ignored. A complete list of 
companies that were contacted can be found below and in the Appendix. This 
overview also highlights the number of attempts that were made by email and phone 
to attempt to get responses. The attempts to receive as many survey responses as 
possible were made over a period of several months, from June 2012 until and 
including October 2012. In consultation with experts it was subsequently decided 
that the number of survey responses would suffice in combination with the interviews 
that were conducted.  
  
Table 23: List of companies contacted for survey participation 
Company Replied 
Agreed to 
do survey 
Completed 
survey Emailed  Phoned 
3P Technik  No No No 3 2 
ABB Yes Yes No 3 3 
Abengoa  No No No 3 2 
AGBAR (Aguas de 
Barcelona) 
No No No 
3 2 
Amiantit No No No 3 1 
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Aquaengineering  No No No 3 2 
Aquafides Yes Yes Yes 1 0 
Arup Yes Yes Yes 1  0 
BASF Yes No No 2 1 
Bauer Yes Yes Yes 3  2 
Bechtel Corporation No No No 3 2 
Biwater No No No 3 2 
Black & Veatch No No No 3 2 
Bran+Luebbe Metering 
Pumps 
Yes Yes No 
1 2 
CARDNO No No No 3 2 
CH2M Hill  Yes Yes No 2 3 
Clyde Union Pumps No No No 3 3 
Consulaqua Yes Yes Yes 1 0 
Crossflow Consulting No No No 3 2 
Danfoss No No No 3 2 
Darco Water No No No 3 2 
Dorsch Yes Yes Yes 3 2 
Ecologix No No No 3 2 
Envirochemie No No No 3 3 
GAMA Holding No No No 3 2 
GE Energy Financial 
Services (investors)  
No No No 
3 1 
GE Water + Process 
Technologies 
No No No 
3 1 
Genesis Water 
Technologies 
No No No 
3 2 
Global we No No No 3 2 
GS Engineering and 
Construction Corporation 
No No No 
3 2 
Hitachi  Yes No No 3 1 
Huber SE No No No 3 2 
Hyflux No No No 3 2 
IBM Yes Yes No 5 3 
IDE technologies No No No 3 2 
Isle Utilities No No No 3 2 
IWA No No No 3 2 
JGC No No No 3 2 
Koch Industries Yes No No 2 0 
MHW No No No 3 3 
Milton Roy No No No 2 3 
Mirador Consulting Yes Yes Yes 1 0 
Modern Water No No No 2 2 
MWH  No No No 2 3 
Nalco  No No No 3 3 
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Netafim/Revaho Yes Yes No 3 2 
Osmoflo  Yes No No 3 1 
Ostara No No No 3 3 
OTT Yes Yes Yes 1 0 
ProMinent No No No 5 4 
Rainer Kiel No No No 2 1 
Remondis No No No 3 2 
RWE  Yes No No 1 0 
SAP No No No 4 1 
SAUR No No No 2 2 
SEBA Yes Yes Yes 1 0 
Siemens Yes Yes No 6 3 
Suez Water / Degremont Yes No No 1 2 
Thyssen Krupp Yes No No 2 2 
Veolia Yes No No 1 1 
Voigtlaender Yes Yes Yes 1 0 
Wehrle Yes Yes Yes 1 1 
Xylem No No No 2 2 
 
 
9.3 Interview process 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted over a period of four weeks in Jordan, at 
multiple conferences and in London with individual experts. Interviews were 
conducted with governmental and other public sector stakeholders such as 
government ministries in Jordan, NGOs, foreign aid agencies, development banks, 
consultancies as well as local associations, individual academics and experts and 
humanitarian funds.  In preparation for the interviews an extensive literature review 
was conducted to familiarise with each organisation’s profile and expertise. In 
general, a semi-structured interview is designed to begin with more general 
questions or open questions that allow the interviewee to get acquainted with the 
topic and the interviewer. Relevant topics are initially identified and the possible 
relationship between these topics and other more specific issues become the basis 
for further detailed questions, which are usually not prepared in advance and are 
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dependent on the flow of the conversation and the interview. During the preparation 
period an advance set of questions had been prepared, which served as a guideline 
during the interviews. Interviews generally lasted between 60 to 90 minutes and 
were all carried out in person; amid the time limitations it proved useful to have a set 
of questions prepared in order not to lose focus and to preserve structure during the 
interview. However, not all questions were designed and phrased ahead of time; 
depending on the stakeholder or expert that was interviewed, questions differed 
according to expertise and institutional background, allowing both the interviewer 
and the person being interviewed the flexibility to discuss other relevant issues. A 
complete set of questions that were prepared before the interviews and used as a 
guideline can be found in the Appendix.  
 
The interviewees preferred not to be recorded during the interview and hence 
detailed notes were taken, which were later transcribed in order to allow 
completeness of the analysis. A total of 29 interviews were conducted, whilst the 
majority of interviewees required full confidentiality of their individual identity. Every 
individual expert, organisation and institution that was contacted was available for an 
interview, which led to a response rate of 100%. All people and organisations that 
were contacted were willing to participate in the interviews and also gave consent to 
be available for follow-up interviews and questions. Moreover, through the interview 
process the snowball effect led to the acquisition of further interview partners and 
more invaluable information.  
 
Predominantly, the interviewees were very knowledgeable in the subject area and 
ready to share information during the interviews as the majority of interview partners 
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have been working in a related field for many years. It was noted, however, that 
senior governmental officials were more reluctant than others to provide detailed 
answers or to share key information in the interview process, likely due to political 
sensitivity of the subject matter and at times, due to lack of expertise. It was 
therefore noted that some comments, which were made during the interviews could 
have been biased or based on subjective opinion and not official government 
positions.  
 
During the interviews detailed notes were taken, which were transcribed into detailed 
summaries after each meeting. Due to security concerns and sensitivity of the 
information, the use of a voice recorder was usually prohibited or not desired.  
 
Both survey participants and interviewees are going to be offered a copy of this 
research and its findings upon publication of this thesis in 2013.  
 
In the following section a summary of the theoretical findings as derived from the 
literature review and policy analysis is presented, which is followed by the 
presentation of the findings from the interviews and surveys. 
 
9.4 Theoretical findings  
The findings in chapter 8 suggest a list of practical and theoretical drivers and 
barriers to private sector investments in general. The majority of these drivers and 
barriers have been derived from the literature and the list has been adapted to fit the 
chosen case study. A summary can be found in the table below. As indicated in 
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chapter 8 there is hardly any practical evidence to validate many of the theoretical 
drivers and barriers.   
 
Therefore, in order to be able to draw conclusions and be able to provide 
recommendations to policy makers and private sector companies alike, further 
research was conducted and the theoretical findings were subject to further 
validation (or not, as the case may be) by reference to stakeholder and expert 
dialogue.  
 
The table below provides an overview of the theoretical findings of drivers and 
barriers as identified in the literature.  
 
Table 24: Factors taken into consideration in investment decisions – drivers and barriers (according to 
the literature)  
Measures – Derived from 
literature review 
Driver Barrier 
Technology penetration/innovation X  
Technology limits  X 
Equator principles X X 
Population 
growth/urbanisation/industrialisation 
X X 
Regulatory mechanisms X  
Business opportunities X  
Loans and financial incentives X  
Direct and indirect exposure to 
climate change effects 
X  
CSR/Corporate Social 
Sustainability 
X X 
Political instability  X 
Corruption   X 
Investment risk  X 
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9.5 Stakeholder and expert validation 
As discussed above, in order to validate the theoretical findings in chapter 8, the 
most relevant stakeholders were identified and findings validated in interviews and 
through surveys. Purposive sampling92 was considered the best approach for this 
specific research, given the level of technical expertise required by stakeholders in 
order to be able to participate in the interviews or to complete the survey. On the 
basis of the lack of responses to requests for interviews it was not possible to 
conduct interviews with private sector companies due to the sensitive nature of the 
information and the more technical and standardised questions that would be 
covered. It is believed that the added value of conducting interviews with private 
sector companies would have been minimal (given their unwillingness to disclose 
material and their lack of expertise in the geographical area) and hence a survey 
was designed that aimed at covering all aspects of the research question.  
 
9.6 Public Sector 
Over the course of four weeks, interviews were conducted in Amman, Jordan 
throughout the March and April 2012 period. More interviews were subsequently 
scheduled with individual experts in London and at conferences in Germany between 
April and October 2012.  Most respondents asked for confidential usage of their 
information and opinions. The aim of the interviews was to better understand the 
complexity of water in Jordan; Haddadin et al. (2006) provides the only 
comprehensive analysis that touches upon the different aspects of water policy in 
Jordan. However, since its publication in 2006, the need to adapt to a shrinking 
availability of water in Jordan is becoming more urgent than ever and the need for 
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 In purposive sampling the focus is on particular characteristics of a population that are of interest, 
which will best enable the researcher to answer the research questions.  
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financial assistance, in light of the economic crisis and political conflicts in the region, 
has also become greater than ever. Furthermore, the aim was to interpret the drivers 
and barriers to private sector investments in climate change adaptation from the 
perspective of the public sector. There is no literature available that investigates 
how Jordan could close the funding gap for climate adaptation-related 
investments. In the following, a summary of the findings will be presented according 
to the political, societal and economic aspects of water policy. Note, the subsequent 
chapter puts the findings into the broader context of climate change adaptation 
finance.  
 
9.6.1 Societal 
Water has always presented a challenge in Jordan, but in particular since the 1990s 
it has attracted attention from politicians and society alike. The Jordanian 
Government initiated policy initiatives93 over the past decades that aimed at raising 
public awareness, but as mentioned in chapter 7, although awareness of a shrinking 
availability of water exists, bringing about behavioural change is proving to be more 
difficult than it was hoped for. Apparently it will be a long process. Foreign aid 
agencies and international institutions regard this as a major barrier for Jordan to 
enter a sustainable pathway in its water policy, as an improvement in domestic water 
usage and agriculture is widely regarded as one of the most efficient short-term 
solutions to the water problem in Jordan. Water theft, especially in the North of the 
country, growing water-intense crops, and using water inefficiently in the household 
are major barriers to reducing water demand. Some of these factors are closely 
linked to inherent societal and cultural norms and traditions; many farmers who have 
                                                          
93
 For example: Water Wise Women Initiative, JOHUD and GIZ: 
http://www.johud.org.jo/Latest/women-save-water.html  
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traditionally grown strawberries for decades are reluctant to switch production to less 
water-intense fruit or vegetables, unless provided a lucrative alternative or financial 
and technological support, which until the time of writing has not clearly been 
provided by the Jordanian Government. This again is closely tied to the political 
aspects, which is discussed in further detail later on in this chapter. In a societal 
context water scarcity seen in the broader context of climate change and the need to 
adapt to climate change does not play an important role; although interviewees have 
highlighted that awareness of the impacts of climate change on Jordan’s water 
availability do not remain un-noticed.    
 
9.6.2 Political 
The political aspect surrounding water in Jordan has been described as highly 
sensitive and complex by all interviewees. As discussed in detail in a previous 
chapter, freshwater availability in Jordan is shrinking while demand is growing due to 
demographic changes, economic developments, industrialisation and consequently 
different and higher usage of water in the household and private spheres. At the 
same time, agriculture consumes between 63 – 70%94 of available freshwater 
resources, whilst it only contributes about 4% of GDP. This requires government 
regulatory attention and the discrepancy was referred to by all interview partners and 
highlighted as an unsustainable situation. Surely, whilst removing subsidies from 
water tariffs in agriculture will have wider societal and political implications in Jordan, 
with adequate alternatives provided the process could be implemented over the 
course of some years and would allow farmers to re-structure agricultural production 
techniques and output.  
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If water consumption in the agricultural sector was lowered considerably water stress 
in Jordan could be eased and hence provide for more time to develop concrete 
action plans for a sustainable pathway. Findings from the interviews, however, show 
that in particular water and environment as policy areas are too closely interlinked 
with political and societal stability as well as with linkages between decision makers 
and diverse lobbies so as to solve this deadlock. Recent, and increasing in number, 
uprisings in the capital Amman were directed at levels of corruption within the 
Jordanian public sector and are widely regarded as a major barrier to foreign private 
sector investments, as stated by interviewees and survey participants.  
 
According to a UN agency in Amman the private sector will play a crucial role in the 
development, funding and maintenance of major climate change adaptation related 
projects and the said Agency highlighted that in April 2012 about 60 applications by 
foreign private sector companies for clean energy projects in the form of joint 
ventures were received by the Ministry of Industry (Director of Energy Efficiency, 
Ministry of Energy & Mineral Resources Jordan, April 2012). However, the 
interviewee furthermore highlighted that government ministries do not yet fully realise 
the potential for green technology in helping them adapt to water scarcity at more 
economic cost for the government. The interviewee further discussed the incentives 
government should provide for foreign private sector investors and in particular 
highlighted the level of income tax, provide equipment free of charge to companies 
and waive custom charges.  As for the two major barriers, the interviewee 
highlighted 1) levels of corruption and 2) outdated regulation and laws. Morocco was 
often referred to as an example of best practice in terms of attracting foreign 
businesses, especially from Europe, to the country for making investments in 
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sustainable technologies, such as solar and wind power, as well as Egypt prior to the 
outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011. It was repeatedly emphasised in the interviews 
that Jordan should aim at becoming a centre of excellence in the region and a role 
model globally for best practice in dealing with water scarcity. Whilst the Jordanian 
Government may refer to Morocco as an example of best practice, the Moroccan 
example cannot be repeated and transferred one to one. It is arguably a known 
phenomenon in Social Sciences that what works well for one country does not 
necessarily work well in another country. Given that political, economic, societal, 
cultural, geographical and environmental circumstances etc. vary, so does their 
impact on a given policy area and jurisdiction (i.e. country).  
 
9.6.3 Economy 
With regards to the economy it was repeatedly mentioned by interviewees that, due 
to the economic crisis the Jordanian Government finds itself in a vicious cycle; on the 
one hand public debt has reached a 60% ceiling and Jordan can in fact not afford to 
subsidise water tariffs. At the same time, due to the economic situation, 
unemployment and poverty levels have risen and the population cannot afford to pay 
higher water tariffs than they currently do. Although the water tariff structure in 
Jordan would urgently require adjustment to reflect the scarcity of this natural 
resource, the Government remains reluctant to adjust the tariffs. This is due, not only 
to the domestic situation, but also to the regional political environment and the 
concern that raising water tariffs (in addition to fuel prices) may cause instability in 
the country. This in turn would decrease the likelihood of foreign private sector 
investments in the country and region (MENA). It has been highlighted by all 
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interview participants that regaining control over the public finances is essential in 
order to pursue a sustainable environmental and water pathway.  
 
The tables below summarise the findings from the interviews and list the drivers and 
barriers to private sector investments as seen by the government itself and other 
public agencies and organisations. The general findings cannot be related to specific 
drivers and barriers as identified in chapter 8. However, these findings should be 
taken into account when developing policy or regulatory approaches and they 
provide a better insight into the multi-facetted dynamics of the water sector in 
Jordan.   
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Table 25: Summary of the findings from the stakeholder process 
General 
Findings 
Public Sector 
1 Water usage is inefficient in many sectors and levels 
2 Focus is mainly on the water supply side; demand has to be reduced 
3 Public awareness, but behavioural change is necessary (demand-side) 
4 Levels of unaccounted-for water are high 
5 Agriculture consumes 63–70% of freshwater availability but only 
contributes 4% to GDP 
6 Existing legislation and regulation lack enforcement 
7 Consistency on water law and legislation is missing 
8 Mega projects are politically sensitive and foster dependencies 
9 Water as a top priority since the 1990s 
10 First PPPs and BOTs with foreign private sector companies successful, 
but mistrust within society  concerns about corruption 
11 Water tariff structure not adequate and not representative of scarce 
nature of the natural resource water 
12 “Water for Life Strategy” as the only policy document that guides Jordan’s 
water strategy for the next 20 years 
13 Reliance on foreign development aid 
14 Meyahunna as a step to corporatizing water utilities  
15 Aquifers are non-sustainable sources of water and not a long-term 
solution 
16 Jordan is resource poor and financially poor: PPPs are seen as viable 
alternative/solution 
17 Climate Change is taken very seriously, especially in the context of water 
scarcity  
18 Response rates are higher when water scarcity is framed in a climate 
context rather than development context  
19 Water is considered a public good, hence privatisation of water is too 
political 
20 Aim: 7% of total energy will be renewable energy by 2015 and 10% by 
2020 
 
Drivers As seen by  the Public Sector 
1 Jordan comparatively stable  make it a zone of excellence and role 
model for the region 
2 Business opportunities as the government realises that aquifers are 
unsustainable and it has to develop more innovative solutions 
3 The need to adapt to a changing climate makes Jordan attractive for 
investors 
4 If successful in Jordan, the regional market is enormous and by far not 
saturated 
5 Scope for regional mega projects 
6 Renewable energy market will offer business opportunities 
7 CSR an important element for businesses  
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Barriers As seen by the Public Sector 
1 Economy  public debt 
2 Lack of transparency and corruption 
3 Regulation is out of date and there is no consistency  makes it difficult 
for investors 
4 No long-term perspective provided by the government 
5 Perception of PPPs amongst population is negative 
6 Political sensitivity of water 
   
 
9.7 Private sector 
Since the 1990s the Jordanian Government has been pursuing a new strategy and 
policy towards the management of national water supplies and sanitation facilities in 
the country. In 2012 97% of the population had access to safe drinking water, albeit 
the quality and the rationing of the water varied greatly depending on area and 
neighbourhood. However, the importance of water in a religious and spiritual context 
has largely shaped people’s attitude towards water, hence it is widely seen as a gift 
from God, a public good, and its provision can hence not be privatised. However, 
throughout the 1990s in the context of an economic restructuring programme the 
Government issued the first management contracts that allowed private sector 
companies to participate in the water market in the form of municipal and waste 
water services and systems maintenance (Haddadin et al.). In order to expand the 
coverage and quality of these services, to reduce fiscal burdens on the government, 
to increase efficiency and to introduce innovation and technological developments, 
the government subsequently decided to attempt to attract private sector 
participation through BOTs in the form of project financing.   
 
As highlighted above, and as discussed in interviews with public sector participants, 
partnerships between the private and public sector are widely regarded as a viable 
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and promising path in the water sector to improve the performance of today’s water 
management. Furthermore, private sector participation in the water sector may 
provide for alternative mechanisms of financing investments in infrastructure that will, 
over the long-term, help reduce unaccounted for water and inefficiencies on the 
administrative side (ibid.). This is a fairly new area; however, since 2009 the OECD 
has been working together with different countries95 to conduct assessments of 
framework conditions for private sector participation in water infrastructure. This 
indicates that the involvement of the private sector is increasingly seen as an 
innovative tool in the water sector at large. At the same time, as has been discussed 
above and as will become apparent later in this chapter, the private sector will not be 
able to counter balance the inefficiencies that lie within the realm of governmental 
responsibilities and neither will the private sector be able to correct all gaps in 
investments.  
 
The results of the surveys that were circulated to private sector companies serve to 
back-up the interviews that were conducted previously and to support the discussion 
thus far. Please refer to chapter 10 which will provide for a detailed discussion of the 
findings presented in this chapter.  
 
9.7.1 Jordan as a business location 
Jordan is considered as an attractive location for investments, according to interview 
and survey participants; this is partially due to company specific pre-conditions such 
as the market saturation for specific products and services. Partially, Jordan’s 
attractiveness is also attributed to factors such as political stability and the business 
                                                          
95
 Egypt, Lebanon, Mexico, Russia and Tunisia 
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climate. In comparison to other countries in the region Jordan is known to be 
relatively resource poor, despite some appearances of shale gas. In September 
2012 the Jordanian Government signed a preliminary agreement with Canada's 
Global Oil Shale Holdings to explore the possible gas resources. However, other 
than that Jordan is known to be resource poor. One company that was surveyed 
specifically addressed Jordan’s resource poverty as a factor that might drive 
business and open opportunities that have been exploited in other regions and 
countries of the world. Examples of such opportunities were listed as innovative 
environmental measuring technologies, development of new irrigation systems for 
water scarce countries and solar-powered desalination plants, as both small-scale 
and megaprojects. 
  
The political situation was largely estimated as very attractive for businesses; seen in 
the context of the Arab Spring and with a Europe-oriented government and 
monarchy, Jordan has been described by one company as “a haven” for businesses. 
Political stability was ranked as one of the major drivers for companies to invest in 
Jordan. This political stability has also been referred to in interviews and has made 
Jordan a regional headquarter for many organisations and institutions alike. In an 
informal follow-up conversation with a company representative who had been 
previously surveyed, it was highlighted that Jordan has long been regarded as a 
politically stable country, but has failed to promote for its advantage.  
 
Although the economic situation in Jordan has been deteriorating over the past three 
to four years, Jordan’s business climate has been highlighted, both in interviews and 
surveys, as particularly attractive for investors. Heavily criticised as a major barrier 
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for company investments from abroad by public agencies and other stakeholders 
throughout the interviews, companies regard the business climate in Jordan as 
favourable. Furthermore, one respondent highlighted the governance system in 
Jordan as very attractive in comparison to any other country in the region. However, 
they also admitted that the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 
particular have more money available for projects and are hence more attractive 
from a purely business point of view. At the same time, the respondent explained 
that a good governance system would mean lower risk for business investors which 
could potentially outweigh the financial resources available in the GCC. A further 
factor that was highlighted to the advantage of Jordan as a business hub was 
relative legal security and political stability; the business potential in the environment 
sector was particularly highlighted by several respondents. One respondent 
explained it as “due to the extreme water scarcity in Jordan, groundwater 
management is an essential and very important part of improving and maintaining 
living standards within a growing population”. As mentioned above, private sector 
participation in the environment and in particular in the water sector in Jordan is still 
in its infancy; hence the business opportunities and potential are immense for the 
private sector to explore.  
 
Another respondent highlighted the fact that Jordan itself would not be attractive as a 
big market, but that it would serve as an ideal “door to the Arabic World”, opening up 
opportunities in other countries and different markets. However, one respondent had 
not even considered investing in Jordan at all, but would consider taking into 
consideration the relative political stability and economic situation.    
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9.7.2 Financing and investment options 
The majority of respondents considered PPPs as the most attractive form of 
financing water scarcity adaptation-related projects in Jordan. Especially for market 
entrants this was considered the most feasible option with the lowest associated risk. 
Low risk, as will be discussed later, is regarded one of the major drivers for 
businesses to make investments. An interesting option was highlighted by one 
respondent who suggested “forgivable loans” as a viable option – a combination of 
loan and grant that can be recouped for projects that work and will negate further 
assistance if not accounted for properly, but can be “forgiven” in the case that 
despite best efforts still no results are achieved. Another scheme that was suggested 
as suitable in the Jordanian context is performance-based contracts in which the 
private sector is, for example, hired on the enforcement side of regulation and 
legislation in the water sector. BOTs are a common mechanism applied by aid 
agencies predominantly in developing countries, but also in emerging markets such 
as Jordan. Probably the most large-scale BOT project currently in Jordan is the Disi 
project in cooperation with a Turkish company96. However, as one respondent 
stated, “the public sector is not renowned for its efficient operations or effective 
management. Therefore, Public Private Partnerships are an essential ingredient for 
the success of the water industry…”. These concerns were shared by other 
interviewees and survey participants as well, highlighting the clear preference of 
PPPs over BOTs in Jordan. A more detailed discussion will follow in chapter 10.  
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 GAMA Holding: http://www.gama.com.tr/en  
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9.8 Drivers and Barriers 
This part provides a summary for a more detailed discussion in chapter 10. Survey 
participants were asked to rank a given list of drivers and barriers according to their 
relevance and importance when making decisions about entering a new market, in 
particular Jordan. The purpose of this exercise was to test the theoretical findings of 
chapter 8 and to understand the differences between private and public sector 
preferences and perceptions, if any. A further reason was to identify the relevance of 
climate change and the need for climate change adaptation in an investment and 
private sector context and in how far it can be stipulated that climate change drives 
investments or not. A separate survey question, which will be discussed in further 
detail in the section below, seeks to establish that the private sector is increasingly 
driven by climate change concerns and the needs to adapt to its adverse effects.  
 
Political stability and transparency, business opportunities and opportunities for 
innovation were ranked as the three most important drivers and incentives for 
businesses to invest in Jordan. Environmental sustainability as a driver for 
investments was ranked fourth by the survey respondents. CSR on the other hand 
was ranked as the least important driver in business investments in Jordan. The 
explanation for this may be rooted in the perception of the private sector that the 
business opportunities within CSR are limited, whereas the environment sector might 
provide for an entirely new market. There might also be a slight bias in the 
responses as some respondents may define environmental sustainability as a sub-
category of CSR, whereas others may apply a different definition and hence regard 
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CSR97 as a purely altruistic policy, uncoupled from environmental sustainability, 
although commonly applied definitions suggest otherwise. Furthermore, survey 
respondents listed economic stability, privatisation and a reduction of bureaucracy as 
major incentives for investments in the water sector in Jordan. Table 27 below lists 
the drivers as they were ranked by survey respondents.  Whereas environmental 
sustainability as a concept and driver has not occurred yet in the relevant literature 
(see chapter 8), it appears to play an important role in the consideration for 
investments in certain sectors and countries, i.e. the water sector in Jordan.  
 
Table 26: Drivers 
Drivers98 Private Sector 
1 Political stability and transparency 
2 Business opportunities 
3 Innovation 
4 Environmental Sustainability 
4 Level of market saturation 
5 Intergovernmental Agreements 
6 Intellectual Property Rights 
7 National government-based incentives 
8 Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
The barriers to private sector investments in the water sector in Jordan are more 
pronounced, with corruption named as the number one barrier for companies to 
decide not to invest in Jordan. As the discussion in chapter 10 will highlight, Jordan 
ranks amongst the more corrupt countries in the Middle East, albeit not in the upper 
third; the corruption score has mildly decreased from 2008 to 2011. Survey 
respondents were provided with a list of eight factors, which had to be ranked 
according to importance for their specific company and industry. Furthermore, lack of 
transparency and political instability as well as an adverse economic climate were 
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 CSR: corporate social responsibility, also called corporate conscience, corporate citizenship, social 
performance, or sustainable responsible business. Responsible Business is a form of corporate self-
regulation integrated into a business model 
98
 Listed according to ranking derived from survey analysis  
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considered as factors that would make Jordan as a location for investment 
unattractive. In a follow-up conversation with one survey respondent, controversially, 
international development aid was mentioned as a barrier, which in the respondent’s 
opinion decreases the willingness and urgency of the national government to 
efficiently implement water policies and strategies and enhance the enforcement of 
such. Interestingly social and cultural differences did not seem to affect investment 
decisions much in the case of Jordan; this may be due to the perception of a 
relatively Europe-and US-oriented government and monarchy. However, looking 
back at chapter 7 it is social and cultural differences within the country in particular 
that render water such a highly politically sensitive matter. Furthermore, public 
awareness and attitude towards water scarcity have been named as two of the main 
barriers internally to water scarcity in Jordan, whereas in the context of business 
investments this does not appear to be a deterring factor. Table 28 below presents a 
summary of the barriers identified and as ranked by the survey participants. The 
three highest ranking barriers are closely associated with high risk99 and as identified 
by the surveys, low risk is one of the key components when making an investment 
decision.  
 
Table 27: Barriers 
Barriers100 Private Sector 
1 Corruption 
2 Lack of transparency and political instability 
2 Economic climate 
3 Investment opportunities 
4 Political climate 
5 Public awareness and attitude 
6 Intergovernmental agreements 
7 Social and cultural differences 
                                                          
99
 The UK Trade & Investment (UKTI) lists the following factors as business risk: Political and 
economic developments, cyber risks, bribery and corruption. 
http://www.ukti.gov.uk/export/howwehelp/overseasbusinessrisk/checklist.html, retrieved 12.11.2012 
100
 Listed according to ranking derived from the survey analysis  
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9.9 Climate Change adaptation and business investments 
One of the main underlying questions in this research is: in how far and to what 
extend does climate change and the need to adapt to a changing climate drives 
business investments? Hence this section deserves a more detailed discussion 
which will follow in the next chapter. As highlighted above, environmental 
sustainability was ranked fourth amongst the drivers for investments; only one 
respondent disagreed and stated that the need to adapt to a changing climate would 
make investments not more attractive. All other respondents either strongly agreed 
or agreed. The discussion in chapter 10 shows, amongst other conclusions, to what 
extent climate change adaptation needs may encourage foreign private sector 
investments in emerging market countries.   
 
9.10 Summary 
Summarising the findings from the stakeholder interviews and surveys, five findings 
can be made as follows:  
1. Within the Middle East, Jordan is regarded as an attractive location for 
business investments;  
2. PPPs are considered the most feasible and desirable form of investing in 
Jordan;  
3. Survey respondents felt that privatization should be enhanced in Jordan to 
subsequently facilitate market entry for foreign private sector companies;  
4. Low risk, long-term gains and the opportunity to increase the company’s 
portfolio and market presence were seen as important; and lastly,  
5. Climate change adaptation increases the interest of foreign private sector 
companies to invest in Jordan   
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Table 29 below presents an overview of the drivers and barriers as identified in the 
literature as well as in the interviews and surveys in order to contrast differing results 
and highlight where results were matching. In some cases certain factors, such as 
environmental sustainability or the level of market saturation, were not mentioned; in 
other cases certain factors, such as the status of the economy, were seen as either a 
driver or a barrier. This is indicated in table 30 at the end of the chapter.   
 
Table 28: General findings 
General 
findings 
Private Sector 
1 Jordan is seen as an attractive location for investments, compared to its regional 
neighbours 
2 Most respondents feel that Public Private Partnerships are the most feasible 
form of financing and implementing water related projects 
3 Most respondents feel that privatization should be enhanced in the water sector 
4 The three most decisive factors when entering a new market: low risk, long-
term gains, increase portfolio 
5 Most respondents agree that the need for adaptation to water scarcity makes 
investments in Jordan more attractive 
 
 
The following chapter analyses the results obtained throughout the stakeholder 
validation process as discussed in this chapter. According to these findings policy 
recommendations are developed that seek to advise the public sector about the 
drivers and barriers for mobilising private sector responses to adaptation projects, in 
this case for projects aimed at managing water scarcity in Jordan.  
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Table 29: Drivers and barriers according to the literature and the stakeholder engagement process in comparison 
 Political instability 
Environmental 
sustainability 
CSR Business 
opportunities 
Innovation IP 
Rights 
Economy Social & 
cultural 
differences 
Level of 
market 
saturation 
Corruption 
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1 = not mentioned 
2 = not applicable 
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10. Discussion of the results obtained  
 
“Adaptation to climate change is no longer the exclusive ambit of the public sector. 
Investment in adaptation makes business sense, due both to the need for companies 
to climate-proof their operations, as well as to the new business opportunities 
opening in the area of adaptation. Companies that act on this vision place 
themselves in the forefront of sustainable entrepreneurship.”  
(Christiana Figueres, UNFCCC, 2011) 
 
It has been widely accepted that there is an urgent need for many regions in the 
world to adapt to the adverse – and in some cases positive – impacts of climate 
change. In regions where the impacts are positive overall, adaptation has to be 
directed at exploring the inherent opportunities of climate change, whilst in the 
majority of countries and regions, projects and programmes are directed at adapting 
to the adverse consequences of climate change and to avoid often costly damages 
to people, livestock and overall economies. Geographically, those countries that are 
most vulnerable and least capable to adapt to the adverse impacts are also the ones 
that will be most severely affected.  
 
There is hence a need for large-scale financing in order to help developing countries 
and emerging markets adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change. However, 
there is a large gap between the funding that is available and the funding that will be 
needed by developing countries. According to Standard & Poor (2010), the current 
level of overall climate change finance is at approximately US$ 8 billion per year, 
whereas US$ 90 – 210 billion per year would be required by developing countries 
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solely. For climate change adaptation alone the estimates vary between US$ 41- 
110 billion per year needed for targeted projects. This funding gap may be more 
difficult to close than previously anticipated; this is due to two reasons. Firstly, as 
industrialised, developed countries struggle with the global financial crisis and 
budgetary constraints, they might find it difficult to mobilise such high levels of 
finance; and secondly, assuming that industrialised countries will be able to raise 
US$100billion per year by 2020 under the newly established Green Climate Fund, it 
is highly unlikely that this will be sufficient to cover the funding needed.  
 
This estimate largely excludes, as shown in chapter 4, countries such as Jordan that 
are classified as a MICs.  Closing this gap has become an important element in 
climate change negotiations and in academic research alike. However, as elaborated 
upon in chapter 4 of this thesis, feasible solutions have not yet been developed. The 
majority of international climate change funds remain targeted at mitigation actions, 
exceptions including the Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund developed 
under the UNFCCC in 2011. However, the Green Climate Fund will not become 
operational until 2014 and the Adaptation Fund excludes Middle Income Countries 
that, in many cases, are equally vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and yet 
their economies do not have the capacity to adapt without additional external 
financial support.   
 
This is closely intertwined with the debate about the relationship between climate 
finance and development finance. The discussion resolves around the question 
whether climate change adaptation is yet another form of development and if 
therefore adaptation funding and development aid should be financed out of the 
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same funding pool. Another argument discusses whether adaptation and 
development complement each other, however, are regarded as two distinct policy 
areas and therefore require separate budget control. Figure 12 below shows how 
climate change funding for mitigation and adaptation activities is distributed globally 
according to region. As expected, the highest percentages of funding are allocated to 
least developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa as well as in Asia and the Pacific. 
The MENA region only receives 4% of the total funding share, compared to 5% that 
is allocated for Europe and Central Asia (Climate Funds Update, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 12: Climate finance by region (Climate Funds Update, 2012) 
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report that was published two years later, the UNFCCC recommended that 85% of 
these funds should be private sector resources. This PhD research determines an 
incremental role of the private sector in mobilising sufficient financial resources to 
bridge the funding gap described above; seeks to assess the private sector’s 
motivation for climate change adaptation financing; and examines the drivers and 
barriers and risks that might prevent private sector investors from making their 
investments. The case study and focus of this thesis was chosen according to the 
MIC status of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and its inherent water scarcity. An 
analysis of literature and policy documents was validated with different stakeholders 
in interviews and surveys.  
 
The results of the stakeholder consultation have been presented in the previous 
chapter; this current chapter therefore serves to put the results into a broader context 
and to extrapolate policy recommendations and offer advice to private sector 
stakeholders.  This chapter presents a discussion of the general findings of the 
stakeholder process, it analyses the validation of the theoretical drivers and barriers 
and discusses any other issues that arose from the stakeholder process. In addition 
to the provision of policy recommendations to the public sector and advice for the 
private sector, this chapter also points towards further related research that should 
be conducted in this field. The definitions of commonly used terms in this thesis were 
provided in the methodology chapter; however, below can be found a short summary 
of the definitions of the most relevant terms for this concluding chapter.   
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10.1 Private sector finance 
The challenge lies within the mobilisation of private sector finance for climate change 
adaptation-directed investments. The private sector constitutes a conglomeration of 
individual investors, private equity firms, institutional investors such as pension funds 
and insurance companies as well as individual companies that have assets 
representing several trillions US$ globally (WRI, 2012). In addition to this, global, 
regional and local finance institutions have also the capacity to provide funding to 
sponsor privately developed climate change adaptation projects under certain 
conditions.  
 
Jordan, in particular, is heavily dependent on mobilising private sector capital, as it is 
not a recipient of large shares of international funding, with only 3% of funding in the 
Middle East going to Jordan. See figure 13 below. Furthermore, of the international 
funds, only 6% are pledged towards adaptation-related projects.
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Figure 13: Climate Finance by country in MENA (Climate Funds Update, 2012) 
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Figure 14: Distribution of funds in MENA (Climate Funds Update, 2012) 
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However, as adaptation is commonly seen as a 
local problem that is to be resolved by local 
communities and governments it has been 
difficult up until now to attract private sector 
investments for adaptation projects. Recent 
policy developments, research and this thesis 
have emphasised the fact that private sector 
participation may not only contribute to climate 
change adaptation in vulnerable and less 
developed countries, but also ensure longer-term 
viability of new emerging markets for investment 
opportunities. This would alter the significance of 
private sector participation in climate change 
finance considerably.  
 
The following chapter analyses and examines the 
drivers and barriers for investments in climate 
change adaptation projects in the water sector in 
Jordan, while subsequently extrapolating a set of 
recommendations and advice to facilitate the 
mobilisation of private sector capital for climate-
related investments in Jordan. The table below 
provides an overview of the broad categories that 
have been identified in literature and case study 
 
Definitions 
 
Private Sector: sector of the 
economy that is not 
controlled by the state and 
includes a wide range of 
actors, including but not 
limited to: individuals, 
corporations, private 
associations, multinational 
companies and small and 
medium-sized firms.  
 
Private Sector Finance: 
capital provided by the 
Private Sector.  
 
Public Finance: using public 
finances (raised through 
taxes or other government 
revenue streams) to fund the 
production and distribution of 
public goods.  
 
Climate Change Finance: 
the provision of financial 
resources and investment, 
both public and private, in 
projects and actions partially 
or wholly intended to support 
action on mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions 
and adapting to climate 
change. 
 
 
Adopted from: Standard & 
Poor’s (2010) and World 
Resource Institute (2012)  
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analysis and in subsequent stakeholder validation.  
 
Table 30: Categories of drivers and barriers 
Drivers Barriers 
Technology development and 
penetration 
Corruption 
Innovation Macroeconomic instability 
Business opportunities Uncertainty/ high risk levels 
Political stability Inconsistent regulation 
Market entry to a new geographical 
region 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility   
Environmental sustainability  
 
Going back to chapter 8, the theoretical drivers and barriers (i.e. the ones that have 
previously not been validated) that were derived from the literature were as follows:  
- The development and penetration of new technologies are largely seen as 
drivers. 
- Demographic changes, such as population growth, serve as drivers and 
barriers.  
- Increasing industrialisation and urbanisation signals business opportunities for 
investors and are hence seen as drivers.  
- Regulatory mechanisms, through national and international bodies, are seen 
as both drivers and barriers. 
- Financial incentives set by governments and international bodies are sending 
strong signals to investors and are therefore seen as drivers.  
- Corruption and political instability within a governing system, in particular in 
Middle and Low Income Countries, are regarded as a major barrier.  
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10.2 Technology development and penetration 
In the literature (Branstetter et al., 2007; Keller, 2010), technology development 
and penetration has been cited as a driver, and in some cases also as a barrier, to 
private sector investments. As a driver, the development of new technologies and 
technology penetration is seen as an opportunity for innovation and therewith as an 
opportunity to enter new markets and establish a company’s market share within a 
given sector. On the other hand, the underlying reason why technology development 
and penetration is also seen critical, are the barriers imposed by intellectual property 
rights that may be assigned to new and innovative technologies; this will lead to 
market dominance by one or few actors as well as hinder the necessary innovation 
process in developing and emerging economies to boost the national economies.  
 
According to the stakeholder validation in the context of this thesis, these factors 
have been repeatedly referred to by the public sector. The interview analysis 
indicates that the private sector in particular regards the room for innovation for new 
technologies as a major driver for investments in the water sector in Jordan. As one 
of the most water scarce countries in the world and with an increasing population 
and urbanisation, Jordan will have to implement new water strategies both on the 
supply and the demand side. This creates room for new businesses, innovation and 
for the development of new technologies that can help Jordan enter a sustainable 
water pathway. At the same time, technology development and penetration creates 
new business opportunities for the private sector and might offer the opportunity to 
enter new technological as well as geographical markets, in the region and 
elsewhere.  
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10.3 Demographic changes, industrialisation and urbanisation 
Demographic changes, industrialisation and urbanisation were not specifically 
mentioned by stakeholders as drivers or barriers, however, it was noted in all 
interviews that these factors naturally increase pressure and stress on the availability 
of water. Therefore, indirectly, these factors can be regarded as drivers for the public 
sector, i.e. the Jordanian Government, to mobilise private sector capital as quickly as 
possible. In respect of private sector motivation, an increasing population and a 
further shrinking availability of water might potentially increase opportunities for 
investments.  With higher birth-rates and a high influx of refugees from neighbouring 
countries, the population of Jordan is steadily increasing. The table below provides 
an overview of population growth estimates according to the Jordanian Department 
for Statistics (2012): 
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Table 31: Projected population growth Jordan, 2013 - 2023
101
 
Year Population Projection  
2013 6,658,925 
2014 6,807,835 
2015 6,971,656 
2016 7,133,294 
2017 7,289,783 
2018 7,440,785 
2019 7,586,859 
2020 7,737,109 
2021 7,885,069 
2022 8,030,720 
2023 8,174,268 
2024 8,315,982 
2025 8,456,140 
2026 8,594,721 
2027 8,731,549 
2028 8,867,951 
2029 9,001,860 
2030 9,134,464 
 
Those figures do not account for, and hence exclude, refugees that came into the 
country during the Arab Spring (starting January 2011) and since then102. With an 
increasing population, economic development and rapid urbanisation, living 
standards are expected to change and so will the demand for water in households, in 
the industry and agriculture. The already limited water resources will hence 
experience further stress and the Government will have to devise new strategies that 
touch upon both the supply and the demand side of water management. In order to 
do so, appropriate regulatory mechanisms for the water sector need to be 
developed. According to stakeholder interviews and survey responses, there is lack 
of consistency in regulatory frameworks and there is lack of enforcement of existing 
                                                          
101
 Note: The projected numbers do not account for the sudden, high numbers of Syrian refugees 
entering Jordan since 2012 amid the Syrian conflict. 
102
 According to the UNHCR on 11
th
 March 2013 the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan was 
estimated at: 285,198. Retrieved from: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107,  
13.03.2013 
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regulation. Regulation should address different aspects of water policy, in particular 
the tariff structure and the balance between water consumption in agriculture and its 
contribution to GDP. In this regard it is important to note that private sector survey 
participants repeatedly listed well-developed and well-formulated regulation as a 
facilitator for market entry for foreign private sector investors and as a provider of 
incentives for leveraging private sector capital.  
 
Financial incentives as a driver in the form of tax relief for foreign private sector 
investors were addressed during the stakeholder validation process; however, they 
were not mentioned as a main driver by either the private or the public sector. One 
interviewee mentioned that waiving custom charges, providing land for free, lower 
income taxes as well as allowing foreign companies to bring their equipment for free 
would enhance private sector capital investments in the country in the water sector 
and the renewable energy market. Noting this point, it may be that the private sector 
will take financial incentives but that it would not be politically prudent to be seen to 
be asking for them.  
 
10.4 Corruption and political instability 
Corruption and political instability on the other hand is widely regarded as one of 
the main barriers to mobilising private sector finances for climate change adaptation-
related projects for the water sector in Jordan. A more detailed discussion and 
analysis of the political risks as barriers to attracting private sector capital will follow. 
Interviewees repeatedly referred to the inherent scepticism of the Jordanian 
population towards the Jordanian Government in terms of corruption. This scepticism 
will render any PPP endeavour difficult or lead to failure of a given project; equally, if 
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corruption levels remain high or no considerable and visible efforts are made to 
reduce corruption, the private sector will remain hesitant to invest in Jordan. Hence, 
it is inevitable for the Jordanian Government to address corruption and create more 
transparency within policy design and decision-making procedures. Furthermore, the 
political landscape of the region has put Jordan in the spotlight of international 
organisations and institutions as one of the most stable and most secure countries in 
the region. In stakeholder interviews it was repeatedly emphasised that Jordan’s 
reputation as a fairly politically stable country has brought international aid agency 
headquarters to the country, as well as increased levels of tourism and interest of 
foreign private sector companies. The Jordanian Government ought to emphasise 
this also to attract private sector finances for the water sector in a climate change 
context, according to a representative of a major regional Water Utilities Association 
in an interview in March 2012 in Amman, Jordan.  
 
The tables below provide a summary of the theoretical drivers and barriers that were 
identified in the literature and subsequently validated throughout the stakeholder 
process. 
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Table 32: Drivers and barriers 
Drivers  
Technology development and 
penetration  
Innovation 
 
Business opportunities 
 
Political stability 
 
Market entry to a new geographical 
region  
Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Environmental sustainability 
 
 
 
Barriers  
Corruption 
 
Macroeconomic instability 
 
Uncertainty/ high risk levels 
 
Inconsistent regulation 
 
 
As such, the methodology validates what were heretofore theoretical propositions 
rather than validated findings.  
 
In the following section, the political, societal and economic risk factors that play a 
major role in investment decisions will be discussed for the Jordanian case, in order 
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to present the drivers and barriers in a broader context and furthermore, to provide a 
basis for the policy recommendations that will conclude this chapter.  
 
10.5 Part I: Political risks  
 
Figure 15: Factors of political risk 
 
The figure above provides an indicator for the different factors that, in combination 
with each other and also individually, increase perceived political risk in a country. 
Different stakeholders may perceive the weight and importance of these factors 
differently.  
 
10.5.1 Political instability 
Political instability, including political violence, involves the risks that arise from 
potential changes in a political system, the overall stability of a government or regime 
and further refer to continuity of a legal system. Jordan is seen by the majority of 
stakeholders as a relatively stable and secure country in the region, potentially to be 
Political 
instability 
Inconsistent 
policy-
making and 
regulation 
Corruption 
Lack of 
integration 
between 
stakeholders 
262 
 
used as an entry point to other countries in the region and a safe haven. However, at 
the same time, political instability and political risk remain common in many 
emerging markets and Middle Income Countries. Politically related acts of violence, 
regime changes, and currency inconvertibility can shut down private sector projects 
completely and can lead to unexpectedly large losses for foreign private sector 
investors, no matter how successful the project might have been (World Resource 
Institute, 2012).  
 
Closely linked to the stability and form of governance is the level of corruption, which 
has a profound impact and has been, during the stakeholder interview process, 
widely named as the one factor that probably deters private sector funding most 
severely (Transparency International Annual Report 2011; various interviewees 
during the stakeholder validation process in 2012). Jordan was ranked 58th of 182 
countries in the 2012 Transparency International Corruption Index; although this 
does not strike one as being particularly high, when comparing it with other countries 
in the region one can see that those countries that have been successful in attracting 
foreign private sector investors for infrastructure projects and climate change 
adaptation-related projects, rank lower, i.e. less corrupt, in the index, with the 
exception of Morocco (ranked 88). Hence, for Jordan to create a favourable 
investment climate the level of corruption is essential to successful mobilisation of 
foreign private sector finances. According to one interviewee, an open, transparent 
and competitive process for tendering and awarding projects is needed in order to 
encourage and guarantee increased levels of foreign private sector investments.  
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Table 33: Transparency International Corruption Index 2012 MENA 
Country Rank Regional Rank Country / Territory 
27 1 Qatar 
27 1 United Arab Emirates 
39 3 Israel 
53 4 Bahrain 
58 5 Jordan 
61 6 Oman 
66 7 Kuwait 
66 7 Saudi Arabia 
75 9 Tunisia 
88 10 Morocco 
105 11 Algeria 
118 12 Egypt 
128 13 Lebanon 
133 14 Iran 
144 15 Syria 
156 16 Yemen 
160 17 Libya 
169 18 Iraq 
Source: Transparency International Corruption Index 2012; Note: Transparency International does not 
include Palestine in its Corruption Index.  
  
Another factor that contributes to a favourable political environment for investors is 
the design and implementation of consistent policies and regulation. However, 
looking back at the interviews with stakeholders from government, aid agencies and 
consultancies, the lack of consistency in designing water laws, regulations and 
policies has been dominating the water discourse for a long time. With frequent 
changes in government, the re-drafting of current legislation with regards to water 
has long been overdue. Whilst for private sector stakeholders a priority would be to 
ensure consistent and reliable legislation, interviewees from the public and third 
sector have emphasised the enforcement-side of legislation as a crucial factor for 
successful cooperation with the private sector.  Furthermore, the lack of integration 
between different stakeholders – government ministries and agencies, the private 
sector, academia and citizens – was repeatedly quoted as a major obstacle to 
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attracting private sector finance for climate change adaptation projects. This was 
mainly regarded as an obstacle by the public and the third sector interviewees as a 
precondition for informed policy-making and favourable regulation.  
 
In order to address these concerns, it was suggested (in an interview with a 
government representative) that the provision of partial risk guarantees, that 
commonly address investors’ concerns with regards to political instability and wider 
political concerns, should be more frequently used in PPP infrastructure projects in 
Jordan. This is a sensible option. 
 
Important parts of the interviews were informed by discussions about mega projects 
such as Disi and the Red-Dead Canal; mega projects are important and necessary 
at this stage, whilst politically sensitive due to second or third party dependencies. In 
the words of one interviewee “do not leave your water tap in somebody else’s 
hands”.  While the Disi project is implemented jointly by Jordan and Saudi Arabia, 
the Red-Dead Canal includes involvement from the Jordanians, Syrians, Israelis and 
Palestinians. It goes without saying that this politicises water and environmental 
policy to a large extent.  
 
Furthermore, frequent changes in government, lack of consistency in law-making as 
well as a lack of integration between different stakeholders and actors have led to 
inefficiency in the water sector. According to a representative of an UN-led project in 
Amman, greater consistency on these levels will be essential in boosting 
investments in the water sector. Development agencies based in Jordan emphasised 
the need for long-term planning and raised concerns about the unilateral tendencies 
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seen in the Jordanian Government. Development agencies see the role of the 
private sector in the provision of technological equipment; innovation for new 
technologies to be used to reduce water stress; on the enforcement side of water law 
and regulation, and, in the provision of technical expertise and skills to assist 
domestic private sectors companies in advancing their technologies. According to 
the Ministry of Energy in Amman, the future lies with the private sector in the 
implementation and promotion of projects for renewable energies in Jordan and the 
region, including mega projects such as solar-powered desalination plants to 
improve the supply of water. Consequently, this would have profound impacts on the 
water policy strategies and legislation as they stand now and an integrated resource 
management strategy between the different ministries and policy areas would 
become essential so as to facilitate market entry for renewables. As it stands, 97% of 
energy in Jordan is imported and it has to be pointed out that regulation and law that 
would govern such investments for renewable energies were still in their infancy at 
the time of writing. This needs to change quickly so that Jordan can diversify its 
energy sources.  
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10.6 Part II: Societal  
 
“…profiting from the sale of water by the private sector is not well perceived by the 
public at large. At the same time, the public sector is not renowned for its efficient 
operations or effective management. Therefore, Public Private Partnerships are an 
essential ingredient for the success of the water industry in Southern Mediterranean 
countries, including Jordan.”  
(Rafiq Husseini, Deputy Secretary General, Union for the Mediterranean, 2012) 
 
“In Islam, people are partners in water; it cannot be sold unless effort has been made 
to provide it.”  
(Munther J. Haddadin, former Minister of Water and Irrigation Jordan, 2009) 
 
Generally speaking, when making investment decisions, the private sector is usually 
less concerned about societal impacts and reactions to certain investments than it is 
with regards to other investment risks. However, the reasons why the private sector 
should take societal factors into consideration in a climate adaptation-related context 
are twofold. The example of the case Coca Cola vs. Kerala as described in chapter 9 
has highlighted the impact of societal concerns and dissatisfaction on the success 
and failure of projects. The second reason closely relates to internal societal and 
political instability as well as to regional political and economic instability. The effects 
of the Arab Spring on environmental policy-making are yet to be seen, however, 
governments, and in this case the Jordanian Government, will be reluctant to aim at 
implementation of regulations and legislation that are regarded as favourable from 
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an investment point of view, however, unacceptable in the eyes of the citizens103.  
However, in light of the government budget deficit and the need to reduce it to 
manageable levels, this requires subsidies on consumer goods to be gradually 
lowered and eventually removed. Water is one of these public goods. In a politically 
sensitive environment it will be difficult for the Jordanian Government to implement 
new tariff structures and re-draft regulation for foreign investors to easier enter the 
market. Climate change is seldom a high level policy priority, given the immense 
political problems Jordan and other countries in the region are confronted with 
(Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2011).   
 
These aspects are crucial for investors. In a political environment where the 
involvement of the private sector, in particular the foreign private sector, is seen with 
plenty of scepticism, societal concerns have to be taken into consideration both by 
policy makers and investors in decisions about PPPs and BOTs. The 
recommendation section at the end of this chapter considers this. 
 
Furthermore, as discussed in detail in this research, adaptation projects will not only 
be developed to manage the supply side of water (in the form of wastewater 
treatment and desalination as well as other technologies) to improve and to secure 
the availability of sufficient water resources. Increasingly, emphasis will shift towards 
the better management of water demand. The demand side will hence require 
financial and technical investments as well as re-thinking within society and amongst 
policy makers. There are vast opportunities for the private sector to implement 
                                                          
103
 In November 2012 the government removed subsidies for fuel, which led to an increase of prices 
between 24 – 50%. This has caused the largest demonstrations in Jordan since the beginning of the 
Arab Spring in 2011. This came shortly before the elections in January 2013. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20335287  
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smaller scale projects and to focus on the domestic households to improve water 
use efficiency, improve irrigation systems, thereby reduce unaccounted for water and 
provide lucrative alternatives to crops that are currently being used for agriculture. It 
is important to highlight that business opportunities within the water sector do not 
only lie within the development of new mega projects and technologies on a large 
scale; taking into account the fact that a considerable part of the population in 
Jordan, and in comparable countries, are dependent on agriculture or are self-
sufficient (in an interview with JOHUD 2012), improving the water supply and 
reducing the demand for water will offer room for innovation and an entry to new 
markets.  
 
In order to partially overcome political and societal concerns and risks the public 
sector could provide for political risk guarantees, interest rate and currency 
exchange products as well as local currency loans; these mechanisms may help 
investors to financially manage political and societal risks better.  
 
10.6.1 The Highland Water Forum 
The “Highland Water Forum”, which was initiated in 2010 by GIZ and the MWI, aims 
at bringing together policy makers, private sector companies, farmers, international 
organisations, academics and customers to discuss feasible options and alternatives 
to make agriculture and domestic water usage more sustainable. In the context of 
the Forum, the twenty most influential farmers of the Azraq region were identified 
and asked to nominate their most influential peers to participate in the Forum. Azraq 
is populated by Jordanian Bedouins, Chechens and Druze, which reflects the 
fragmentation of Jordan’s society, a factor that complicates policy-making. One of 
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the main aims of the Highland Water Forum is to draft a comprehensive action plan 
that includes measures to limit unaccounted for water and to reduce illegal 
abstractions from aquifers. According to participants of the Forum, farmers indicated 
readiness to abandon cultivation of crops that consume large amounts of water and 
to initiate projects that would preserve aquifers from further depletion while 
generating more income. However, farmers lack the technical and financial 
resources to shift from water-intensive cultivation and inefficient irrigation systems to 
environmentally sustainable and economically feasible investments.  
 
Taking Jordan’s economic situation into consideration, public funding will not be 
available for such projects and it was highlighted in several interviews that were 
conducted in Jordan in the context of this research, that the heavy reliance on 
development aid from “friendly countries” (Haddadin et al., 2006) would not be 
acceptable over the long-term. The role of the private sector in this context was 
seen, by many interviewees, as to provide the necessary technologies and 
investments – in the form of PPPs or individual company investment – for this shift to 
become feasible and to close the funding gap in climate change adaptation 
technologies.  
 
10.7 Part III: Macroeconomic risks – creating an attractive investment 
climate 
The recipients of international climate finance range from the world’s poorest and 
least developed countries to some of the most rapidly growing economies in the 
world, such as India, Brazil and China. Clearly, there are different responsibilities 
and interests behind funding decisions; however, as highlighted above a large group 
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of countries is often neglected in funding decisions. Middle Income Countries such 
as Jordan are not entitled to large parts of funding that is allocated to least 
developed countries, nor is it resource rich enough that multinational companies or 
foreign governments would have a particularly high interest in Jordan as a market104.  
 
However, as the quote by Christiana Figueres (at the beginning of this chapter) 
indicates, investment in adaptation makes business sense, as new business 
opportunities open up in the area of adaptation. Jordan fulfills many of the 
preconditions to present itself as an attractive investment location for foreign private 
sector companies to become engaged in climate adaptation projects, even if in the 
widest sense and not as their primary objective as the case may be. The 
macroeconomic attractiveness is fundamental in the effort to mobilise private sector 
capital; creating an attractive investment climate has been referred to as one of the 
major drivers in interviews and surveys. The investment climate comprises features 
such as strong institutions and investor-friendly regulations. In a poor investment 
climate both foreign investors and host economies may not be able to benefit fully 
from business opportunities. An economy that has a poor investment climate is 
hence likely to attract both less FDI and lower-quality FDI than it otherwise could if 
institutions were stronger and regulation both more consistent and enforced (World 
Bank, 2011). 
 
In consultation with private and public sector stakeholders it was found that the 
following factors contribute largely to investment decisions in Jordan:  
 
                                                          
104
 However, there are increasingly reports referring to the occurrence of shale gas in Jordan. 
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 business opportunities,  
 level of difficulty or easiness of market entry,  
 room for innovation  
 
However, on the more negative side, the most significant deterrents were stated as: 
 corruption,  
 no long-term prospects for investors,  
 lack of legislation and strong regulatory frameworks to protect investments,  
 no risk-sharing schemes or insurances,  
 no transparency or competitive process for awarding and tendering projects 
as well as  
 the fragile economic situation of the country  
 
The concluding section of this chapter develops a set of ten policy recommendations 
derived from the research and analysis conducted for this thesis over three years. 
This is then followed by a critique of the research methodology and suggestions for 
further research related to this work, which could provide the basis for further 
exploration.  
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10.8 Policy recommendations 
The following section presents a set of ten policy recommendations. Each 
recommendation is accompanied by a set of sub-recommendations specifically to 
address the case of Jordan.  
 
1 Recommendation: Make the elimination of corruption 
a top priority for the King of Jordan and the Jordanian Government.   
Corruption has been a cause for debate and concern over the past years. Not only 
does corruption weaken the trust of citizens in the government and the monarchy, at 
the same time it destabilizes the political system and thereby irritates foreign 
investors and companies. Amid Jordan ranking 58th in the 2012 Corruption Index, 
corruption has been named one of the three most decisive factors for companies 
when considering investment in Jordan. The government needs to identify the fight 
against corruption as a priority and precondition for mobilizing private sector finance 
in a climate change adaptation context and for the purpose of tackling water scarcity.  
 
Corruption takes place at many different, distinct levels105. This includes the public 
(i.e. the state) as well as the private sector, although, generally, corruption tends to 
be found in the interaction between the public and the private sector, as well as 
between different public sector agencies. Corruption between private sector entities 
appears less common.  
Corruption at the state- and government-level includes (but is not limited to): 
- corruption at the electoral level (e.g. in the forms of bribes and nepotism) 
- in the award of governmental positions and within ministries 
                                                          
105
 Adapted to the case of Jordan.  
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Solutions to reduce corruption at this level address the limited public availability of 
information on budget control and budget decisions, as well as the exclusion of 
citizens in the development of legislation and regulation.  
 
Corruption between the public and the private sector, on the other hand, is most 
frequently seen at the interface between the government, bidders and contractors. 
This is especially relevant in the Jordanian context and will be addressed in more 
detail in recommendation 6. Often, contracts are awarded without fair competition. 
Strong and transparent procurement policies and their enforcement will ensure that 
projects are awarded not on the basis of the political connections of one bidder, but 
on the basis of the quality of the contract. 
 
Effective and transparent procurement is essential for reducing corruption levels in 
Jordan and for increasing not only investors’ trust, but also public trust into PPP 
projects and alike (recent example: the extension and refurbishment of the Queen 
Alia International Airport in Amman). Procurement practice should be used by the 
Jordanian Government, as well as by any private sector and arm’s length 
organisations that deliver public services, such as the utility companies. A 
sophisticated and good example of a procurement practice is the EU Practical Guide 
(EU PRAG), which lays out the contracting procedures that apply to all EU external 
aid contracts that are financed through the EU general budget and the European 
Development Fund (EDF). If a similar framework was implemented and used in the 
Jordanian context, corruption levels would presumably fall sharply.  
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EU PRAG106 covers eligibility rules and provides the information necessary to 
undertake procurement or grant procedures throughout the entire process up to the 
award and implementation of contracts. PRAG differentiates between services, 
supply and works contracts. Therefore, the first part of PRAG covers the different 
procurement procedures. The basic means of awarding contracts under PRAG is 
“competitive tendering”. Competitive tendering is applied in order to ensure that 
operations respect the awarding principles and in order to obtain the quality of 
services, supplies or works, at the best possible price. There are several different 
procurement procedures, each one of them allowing a different degree of 
competition107. This section also covers contract sizes as well as conciliation and 
arbitration procedures. An Evaluation Committee is designated to ensure that any 
proposal made does not infringe the formal requirements. The role of the Committee 
is furthermore to ensure the equal treatment of tenders and the principle of 
proportionality. Once the decision of an award has been made, the successful 
tenderer notified, the contract prepared and signed, the award of the contract is 
made publically available in the Official Journal of the European Commission. This 
entire process makes for more corruption-proof procurement practices, and again, is 
closely linked to recommendation 6.  
 
However, in Jordan, this process should not be limited to the award of projects and 
contracts (in the form of PPPs), but should be extended to the wider sphere of 
policymaking and applied in the formulation of legislation and tariffication of water 
prices in particular.  
                                                          
106
 For the full text and guidelines, see EU PRAG (EU Practical Guide): 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/procedures/implementation/practical_guide/index_en.htm  , 
retrieved 13.03.2013  
107
 See the following link for a comprehensive list of procurement practices under PRAG: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/prag/document.do?chapterId=2.4.&id=41, retrieved 13.03.2013 
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According to Transparency International (2011), in particular in the award of climate 
change-related projects, governments ought to design a framework of checks and 
balances and publish the flows of money, in order to avoid that funds are spent 
elsewhere. In Jordan, this would involve the different entities linked to the 
environment and water in particular, i.e. the MWI, JVA and the WAJ.  
 
Since Jordan is a unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy, ruled by the King, 
procurement practices should be overseen by either: a government-independent 
entity or by the King himself, in order to ensure that corruption-levels within 
government bodies remain minimal and for increasing accountability linked to 
corruption. Implementation of such a framework could occur under the guidance of 
the EU in the realm of ENP framework, for Jordan to apply aspects of best practice 
approaches. The King himself should in fact not be corruptible due to a variety of 
factors: 1) he is not affiliated with a particular party, but acts for the best of his 
country, 2) amid the uprisings of the Arab Spring, the monarchy is more sensitive of 
corruption allegations and 3) the Jordanian Monarchy is seen as a crucial ally for the 
United States and Europe; corruption scandals within the Monarchy could jeopardise 
this relationship.  
  
Taking this a step further, a set of regulations that govern the enforcement of 
procurement and anti-corruption measurements should be in place. Legally 
enforceable penalties, such as dissuasive sanctions, as well as criminal sanctions, 
should be in place for worst case scenarios. Dissuasive sanctions are usually 
implemented in the form of financial penalties.   
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According to the Transparency International Corruption Index for 2012, Qatar and 
the UAE have achieved the best rating (i.e. the least corrupt) within the MENA region 
and even rank comparatively high in the international context (ranked 27 of 174 
countries in total). In November 2011 Qatar founded the “Administrative Control and 
Transparency Agency Qatar”, which is responsible for investigating the misuse of 
public funds and following complaints against government officials. The Agency is 
led by the Deputy Prime Minister and may also have access to banking details, in 
cases that allege money laundering activities. There is also a “National Committee 
for Accountability and Transparency”, which has been responsible for combating 
corruption since 2007. It appears as if Qatar and the UAE have recognised the 
importance of low levels of corruption in an investment-related context, whilst 
Jordan’s anti-corruption committee (established under the Anti-Corruption 
Commission Law (No. 62)) is facing fierce resistance. The Jordanian Parliament has 
often pre-empted the Courts, which are responsible for dealing with corruption 
allegation cases, in acquitting individuals even before the start of the official trials. In 
April 2012 then Primer Minister Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh108 resigned after his 
anti-corruption campaign was met with fierce opposition and resistance.  
 
The Qatar National Development Strategy 2011-2016 emphasises on the need for 
“enhancing procurement policies to establish standards for tendering, contracting 
and managing supplier performance” (p. 258), recognising the importance for 
procurement in the relationship between the public and the private sphere.  
                                                          
108
 Al-Khasawneh was the Prime Minister of Jordan from October 2011 to April 2012. He was also 
formerly a judge of the International Court of Justice in The Hague.  
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In January 2013 a team of independent experts reviewed the UAE’s anti-corruption 
laws to evaluate the country’s compliance with the “UN Convention against 
Corruption”. The UAE was praised for its efforts in this review process109.  
It appears therefore highly advisable to follow suit a best practice example in the 
MENA region and globally in order to effectively address corruption.  
 
2 Recommendation: Create long-term prospects for 
investors for Jordan to establish itself as a business hub and centre for 
excellence in the MENA region  
Long-term prospects are crucial for private sector investors. In the context of climate 
change adaptation on a global level, but especially on the national levels of 
Jordanian politics, investors are concerned about the long-term prospects of their 
capital commitments. Whereas the capital investments in a climate change 
adaptation-related context are of a long-term nature, there seems to be discrepancy 
with the relatively short timeframe of climate change policy and law. Investment 
horizons and capital commitment periods can be up to 50 years for climate change 
adaptation-related investments. Legislation, however, has been very fragile and 
inconsistent amid frequent changes in government and hence changes in the 
approach to water policy and water management. The “Water for Life Strategy”, 
which is non-binding, sets out Jordan’s strategy until 2022 and even these targets 
are subject to changes. If legislation was consistent and laid-out with a long-term 
perspective, additional regulations and strategies could aim at developing Jordan 
into a centre for excellence and best-practice for innovative solutions for climate 
change adaptation in the water sector. The same should apply to implementing long 
term water management contracts, which will make secure investment returns more 
likely.  
 
                                                          
109
 “UAE’s anti-corruption measures praised”, retrieved from: 
http://saiwb1.saiuae.gov.ae/English/News/Pages/10012013.aspx, 13.03.2013 
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Creating a long-term perspective and prospects for investors is essential in attracting 
more investments in general, but even more so in the context of climate change. 
Climate change itself is generally associated with high levels of uncertainty, whilst 
uncertainty is seen as a major obstacle to private sector investments. It is therefore 
crucial, that a country such as Jordan – associated with political and economic 
instability – has legislation in place that addresses these uncertainties, in order for 
the private sector to have the confidence in making investments.  
 
The Energy Charter Treaty provides an excellent framework under which signatories 
are obliged to “strengthen the rule of law on energy issues, by creating a level 
playing field of rules to be observed by all participating governments, thereby 
mitigating risks associated with energy-related investments”. Jordan has only 
observer status to the Charter110. The Charter furthermore states that “the binding 
rules contained in the Energy Charter Treaty can play a significant and positive role 
in mitigating risks. This is because they provide investors with the possibility to 
protect their rights by taking the host government to international arbitration. Since 
the Treaty came into force in 1998, several investor-state disputes have already 
been addressed under the Treaty and successfully resolved, either by amicable 
settlement or by an arbitral award. If Jordan was to become a signatory of the 
Charter or develop a comparable policy on state-level, investors would be provided 
with a framework that would allow the development of long-term projects in the 
country. Jordan is, furthermore, signatory to the World Trade Organisation General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the OECD-MENA Investment 
Programme. However, the OECD programme is not legally binding and only 
                                                          
110
 Energy Charter Treaty: 
http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=6&L=0LC%03%20C%06%20%20C%03%20C, retrieved 
13.03.2013 
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promotes the mobilisation of investments as a driving force for economic growth and 
development. Contrary to countries such as Morocco, Jordan has thus far failed to 
promote for itself as an investment location. The Moroccan Investment Development 
Agency111 is, according to interviewees in Jordan, active in mobilising investments in 
Morocco, in particular from the EU. The Jordan Investment Board112, in comparison 
and according to the same sources, remains passive in attracting investments to 
Jordan and its bureaucratic structures aggravate investment decisions.  
 
Furthermore, there is no binding piece of legislation or regulation that addresses 
investments in climate change-related projects, technologies or infrastructure. If 
Jordan aims at attracting investments in a climate change context then a framework 
has to be developed that facilitates sector-specific needs and requirements, as well 
as providing the securities in light of context-specific uncertainties. The CDM 
provides one possible framework, one that has not been taken up by Jordan and 
should be. 
 
Brazil has been praised (Inter-American Development Bank, 2012) for its national 
policies that favour investments in biofuels. Brazil has been a pioneer in national 
regulatory efforts for the bioenergy sector and has accumulated signiﬁcant expertise 
in the area of biofuels. This is evident by the National Ethanol Programme and its 
associated subsidies, as well as other policy initiatives developed since the 1970s113. 
                                                          
111
 Website of the Moroccan Investment Development Agency: www.invest.gov.ma  
112
 Website of the Jordan Investment Board: 
http://www.jordaninvestment.com/BusinessandInvestment/InternationalAgreementsandMemberships/t
abid/143/language/en-US/Default.aspx  
113
 “Current bioenergy policies in Brazil are guided by the Federal Government’s Agroenergy Policy 
Guidelines, prepared by an inter-ministerial team. Linked to the overall policy of the Federal 
Government, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply has prepared a programme to 
meet the bioenergy needs of the country. The goal of the Brazilian Agroenergy Plan 2006–2011 is to 
ensure the competitiveness of Brazilian agribusiness and support speciﬁc public policies, such as 
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Brazil has therefore, arguably, developed into a centre for excellence in the field of 
biofuels; borrowing from such best practice, would allow Jordan to aim at developing 
binding strategies and clear long-term goals that attract international investors. This 
recommendation is very closely linked to recommendation 8 of this chapter, which 
addresses the need for more consistency in the development and design of 
adequate legislation, as well as with the agencies that are involved in such 
processes.   
 
3 Recommendation: Emphasis on business 
opportunities and innovation to build confidence.  
Private sector companies and investors are mainly driven by the prospect of 
business opportunities. Promoting the Jordanian water sector as a lucrative business 
opportunity, with room for innovation and expansion, is essential. This 
recommendation goes hand-in-hand with lack of trust in new technologies and 
markets. Knowledge-sharing platforms may offer the opportunity to showcase 
successful examples of private sector participation in the water sector in Jordan or 
elsewhere. This can be done through documentation and live demonstrations and 
will build confidence in success.  
 
Successful examples of private sector participation in a climate and environment 
context include urban solid waste management. As highlighted by the World Bank114, 
“one of the proven ways of obtaining efficiency gains in solid waste management is 
through the involvement of the private sector– that is, when the key success factors 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
social inclusion, regional development and environmental sustainability.”, retrieved from 
http://www.greenfacts.org/en/biofuels/figtableboxes/biofuel-brazil.htm, 13.03.2013 
114
 “Private Sector Involvement”, World Bank 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTURBANDEVELOPMENT/EXTUSWM/0,,c
ontentMDK:20239710~menuPK:497754~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:463841,00.html, 
retrieved 13.03.2013 
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of competition, transparency and accountability are present. The private sector 
improves efficiency and lowers costs by introducing commercial principles such as 
limited and well-focused performance objectives, financial and managerial 
autonomy, a hard budget constraint, and clear accountability to both customers and 
providers of capital. The private sector plays other important roles by mobilizing 
needed investment funds, and by providing new ideas, technologies and skills”. The 
World Bank draws on examples from Malaysia and Latin America, as well as Ghana, 
where PPPs created new business and investment opportunities, as well as allowed 
for innovation of new procedures and technologies.  
 
Furthermore, there are various knowledge-sharing platforms that allow businesses to 
interact, collaborate and to share best practice in various sectors, ranging from 
pharmaceutical companies to IT and inclusive businesses. These platforms115 aim at 
providing a space for practitioners to connect, share experiences and gain new 
insights into latest developments. Developing such a platform and database for the 
water sector in Jordan may increase the exchange between different stakeholders, 
highlight innovation gaps and lead to collaboration in the development of new 
projects. Internationally, probably the most prominent platform is The Adaptation 
Learning Mechanism116, which is a platform supported by the World Bank, UNDP, 
GEF, UNFCCC, UNEP and the FAO that aims at mapping good practices, providing 
information and sharing knowledge about climate change adaptation. Partners 
include major development organisations and international institutions.   
 
                                                          
115
 Examples of such platforms are the “Practitioner Hub”: http://businessinnovationfacility.org or the 
“Technology Strategy Board”: http://www.innovateuk.org/ourstrategy/innovationplatforms.ashx  
116
 The Adaptation Learning Mechanism: http://www.adaptationlearning.net/about  
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There is not one best practice from which a specific approach could be derived, 
however, representatives of development agencies and private sector companies 
emphasised the potential benefit of such platforms repeatedly, during interviews in 
Amman in 2012. Equally, large water management companies and technology firms 
that have the opportunity of longer term contractual relationships will be ready to 
share a wealth of technical know-how in the delivery of efficient, high quality sectoral 
services.  
 
4 Recommendation: Legislative frameworks and risk-
sharing schemes for private sector investments in Jordan 
Collaboration between the private sector and the public sector could lead to the 
development of design and implementation of regional and national risk 
management frameworks and legislation. This is particularly important to investors 
for whilst the investment risk appears high, there is some degree of security for the 
private sector that the investments are protected. Risk-sharing schemes and legally 
binding frameworks will provide the private sector with the necessary incentive to 
invest what in is still regarded a rather new investment area and context.  
 
A risk sharing facility allows businesses to sell a portion of the risks that are 
associated with certain assets and investments. The International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), as an example, provides a risk transfer in the form of a partial risk 
guarantee (PRG)117 to its clients, whilst assets typically remain on the client’s 
                                                          
117
 For more information about partial risk guarantees, see The World Bank: 
http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSitePK=3985219&pagePK=64143534&contentMD
K=20260268&menuPK=64143504&piPK=64143448, retrieved: 14.03.2013 
 
PRGs cover private lenders against the risk of a public entity failing to perform its obligations with 
respect to a private project. PRGs ensure payment in the case of default resulting from the non-
performance of contractual obligations undertaken by governments or their agencies in private sector 
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balance sheet. The IFC furthermore provides partial credit guarantees that represent 
a commitment of full and timely debt service payment up to a predetermined amount. 
The European Investment Fund (EIF) is a pilot guarantee scheme for small and 
medium-sized businesses to support their research, development and innovation 
projects. The scheme is open to the EU 27 member states as well as to a number of 
other associated countries under FP7118. Other countries may join the scheme under 
certain conditions. It may be an option for Jordan to join such initiatives under the 
ENP framework in order to facilitate the inflow of medium-sized and larger 
companies from abroad.       
 
Furthermore, a legislative framework governing the relationship between private 
sector investors and the public sector is needed, in order to provide the private 
sector with the necessary guarantees and securities for making investments. Jordan, 
thus far, is in the process of drafting a PPP law that recognises the important role of 
private sector involvement in advancing national infrastructure development. 
Currently, PPPs are governed under the privatization laws; however, there is no 
specific legislative framework in place that deals with PPP procurement in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
projects. PRGs typically cover outstanding principal and accrued interest of a debt tranche in full. 
Payment is made only if the debt service default is caused by risks specified under the guarantee. 
 Eligible projects: Projects with private participation dependent on certain government 
contractual undertaking, such as: Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and concession projects; 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects; privatizations. The projects can be both greenfield 
or existing projects. 
 Eligible debt: PRGs can be used for any commercial debt instruments (loans, bonds) 
provided by any private institution, including debt provided by sponsors in the form of 
shareholder loans. PRGs can cover both foreign currency and local currency debt. 
 Risk coverage: PRGs can cover a range of risks relating to government performance 
including, changes in law, failure to meet contractual payment obligations, obstruction of an 
arbitration process, expropriation and nationalization, foreign currency availability and 
convertibility, non-payment of a termination amount or an arbitration award following a 
covered default, and failure to issue licenses, approvals, and consents in a timely manner. 
 
118
 Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, Switzerland, Israel, Turkey, Croatia, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and Serbia, Albania and Montenegro, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Faroe Islands 
and Moldova. 
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particular119. In particular, such legislative frameworks and risk-sharing schemes are 
essential for investments in the environment sector. Associated with high levels of 
uncertainty and ambiguity, investments in the water sector, in the context of climate 
change, requires a solid legislative foundation.   
 
5 Recommendation: Emphasise business opportunities 
associated with climate change adaptation in Jordan 
Climate change finance, in particular adaptation finance, is often regarded a burden 
and a necessity by the private sector. Closely linked to Recommendation 3, this 
recommendation emphasises the framing of climate change finance. In the 
stakeholder process it was found that highlighting the inherent opportunities within 
climate change adaptation would increase interest and willingness to invest.  
Furthermore, the private sector should be more engaged in the development of 
adaptation strategies and projects. This could be in the form of a PPP or through 
                                                          
119
 See also: “The legal framework for PPP and Concession in Jordan is based on the provisions of 
the Privatization Regulation Number (80) of 2008 for Implementing Privatization Transactions Issued 
in pursuance of Article (20) of The Privatization Law Number (25) of 2000. Privatization means 
according to the Law the adoption of an economic methodology which enhances the role of the 
private sector in the economy to include public sector enterprises the nature of which requires that 
they be managed on commercial bases.  
It is therefore the privatization law which was designed for the development of the private sector 
participation in public services and infrastructure and not specifically for PPP which has provided the 
legal framework for PPP.  
Jordan officially launched its PPP Program on June 23rd 2008, and assigned its implementation to 
the Executive Privatization Commission (EPC) as a way of continuation of its Privatization Program.  
The Privatization Regulation defines PPP as "A relatively long-term written agreement between the 
public and private sectors for the purpose of providing a service of a general nature or implementing a 
project or performing a certain task whereby project financing and allocation of risks arising therefrom 
shall be pursuant to the contract."  
The Privatization Law (Article 4) provides that the restructuring and privatization of public institutions 
or enterprises owned by the public sector can be carried out by adopting in addition to classical 
privatization methods the following type of agreement or license : BOT, BOO,BOOT, as well as 
granting the private sector the right to build a particular enterprise with a monopolistic and exclusive 
right to exploit it pursuant to a license or an agreement signed with the Government for this purpose 
or any other method not specified in the Law as decided by the Council of Ministers.  
The current legislation does enable for all types of PPP, but there is no specific legislation or 
regulation dealing with PPP procurement in detail and no regulation at all concerning PFI or PPP 
applicable to the non-merchant sector.” (EBRD, JORDAN ASSESSMENT OF THE QUALITY OF THE 
PPP LEGISLATION AND OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION, 
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/concessions/jordan.pdf)  
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advisory functions. Involving private sector stakeholders increases the cross-sector 
dialogue and enhances the identification of adaptation needs, the linkages between 
different parts of the economy and society as well as potential opportunities for 
collaboration in the water sector.  
 
As the quote by Christiana Figueres at the beginning of this chapter has highlighted 
“investment in adaptation makes business sense, due […] to the new business 
opportunities opening in the area of adaptation”. In 2010, PwC, in collaboration with 
DfID and the UNFCCC, published a study that collected views from around 40 
businesses in developed and developing countries and found that a majority of 
businesses believed that they could play a more important role in the development of 
adaptation strategies. This is in line with some of the findings of the stakeholder 
process conducted for the purpose of this thesis. Whilst the mitigation of climate 
change has been widely explored and partially exhausted for business opportunities, 
adaptation presents an entirely new business area.  
 
Businesses increasingly recognise that adaptation to climate change is not only 
about protecting and securing their own assets, but that adaptation allows for 
capitalising of new markets and opportunities as well as innovation. However, thus 
far, the public sector has failed to translate this into government strategies to attract 
private sector investments particularly in climate proofing infrastructure and key 
urban, industrial and agricultural interests. Adaptation to climate change in itself is a 
rather new policy area that, considered from various aspects, is still in its infancy. 
According to the research undertaken for this thesis, no country could be identified, 
which actively promotes for adaptation as an investment opportunity. However, 
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research and current studies (PwC, 2010; Sida, 2011; this research) have shown 
that attitudes towards adaptation are becoming increasingly business-oriented.  
As there is a strong link between economic development, business growth and 
climate change adaptation, business plays an essential role in driving economic 
development and building adaptive capacity. Jordan, as a Middle Income Country, 
could become a forerunner in framing the need to adapt to a shrinking availability of 
water in a business and capitalising context. Businesses that eventually decide, 
then, to invest in climate change adaptation-related projects in Jordan, will have the 
benefit of exploring an entirely new market, with ample opportunities for innovation 
and technology development.   
 
6 Recommendation: Achieve high levels of 
transparency in the award of projects to strengthen public confidence in private-
public cooperation and partnerships in Jordan 
Closely linked to recommendation 1, increasing the transparency in the award of 
projects – for example in the form of PPPs – will enhance public trust in cooperation 
between the public and the private sector and will furthermore reduce suspicion 
towards foreign private sector companies. This in turn will increase private sector 
willingness to engage in PPPs and to mobilize capital for adaptation-related projects 
and will also decrease levels of corruption.  
 
In order to: 1) increase trust in public-private venture and 2) increase transparency 
and thereby reduce levels of corruption, it is essential that projects and contracts are 
awarded based on merit and purely on the basis of value-for-money decisions. 
According to the Jordanian Privatization Law Article 17a, “The EPC120 shall, in 
                                                          
120
 Executive Privatization Commission 
287 
 
cooperation with the Steering Committee and after the evaluation of the technical 
proposal, inform the investors, whose proposals were rejected, of the rejection 
decision”. However, according to the research undertaken in this thesis, this 
information is not widely publically available. There is need for designated PPP 
frameworks and legislation, which increase transparency for the public on: 
- who the candidates are for specific projects and contracts 
- who won the bid  
- on what grounds the bid was won 
 
This recommendation is closely tied to the first recommendation given in this final 
chapter. As discussed in the previous chapter, corruption has increasingly become a 
concern in Jordan, even more so amid the Arab Spring since 2011. There is wide-
spread concern amongst citizens that contracts are not awarded objectively and that 
PPPs are awarded in a way that the national labour market is excluded.  
According to the OECD (2010), best practice in the PPP process includes: 
- a competitive public procurement process covering all investments is required 
by law  
- the right to appeal against a procurement decision to an independent judicial 
body 
- an independent monitoring authority/auditor to investigate PPP procurement 
practices and help rule out any conflict of interest in the dealings of the 
contracting authority 
- step-in rights and termination rights 
- the option for re-negotiation 
- a dispute resolution mechanism 
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- transparency for fair and equitable treatment 
- accountability and control  
 
Additionally, legally enforceable penalties with the threat and exercise of criminal 
sanctions should be implemented in order to enforce the transparency and accuracy 
in the award of PPP projects and alike.  
 
7 Recommendation: The role of agriculture and its 
freshwater consumption in relation to GDP contribution needs to be addressed 
through government regulation    
Water for agricultural usage consumes between 63 – 70% of freshwater 
availabilities, however, agriculture contributes only 4% to GDP. These high levels of 
consumption need to be urgently addressed. The private sector can play a role in the 
provision of new irrigation technologies or less water-consuming and more drought 
resistant crops as well as other technologies and machinery.  
 
Water usage for irrigation in agriculture accounts for 63-70% of annual freshwater 
resources in Jordan, whilst at the same time, agriculture only accounts for 
approximately 4% of GDP (this research; Molle et al., 2008). In a country, where 
annual renewable freshwater availability per person amounts to only 165m³, such 
high levels of water consumption need to be addressed under a regulatory 
framework. Government officials in Jordan are concerned with the potential political 
and social consequences of reforming the irrigated agricultural system in the country; 
however, quotas or alternatively increased water prices for irrigation in agriculture 
could motivate farmers to reconsider the benefits of adopting new technologies and 
crops to reduce overall water consumption and losses.  This in turn could provide the 
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opportunity for the private sector to develop new technologies and crops that would 
help farmers meet these new objectives and targets.  
 
Best practice approaches to address this can be found in the EU Water Framework 
Directive and under the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) framework, but are 
not present in the MENA region.  
 
Both CAP and the Water Framework Directive121 recommend the provision of 
incentives for farmers who reduce water consumption; CAP furthermore states that 
quantitative requirements under the Water Framework Directive have to be met in 
agriculture, and, more vaguely, that farmers are required to respect water resources.  
 
Since the implementation of the Directive into national law is in the realm of member 
states, these quantitative requirements may vary.  Article 9122 of the Water 
Framework Directive reads that the cost of water services must reflect the impact on 
the environment and aquatic ecosystems, in line with the polluter-pays-principle. But 
it does not single out agriculture or acknowledge contributions to 
GDP. Acknowledging that implementing quantitative requirements and restrictions in 
the context of agriculture and water consumption in Jordan is a sensitive matter, the 
                                                          
121
 Directive 2000/60/EC “Establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy” 
122
 Article 9, Directive 2000/60/EC 
Recovery of costs for water services 
1. Member States shall take account of the principle of recovery of the costs of water services, 
including environmental and resource costs, having regard to the economic analysis conducted 
according to Annex III, and in accordance in particular with the polluter pays principle. 
Member States shall ensure by 2010 
 that water-pricing policies provide adequate incentives for users to use water resources 
efficiently, and thereby contribute to the environmental objectives of this Directive, 
 an adequate contribution of the different water uses, disaggregated into at least industry, 
households and agriculture, to the recovery of the costs of water services, based on the 
economic analysis conducted according to Annex III and taking account of the polluter pays 
principle.  
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Government should nonetheless implement incentives that support farmers who 
reduce their water consumption. Furthermore, the switch to less water-intense crops, 
fruits and vegetables, as well as the use of grey water in agriculture should be 
incentivised and enforced by the Government. Non-compliance with these 
requirements should be met with dissuasive measures. They should also be 
supported by an EU twinning project around implementation od the precepts of the 
Directive.  
 
8 Recommendation: Ensure consistency and continuity 
in legislation that regulates the water sector. Improve enforcement procedures   
Frequent changes in government and thereby resulting fluctuations in government 
strategies towards water scarcity and water policy render it difficult to develop plans 
for private sector companies to enter the market; there are too many uncertainties 
and risks, policy-making appears arbitrary which in turn creates a barrier for 
companies to make investments or to get involved in co-financing projects with the 
public sector. Regulation that addresses the problem of a shrinking availability of 
water and the role of private households and private sector companies in regulating 
the demand and supply is necessary; furthermore, it has been repeatedly 
emphasised that the enforcement of regulation and legislation has to be improved.  
 
Joined-up regulations, as well as cross-departmental committees are needed to 
improve levels of continuity and consistency in legislation with regards to water and 
climate change and to increase levels of transparency in the context of regulatory 
initiatives. This recommendation ties in with the second recommendation given 
herein, which aims at creating long-term perspectives for investors.  
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Due to frequent changes in government123 and therefore frequent changes in the 
composition of government ministries and minister positions, policy priorities shift. As 
a result, laws and regulation – in the context of water and climate change – are 
frequently re-drafted, but an implementation deficit remains. It has therefore been 
suggested, through the stakeholder engagement in the course of this research, that 
cross-departmental committees should be established, which should aim at 
integrating a variety of other non-governmental stakeholders124. These committees 
would serve as a platform for discussing, negotiating and eventually designing 
regulation that is acceptable by a majority of the stakeholders. Initiatives that have 
developed into this direction include the Highland Water Forum as well as ACWUA; 
the Forum creates a platform for exchange between government officials and 
farmers, whereas ACWUA provides the basis for utility companies, the Government 
and international aid agencies to interact. Certainly, greater consistency will be 
achieved by designing and implementing laws that govern water policy, which is 
acceptable over a long-term and which cannot be amended. This is also important in 
the context of the provision of a long-term perspective for private sector investors.  
 
Furthermore, under the current structure three authorities in Jordan deal with water 
issues: the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, the Jordan Valley Authority and the 
Water Authority Jordan (in coordination with the Programme Management Unit). 
While each individual department is responsible for the management of certain 
aspects of water policy, there could be more integration and coordination, including 
the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry for Energy and 
                                                          
123
 Four new Prime Ministers were appointed since February 2011: Marouf al-Bakhit, Awn Shawkat 
Al-Khasawneh, Fayez Tarawneh and Abdullah Ensour (current Prime Minister, March 2013). 
124
 Farmer associations, utility companies, individuals, NGOs, consultancies, international 
organisations, companies, industry. 
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Mineral Resources. Notwithstanding excellent initiatives, such as the National Water 
Master Plan (2004), the Water for Life Strategy (2009) and the formulation of 
different policies (Ground Water Policy, Waste Water Policy, Water Irrigation Policy 
and the Water Policy), there is a lack of legally binding joined-up regulations that 
provide investors with the consistency needed for planning adaptation-related 
investments in the water sector in Jordan (according to this research; Molle et al., 
2008).  
 
A final note on enforcement comes by way of recommending that the Jordanian 
Environmental Ranger system of enforcement should be applied to the enforcement 
of water legislation given the resources, expertise and success of the Rangers in 
pursuing enforcement action in the environmental sector.  
 
9 Recommendation: Draft water strategies in a climate 
change adaptation context to attract investments in Jordan  
The Government should clearly identify its adaptive needs with regards to water 
scarcity and subsequently identify the specific roles the private sector could play and 
helping Jordan adapt to a shrinking availability of water. This would help integrate 
the private sector better in the decision-making process, draw on best practice 
experiences from elsewhere and scale-up private sector investments. The private 
sector tends to not always be willing to share information; hence a private sector 
platform that allows companies to share experiences and to devise targeted projects 
may enhance collaboration.  
 
It is generally not clear whether Jordan’s water strategies and policy frameworks are 
considered in a climate change context or whether water scarcity is seen as 
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independent of climate change. Fact, however, is that Jordan does not pursue a 
dedicated climate change strategy until the time of writing (March 2013) and 
adaptation to climate change in particular, is not a priority concern for the Jordanian 
Government.  Notwithstanding existing data125 that indicates an increasing stress on 
water resources in the region under climate change, water is not actively debated as 
a trend that requires an adaptation strategy in Jordan. According to the last IPCC 
assessment report, the climate in the MENA region is predicted to become even 
hotter and drier over the coming decades, with increases in the frequency and 
intensity of droughts, chronic water stress and hence increased pressure on the 
limited groundwater resources (which are already extracted beyond the aquifers’ 
recharge potential). For Middle Income Countries, such as Jordan, it is therefore 
crucial that governments, development partners as well as the private sector join 
together in order to mobilise sufficient resources to minimise climate change impacts 
and to mainstream climate change reform agendas and modernise the provision of 
infrastructure plans and services.  
 
However, as discussed in the fifth recommendation presented herein, “adaptation 
makes business sense” and increasingly companies and other private sector entities 
will realise the underlying opportunities within climate change adaptation. Hence, by 
framing the Jordanian water strategy in an adaptation context, private sector 
investment can be scaled-up. Furthermore, this would lead to an increased pool of 
stakeholders (including the private sector, farmers, individuals, development 
                                                          
125
 “Adaptation to Climate Change in the Middle East and North Africa Region”, The World Bank: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/0,,contentMDK%3A2159676
6~pagePK%3A146736~piPK%3A146830~theSitePK%3A256299,00.html, retrieved 14.03.2013  
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organisations, NGOs etc.) who in turn could participate in stakeholder engagement 
to draft adequate and good legislation for water.  
 
A good example, for a country that has framed its water strategy in the context of 
adaptation to climate change, is Morocco. A project run by the World Bank under its 
Sustainable Development Programme, addresses chronic water shortages. The 
Oum Er Rbia River basin makes up half of Morocco’s irrigated agriculture and 
produces 60% of national sugar beets, 40% of olives, and 40% of milk (The World 
Bank). Over the past years the availability of irrigation water has fallen dramatically; 
as a consequence, farmers are supplementing surface water by pumping 
groundwater from aquifers, non-renewable water resources. In cooperation with the 
World Bank, the Moroccan Government is working on developing a strategy under 
which the Government is committed to provide a fixed amount of water to farmers, 
for them to have the confidence that water will be available at the time they require it. 
The farmers, on the other hand, are committed not to exceed a fixed level of water 
consumption and will be sanctioned if this limit is exceeded. An article published in 
2010126 described “Morocco as the environmental pioneer of the Arab World”, 
highlighting the Government’s plan to invest US$ billions into climate change 
adaptation programmes and aiming at generating 42% of total power from renewable 
energies by 2020. Foundations and companies such as “Desertec” have already 
entered the Moroccan market, whereas – despite comparable conditions – this has 
not yet been the case for Jordan.  
 
                                                          
126
 “Morocco pledges billions to tackle climate change”: http://www.edie.net/news/6/Morocco-pledges-
billions-to-tackle-climate-change/18082/, retrieved 25.02.2013 
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It appears, then, that formulating a designated climate change adaptation strategy 
that contextualises water scarcity, will draw more attention to possible investors and 
thereby increase the opportunities to enhance Jordan’s adaptive capacity to 
shrinking availabilities of water resources. Jordan, as a MIC does not fall under the 
NAPA process as developed by the UNFCCC for LDCs. However, if another Middle 
East state NAPA (i.e. Afghanistan and Yemen) would be followed, this could provide 
a basis for the development of a project database and thereby increase investor 
awareness.  
  
10.9 Summary 
The recommendations given herein provide a basis for enhancing private sector 
investments in the water sector in Jordan. Though they are specific to Jordan, these 
recommendations (which have been explained with supporting rationales in this 
chapter) are valid and can be translated to other scenarios under which a MIC 
government aims to attract private sector finance for climate change adaptation 
projects provided that similar political, economic, cultural and environmental 
conditions prevail: 
1. Eliminate corruption 
2. Create long-term prospects for investors (especially under uncertainty about 
climate change and its effects) 
3. Build confidence for investors 
4. Develop a solid legislative framework and risk-sharing scheme 
5. Adaptation makes business sense: open adaptation to climate change as a 
new market for innovation and investments 
6. Achieve high levels of transparency in the award of projects and contracts 
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7. Develop a regulatory framework that defines the water consumption for 
agriculture (proportionate to GDP and available water resources) 
8. Ensure consistency and coherence in policy-making. Avoid an implementation 
deficit 
9. Frame a trend in climate that requires an adaptation strategy in the context of 
climate change 
 
10.10 Critique of research methodology 
In order to undertake this research numerous methodologies were employed. To 
obtain stakeholder perceptions with regards to the case study policy instruments, a 
comprehensive survey, based on questionnaires and interviews were undertaken. 
Other evidence sources were analysed to enhance the case studies.  
 
One area that proved to be challenging was the inclusion of external stakeholders in 
the surveys. The response rate from the private sector external stakeholder groups 
was low. Only ten responses were received. Whilst this proved to be very useful 
input in terms of giving detailed insights into the different aspects of the drivers and 
barriers to private sector capital investments in the water sector in Jordan, it was 
insufficient to give a balanced, reliable and comprehensive representation for this 
stakeholder group. Substantial efforts were made to increase the response rate to 
the survey by either telephone or email. Despite best efforts no further responses 
were received. Nevertheless, the intimate relationship between the stakeholders 
within the water sector and broader context of climate change adaptation in Jordan 
meant that many of the other respondents, in particular interviewees in Jordan, made 
a significant number of references to relevant information, thus providing further facts 
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to be used in this research. Furthermore, the stakeholders that were interviewed 
recommended other experts, which in turn were contacted and interviewed as well.  
A total of 29 semi-structured, face-to-face interviews were carried out over the 
duration of this research. Perhaps there is a question of cultural conservatism and a 
closed society that still needs to be overcome for social scientific research to flourish 
in Jordan and that is a constraint that this PhD author needs to accept for the time 
being.  
 
As briefly discussed above, one of the major challenges during the stakeholder 
validation process proved to be: the number of questionnaire respondents willing to 
participate. All questionnaire respondents who expressed an interest in participation 
in the research were contacted to arrange questionnaire participation. However, a 
number of respondents who had expressed initial interest subsequently declined to 
participate further. This was disappointing and efforts were made to increase the 
number of survey participants. The use of stakeholder feedback in relation to the 
policy recommendations proved to be a highly beneficial approach in terms of 
validating the key outcomes of the research.  
 
10.11 Limitations of the research 
As with any form of research, there are limitations in terms of the practical 
undertaking of the research and limitations of the analysis. These limitations, as they 
apply to this research, will be discussed in this section. Furthermore, topics that 
would be valuable for further research will be discussed below.   
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The use of case studies as a research approach is not without limitations. Case 
study research naturally involves a limited number of examples from which to draw 
conclusions. Secondly, examples or case studies are rarely selected at random, 
which may also limit the observations arising from the evaluation. Furthermore, the 
resources available throughout the research predetermined the scope of the 
stakeholder validation process, which could have been, if carried out over a longer 
period of time, involved a greater variety of stakeholders and included a comparative 
aspect. However, the inherent benefits and advantages of case study research have 
been highlighted in the methodology chapter of this work.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis has been based under the assumption that climate change 
exacerbates the availability of freshwater resources in Jordan, in addition to other 
factors mentioned in this thesis.  Due to the lack of high-quality data and research, 
as pointed out in this work, it would require further research in order to be able to 
determine to what degree climate change is indeed accountable for a notable 
decrease in freshwater availability.  
 
10.12 Recommendations for future research 
The topic of water scarcity, particularly in the Middle East has an impact on many 
different policy areas. Water sustainability influences society, culture, domestic and 
regional politics; and in turn, water policy and management is influenced by these 
factors as well. Water management is hence subject to sensitive debates as has 
been highlighted in this research. There are several matters of interest that were 
referred to in this thesis, however, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss and 
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analyse these in more detail. However, some interesting topics for further research 
are outlined below.  
 
1. Public awareness and behavioural change –water demand management 
2. Business innovation for sustainable water management  
3. Scenario-planning under uncertainty: the concepts of “virtual water” and 
“water trading” 
 
During the research and subsequent stakeholder validation it became apparent that 
despite high levels of public awareness of water scarcity in Jordan, behavioural 
change has not been brought about as of yet. Focus in the immediate future will 
have to shift to the water demand management side until other projects come into 
force that tackles the supply-side of freshwater availability. Water demand 
management has been neglected in the past, however, under limited financial and 
technical resources, countries such as Jordan, will need to put considerable effort in 
the design of innovative solutions for effective water demand management.  
 
This is also closely linked to business innovation for sustainable water management; 
a field that is not yet fully explored, but will be necessary in the future to tackle 
diminishing water resources. More research in this area could also enhance the 
drivers and attractiveness for investments in certain countries and regions. Research 
could look at new technologies that could be applied, in particular in agricultural 
irrigation, but also in private households, in order to reduce water consumption and 
water-theft. This would not only benefit Jordan, but other countries in the MENA 
region and elsewhere.   
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Climate change and its effects are associated with a large degree of uncertainty. In 
the context of private sector finance for climate change adaptation it would therefore 
be valuable to undertake scenario-planning activities and conduct further research 
into different possible scenarios. The question that requires more investigation is: if 
water management fails in Jordan, what are the options and consequences? At the 
time of writing (March 2013) climate change and water scarcity have been replaced 
by other policy priorities; studies have shown that the Disi aquifer is highly likely 
radioactively contaminated; the Red-Dead project is on hold; and lastly, the 
Jordanian population is steadily increasing.  These factors are cause for great 
concern about the direction water management and water policy in Jordan will 
develop. Scenario-planning would investigate the different scenarios and would allow 
for developing possible solutions, drawing on concepts such as “virtual water” (Allan, 
J.A., 2011) and regional “water trading” schemes. “Virtual water” refers to the hidden, 
“virtual” water that flows in the form of exchange of goods and commodities and can 
be of particular use in arid and semi-arid regions of the world in determining how 
best and most sufficiently to use the scarce water resources that are available. 
 
10.13 Summary 
This chapter has provided a discussion of the findings of the research and 
stakeholder process that was undertaken for the purpose of this work since April 
2010. The findings derived from this research were developed into a detailed policy 
recommendation framework that will be useful to the public sector in the 
development of an adaptation finance strategy for the water sector in Jordan, and 
elsewhere in Middle Income Countries. The policy recommendations are furthermore 
meant as a decision-making tool for the private sector in developing its responses to 
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an increasing demand for private sector investments in climate change adaptation 
projects. If they are implemented then the basis for closing the inherent funding gap 
in climate change adaptation-related projects will be laid and Jordan will serve as an 
example for other countries to follow lead.  
 
Figure 16: Factors contributing to achieving private sector engagement in investments in climate 
change adaptation in the water sector in Jordan 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mobilise private 
sector finance for 
climate change 
adaptation: water 
sector 
Eliminate 
corruption 
Adequate and 
consistent 
legislation. Avoid 
implementation 
deficit 
Climate Change 
adaptation 
makes business 
sense 
Transparency in 
the award of 
projects and 
contracts 
Regulation that 
addresses water 
consumption in 
agriculture 
Regulation for 
public private 
partnerships 
302 
 
11. Conclusion 
 
The funding gap for climate change adaptation projects is very large and to date 
there are no strategies how to close this gap. The Adaptation Fund, NAPAs and the 
Green Climate Fund are important and necessary initiatives, but they only cover a 
small percentage of the funding that is needed in developing countries and emerging 
countries alike. Chapter 4 has shown that if the Ethiopian NAPA with its suggested 
projects was to be implemented, it alone would exceed the funding provided by the 
NAPA framework. During the COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009 the role of the private 
sector was for the first time recorded in writing within the Copenhagen Accord. Albeit 
vaguely formulated it is a symbolic move towards recognising the essential role of 
the private sector in financing adaptation projects globally. This can range from 
small-scale projects at the local and household-level, to the support of domestic 
private companies in developing smaller-scale adaptation projects to large-scale 
strategies to engage multinational companies in adaptation work. An argument that 
strongly favours the active and legally binding engagement of the private sector is 
the responsibility-based approach as discussed in chapter 6.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis it would have been beyond the scope to develop a 
framework according to which the private sector could be coerced into financing 
adaptation projects. However, it was decided that by focusing on an emerging 
economy and MIC the aim of the research would be to develop a set of policy 
recommendations; these recommendations will facilitate Jordanian policymakers to 
take decisions that favour the voluntary investment of companies in what has been 
identified as adaptation technologies and systems, by simultaneously offering 
profitable business to companies. The drivers and barriers to private sector 
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investments were developed in the context of water scarcity in the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, however, the majority of recommendations can be extrapolated 
to other, similar cases where similar conditions prevail. It was noticed, however, that 
the case of water scarcity is a very complex, politically and socially sensitive matter, 
which cannot be disregarded in the formulation of any policy recommendations and 
decision-making.    
 
2013 marks the UN International Year of Water Cooperation. Access to water as a 
fundamental human right is crucial for socio-economic development, peace, stability, 
prosperity and health. As this research has shown, climate change in addition to 
economic development and demographic changes, is adding further stress on the 
limited water resources in many regions of the world. The Jordanian Government 
has recognised water scarcity as a main challenge of the 21st century; however, 
amid political instability in the region and economic downturns, the water-food 
security-nexus has been neglected for some time and adaption to shrinking 
availabilities of water is ever more urgent.  
 
Climate change adaptation strategy and implementation are still in their infancy and 
so is the development of finance mechanisms and agreement on the role the private 
sector should play. It is a fact though, that adaptation to climate change and socio-
economic development are very closely interlinked – some go so far as to say there 
is none is possible without the other – and that investments in infrastructure and 
technologies that help a country to adapt to an adverse impact of climate change will 
over the long-run feed into the overall development of its economy and society. 
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Recognising this should be crucial enough for emerging market economies to 
implement the necessary policy changes.   
 
To conclude, balancing the relationship between water, food security and energy is 
probably the only approach to ultimately achieving sustainability. Collaboration of all 
stakeholders – public and private sector - is, therefore, essential for selecting and 
implementing the most viable solution for water management, laying the foundations 
for a sustainable future. It should be highlighted, then, that it is our obligation towards 
future generations to secure our water resources and manage them in the best 
possible intention and way.  
 
To conclude further, water is one, if not arguably the most important natural resource 
that keeps our planet alive. Without adaptation to shrinking availabilities of water, the 
possible side effects of this inaction could trigger a series of severe consequences. 
Without water, rural areas are likely to be abandoned with people moving into cities; 
this will inevitably lead to the desertification of possibly entire countries. This in turn 
will increase the number of climate change-induced refugees and displaced people 
who migrate to neighbouring countries to seek a living. This may lead, as has been 
witnessed in previous instances, to political instability, social unrests and even civil 
wars. In order to avoid this, a viable solution for least developed countries and 
emerging economies has to be developed. If Jordan was to address its problem of 
water scarcity through active private sector participation, it could set a precedent for 
other countries and serve as an example of best practice.  Ultimately this will help 
the economic stability and growth of Middle Income Countries – often seen as the 
engine of the global economy - in a time of global economic difficulty and transition.  
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Through extensive literature analysis and research, as well as through active 
stakeholder engagement, the results of this research are therefore important and 
highly relevant as they address the inherent challenges, risks and opportunities of 
private sector responses to for a chosen case study and sector. The thesis provides 
a set of policy recommendations and findings, which can be used as a basis for 
developing such framework for other MICs.  
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Appendix 
 
Theoretical and actual drivers and barriers as identified in the literature 
 Driver Barrier Theoretical Actual 
Technology penetration X  X (IBM: not 
validated) 
 
Technology limits  X X  
Equator principles X X X  
Population 
growth/urbanisation/industrialisation 
X X X  
Regulatory mechanisms:  
 ENP Action Plans; EU 
Association Agreements 
 Morocco: Le Code des Eaux 
X  X  
Business opportunities X  X 
(Heymann, 
2010: not 
validated) 
X 
(Veolia, 
2008) 
Loans and financial incentives X  X  
Direct and indirect exposure to 
climate change effects 
X   X 
(LLoyds, 
2010: 
Coca-
Cola, 
2010: 
BASF, 
2010) 
CSR/Corporate Social Sustainability X X X 
(Tsoutsoura, 
2004: not 
validated)  
X (Coca-
Cola vs. 
Kerala, 
2002) 
Corruption; political instability  X X  
New political system  X  X  
Investment risk  X X  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
325 
 
1. Questionnaire used for guidance in semi-structured interviews 
Jordan/Amman in March and April 2012 
 
Water scarcity in Jordan  
 
1. Is water scarcity an issue in Jordan? Since when? Is the public aware? 
2. In your experience, is water/water scarcity a priority for the Jordanian 
government? 
3. Why, why not? 
4. What does the government do? Regulation, policies, subsidies etc.? 
5. What is the role of the farmers? 
6. Who suffers most from water scarcity? 
7. Is there community based water scarcity adaptation?  
8. What is the role of the private sector? High consumption of water – do they 
help? 
9. What is the political dimension of water scarcity? I.e. neighbouring countries?  
 
 
FDI – water technologies in Jordan 
 
10. Why do you think there are not more foreign investors in the water sector in 
Jordan?  
11. What could you do to attract more FDI? 
12. Which countries are the highest investors/give most aid to Jordan?  
Germany?! 
13. What do you think are the drivers for foreign private sector companies to 
invest in Jordan? 
14. What do you think are the barriers for foreign private sector companies to 
invest in Jordan?  
15. What made you invest in Jordan?  
  
16. Do you think PPPs are a feasible option in Jordan? 
17. Water trading schemes – feasible option for Jordan? (comparable scheme as 
emissions trading  country A has abundant water and sells it to country B)  
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18. What role do academic institutions play? What role do you see for 
academics/researchers? 
 
 
19. Is desalination a feasible option? 
20. Solar – powered desalination plants? 
 
 
21. Does Jordan work closely with the EU? How? What projects? 
22. In how far does the ENP support Jordan in environmental issues? Is it a 
priority? 
23. Is water scarcity seen as a result of climate change? 
24. What does the EU do to help Jordan adapt against water scarcity?  
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2. Survey sent to private sector companies 
 
 
Drivers and barriers to company investments in 
Jordan 
Katrin Glatzel, Imperial College London 
 
Imperial College London is conducting research on the potential role of private sector 
operators in financing climate change adaptation projects. The focus of the research 
is adaptation technologies and projects that help a country (i.e. Jordan) to adapt to a 
shrinking availability of water.  
 
We will send you a copy of the results. If you wish to remain anonymous or to 
comment in a personal capacity, please indicate below.  This survey can take as 
little as 10 minutes of your time.  
 
Name:                                
Wish to remain anonymous:  Yes   No  
 
Please return the survey to: k.glatzel10@ic.ac.uk  
 
1. Have you thought about making investments/start operating in Jordan?  
Yes   No          Comments:       
 
 
2. Compared to other countries in the region127, is Jordan an attractive 
location?        
 
Very attractive   
Attractive   
Neutral    
Unattractive   
Very unattractive  
 
Comments:       
 
                                                          
127
 Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE, Yemen 
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3. What are the reasons for your response to Question 2? Please explain in 
a few words 
 
Corruption    
Laws/Regulations   
Natural Resources   
Political Situation   
Economic Situation   
Geographical Location   
Market/Business Climate  
 
Explanation:       
 
 
 
 
4. “Jordan needs financial support to enter a sustainable water pathway”. 
Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Strongly agree    
Agree     
Neither agree nor disagree  
Disagree    
Strongly disagree   
 
 
5. In your opinion, what is the most feasible form for financing water-
related projects? Please rank according to feasibility128. (1 = most 
important)   
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Loans      
Grants      
Public Private Partnerships      
Build-Operate-Transfer      
                                                          
128
 Public Private Partnerships (PPPs): Any collaboration between public bodies, such as local authorities or central 
government, and private companies; Build Operate Transfer (BOTs): a form of project financing, wherein a private entity 
receives a concession from the private or public sector to finance, design, construct, and operate a facility stated in the 
concession contract. This enables the project proponent to recover its investment, operating and maintenance expenses in the 
project 
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Privately owned and operated      
 
 Other:       
 
 
 
6. Why do you think not more foreign companies are operating and 
investing in Jordan, compared to other countries, such as Tunisia or 
Morocco?      
 
 
Corruption    
Laws/Regulations   
Natural Resources   
Political Situation   
Economic Situation   
Geographical Location   
Market/Business Climate  
 
 
Other:       
 
 
 
7. Do you believe that the Jordanian Government provides sufficient 
incentives to attract foreign private sector companies and investors?     
 
 
Strongly agree    
Agree     
Neither agree nor disagree  
Disagree    
Strongly disagree   
 
 
8. What more could be done, if anything?     
 
Regulation to facilitate market entry  
Enhance privatization    
Less bureaucracy     
Tackle corruption    
Political stability     
Economic stability     
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Other:       
 
 
 
9. As a business, what are the three most decisive factors when deciding 
to enter a new market? Please number according to priority. 
 
Increase market presence  Short-term gains   
Increase portfolio  Long-term gains  
Low risk 
 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 
 
Other:       
 
 
 
10. If you were to consider investing in Jordan: please rank the following 
drivers to company investments according to importance (1 = most 
important) 
 
Drivers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Political stability & transparency          
Intergovernmental agreements          
Level of market saturation          
Environmental sustainability          
Corporate social responsibility          
National government-based 
incentives 
         
Business opportunities          
Innovation          
Intellectual Property Rights          
 
Other:       
 
 
 
11. If you were to consider investing in Jordan: please rank the following 
barriers to company investments according to importance (1 = most 
important)  
 
Barriers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Corruption         
Lack of transparency & political         
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stability 
Investment conditions         
Public awareness and attitude         
Social and cultural differences         
Intergovernmental agreements         
Political climate         
Economic climate         
 
Other:       
 
 
12. Would you consider entering a Public Private Partnership with the 
Jordanian government?  Yes     No     Maybe  
 
Comments:       
 
13. The need to adapt to a changing climate (i.e. less water availability) 
makes investment in Jordan more attractive:     
 
Strongly agree    
Agree     
Neither agree nor disagree  
Disagree    
Strongly disagree   
 
Comments:       
 
 
14. Would you be willing to let me talk to you further?     
 
Yes  
No  
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3. Interview partners [the names of individuals are withheld for confidentiality reasons, although they can be made available to 
the examiners in confidence at the examination as required]  
 
Name Organisation Title 
 
Euro-Mediterranean Association for Cooperation and 
Development General Secretary 
 
Jordan Valley Authority Coordinator 
 
Ministry of Environment Jordan Secretary General 
 
Jordan Investment Board Director of Research 
 
World Bank 
Climate Change Coordinator Middle East & North 
Africa 
 
GIZ Water Sector Coordinator  
 
Ministry of Environment Jordan Director 
 
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany Counsellor, Deputy Head of Mission 
 
Arab Countries Water Utilities Association  Secretary General 
 
Zenith Editorial Office 
 
ECO Consult Amman Senior Consultant 
 
Public Action for Water, Energy and Environment Senior Specialist 
 
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Amman Resident Representative  
 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources Jordan 
Director of Energy Efficiency & Energy 
Conservation Department 
 
Ministry of Water and Irrigation Jordan Minister 
 
UNCT/JP/Ministry of Water and Irrigation Jordan Joint Programme Coordinator 
 
The Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development NRMP Director 
 
ITAG Jordan Owner 
 
Delegation of the European Union to the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan Programme Manager - Environment & Energy 
 German Jordanian University 
Assistant Professor, Department of Water and 
Environmental Engineering 
 
Union for the Mediterranean Deputy Secretary General 
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Environment Directorate at Water Authority of Jordan-
WAJ Director 
 
GIZ 
Principal Technical Advisor German-Jordanian 
Programme 
 
The Higher Council for Science and Technology General Secretariat 
 
UN FAO Technical Officer Water Unit 
 
KfW Development Bank Amman Deputy Director 
 
KfW Development Bank  Head of Division, Sector and Policy Division Water  
 
ECO Consult Amman Environment & Natural Resources Director 
 
NCCR Consultant 
 
Friends of the Earth Middle East Assistant Director projects 
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4. Survey participants 
 
Company Replied 
Will do 
survey 
Actually did 
survey Email Phone 
3P Technik  No No No 3 2 
ABB Yes Yes No 3 3 
Abengoa  No No No 3 2 
AGBAR (Aguas de 
Barcelona) 
No No No 
3 2 
Amiantit No No No 3 1 
Aquaengineering  No No No 3 2 
Aquafides Yes Yes Yes 1 0 
Arup Yes Yes Yes 1   
BASF Yes No No 2 1 
Bauer Yes Yes Yes 3   
Bechtel Corporation No No No 3 2 
Biwater No No No 3 2 
Black & Veatch No No No 3 2 
Bran+Luebbe Metering 
Pumps 
Yes Yes No 
1 2 
CARDNO No No No 3 2 
CH2M Hill  Yes Yes No 2 3 
Clyde Union Pumps No No No 3 3 
Consulaqua Yes Yes Yes 1 0 
Crossflow Consulting No No No 3 2 
Danfoss No No No 3 2 
Darco Water No No No 3 2 
Dorsch Yes Yes Yes 3 2 
Ecologix No No No 3 2 
Envirochemie No No No 3 3 
GAMA Holding No No No 3 2 
GE Energy Financial 
Services (investors)  
No No No 
3 1 
GE Water + Process 
Technologies 
No No No 
3 1 
Genesis Water Technologies No No No 3 2 
Global we No No No 3 2 
GS Engineering and 
Construction Corporation 
No No No 
3 2 
Hitachi  Yes No No 3 1 
Huber SE No No No 3 2 
Hyflux No No No 3 2 
IBM Yes Yes No 5 3 
IDE technologies No No No 3 2 
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Isle Utilities No No No 3 2 
IWA No No No 3 2 
JGC No No No 3 2 
Koch Industries Yes No No 2 0 
MHW No No No 3 3 
Milton Roy No No No 2 3 
Mirador Consulting Yes Yes Yes 1 0 
Modern Water No No No 2 2 
MWH  No No No 2 3 
Nalco  No No No 3 3 
Netafim/Revaho Yes Yes No 3 2 
Osmoflo  Yes No No 3 1 
Ostara No No No 3 3 
OTT Yes Yes Yes 1 0 
ProMinent No No No 5 4 
Rainer Kiel No No No 2 1 
Remondis No No No 3 2 
RWE  Yes No No 1 0 
SAP No No No 4 1 
SAUR No No No 2 2 
SEBA Yes Yes Yes 1 0 
Siemens Yes Yes No 6 3 
Suez Water / Degremont Yes No No 1 2 
Thyssen Krupp Yes No No 2 2 
Veolia Yes No No 1 1 
Voigtlaender Yes Yes Yes 1 0 
Wehrle Yes Yes Yes 1 1 
Xylem No No No 2 2 
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5. Transparency International Corruption Index 2012 overview 
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1 Denmark 
1 Finland 
1 New Zealand 
4 Sweden 
5 Singapore 
6 Switzerland 
7 Australia 
7 Norway 
9 Canada 
9 Netherlands 
11 Iceland 
12 Luxembourg 
13 Germany 
14 Hong Kong 
15 Barbados 
16 Belgium 
17 Japan 
17 United Kingdom 
19 United States 
20 Chile 
20 Uruguay 
22 Bahamas 
22 France 
22 Saint Lucia 
25 Austria 
25 Ireland 
27 Qatar 
27 United Arab Emirates 
29 Cyprus 
30 Botswana 
30 Spain 
32 Estonia 
33 Bhutan 
33 Portugal 
33 Puerto Rico 
36 Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
37 Slovenia 
37 Taiwan 
39 Cape Verde 
39 Israel 
41 Dominica 
41 Poland 
43 Malta 
43 Mauritius 
45 Korea (South) 
46 Brunei 
46 Hungary 
48 Costa Rica 
48 Lithuania 
50 Rwanda 
51 Georgia 
51 Seychelles 
53 Bahrain 
54 Czech Republic 
54 Latvia 
54 Malaysia 
54 Turkey 
58 Cuba 
58 Jordan 
58 Namibia 
61 Oman 
62 Croatia 
62 Slovakia 
64 Ghana 
64 Lesotho 
66 Kuwait 
66 Romania 
66 Saudi Arabia 
69 Brazil 
69 Macedonia 
69 South Africa 
72 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
72 Italy 
72 Sao Tome and Principe 
75 Bulgaria 
75 Liberia 
75 Montenegro 
75 Tunisia 
79 Sri Lanka 
80 China 
80 Serbia 
80 Trinidad and Tobago 
83 Burkina Faso 
83 El Salvador 
83 Jamaica 
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83 Panama 
83 Peru 
88 Malawi 
88 Morocco 
88 Suriname 
88 Swaziland 
88 Thailand 
88 Zambia 
94 Benin 
94 Colombia 
94 Djibouti 
94 Greece 
94 India 
94 Moldova 
94 Mongolia 
94 Senegal 
102 Argentina 
102 Gabon 
102 Tanzania 
105 Algeria 
105 Armenia 
105 Bolivia 
105 Gambia 
105 Kosovo 
105 Mali 
105 Mexico 
105 Philippines 
113 Albania 
113 Ethiopia 
113 Guatemala 
113 Niger 
113 Timor-Leste 
118 Dominican Republic 
118 Ecuador 
118 Egypt 
118 Indonesia 
118 Madagascar 
123 Belarus 
123 Mauritania 
123 Mozambique 
123 Sierra Leone 
123 Vietnam 
128 Lebanon 
128 Togo 
130 Côte d´Ivoire 
130 Nicaragua 
130 Uganda 
133 Comoros 
133 Guyana 
133 Honduras 
133 Iran 
133 Kazakhstan 
133 Russia 
139 Azerbaijan 
139 Kenya 
139 Nepal 
139 Nigeria 
139 Pakistan 
144 Bangladesh 
144 Cameroon 
144 Central African Republic 
144 Congo Republic 
144 Syria 
144 Ukraine 
150 Eritrea 
150 Guinea-Bissau 
150 Papua New Guinea 
150 Paraguay 
154 Guinea 
154 Kyrgyzstan 
156 Yemen 
157 Angola 
157 Cambodia 
157 Tajikistan 
160 Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
160 Laos 
160 Libya 
163 Equatorial Guinea 
163 Zimbabwe 
165 Burundi 
165 Chad 
165 Haiti 
165 Venezuela 
169 Iraq 
170 Turkmenistan 
170 Uzbekistan 
172 Myanmar 
173 Sudan 
174 Afghanistan 
174 Korea (North) 
174 Somalia 
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